Lemonade - Insurance industry disruption

The people have spoken, Lemonade narrowly won Inderes forum’s second pitch competition. Therefore, Lemonade (NYSE: LMND) deserves its own thread. In honor of winning the pitch competition, LMND stock has been available yesterday and today at about a -10% discount compared to Friday’s price.

I won’t repeat the entire pitch here, but let’s summarize a few essential points about Lemonade.

The story of Lemonade’s founding, the size and potential of the insurance business, directly from the mouth of Daniel Schreiber, CEO and co-founder.

Lemonade’s goal is to become a global insurance industry player that disrupts the sector with data, technology, and automation. Lemonade, which generates approximately a billion in revenue or, in the correct term, In Force Premium (IFP) in 2024, announced at Investor Day 2024 a goal to 10x its IFP at a 30% CAGR. Historically, Lemonade has set public targets so moderately that the goals have always been met.

It’s what propels us to 10x our business and 10x it again

Investor Day materials:
Webcast / Presentation

LMND financial targets in brief: Cash flow positive now, EBITDA profitable by the end of 2026, and net profitable by the end of 2027.

About Lemonade’s risks
-The realization of some massive catastrophe, for which Lemonade would have offered too many policies relative to its size, could drive the company into bankruptcy.
-Could Palantir or some other player potentially make traditional operators overwhelmingly profitable?
-Performance in the coming years is crucial to avoid burning through cash.
-Personnel risk, a significant part of the LMND story is personified by co-founders Daniel Schreiber and Shai Wininger.

Lemonade’s short interest is around ~30%; this level of short interest, if the story continues positively, could also provide a catalyst for a rocket ride. Personally, I hope I can still add a bit to my LMND position at a moderate price. Defining what is moderate, however, is truly difficult.

One cannot create a thread about Lemonade without linking PaperBagInvestor, who produces quality LMND content on YouTube.

Finally, a couple of good interviews with Daniel, where he excellently reveals his own personality, motivation, and drive. Additionally, one learns a lot about the company from these.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BtptUuyPZXw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_le8vp4AV1o

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Sometimes I took a very superficial look at the company, and this made me wonder. How does this differ in any way from what other insurance companies do? They have access to a huge amount of data, based on which risks are priced. Processing is also largely automated in many cases.

Has the wheel now been reinvented, and is risk pricing better than before, or is the same thing being done with a worse margin?

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Does this mean that, unlike in the latest 10-Q, the next one will have positive cash flow?

Cash has indeed been increased in the last couple of quarters, but that has been done by selling bonds and taking on debt; the cash flow itself is negative.

Disclaimer: Every time I hear the word ‘disruption’, I take the safety off my weapon :kissing:

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Great that you opened this thread – I was also planning to open a thread about this company.

Thoughts on Lemonade that I liked:

  • Lemonade attracts young, good customers from large insurance companies and prices reckless customers more expensively. Young customers age and naturally take out new insurance policies from Lemonade because they have been its customers from the start.

  • Low insurance prices attract good customers to Lemonade. This reminded me of Costco’s strategy: not high margins, but growth in customer numbers. This should not be underestimated, as companies that maintain low margins and grow their customer base create significant growth through new customers. Low prices also act as marketing: people recommend the service to each other through word-of-mouth. This is a kind of “economy of scale” strategy, even though Lemonade is a small company. (Correct me if I’m wrong.)
    In the United States, the economy is tight, and people are looking for savings in their daily lives. I believe many will continue to find Lemonade.

  • Legacy insurance companies are clumsy and bureaucratic. For example, Geico’s 600 systems that don’t communicate with each other could be condensed into 13–16 systems. However, even this would be modest compared to Lemonade, which has had only one system from the start.
    Legacy companies’ systems may be based on old software, on top of which new layers have been added. Their builders may already be retired, making it difficult to obtain information about the structure of these systems. This significantly slows down the process of modifying systems to be more efficient.

  • Lemonade utilizes AI to keep costs low, and its operations scale beautifully. Data continuously accumulates as customer numbers grow, which also improves underwriting results over time. Lemonade constantly becomes more efficient and gains a further competitive advantage.

  • Lemonade has already overcome initial regulatory issues, which gives it a head start over technological competitors.

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This is exactly what I was thinking myself when I looked at that investor presentation on Lemonade’s website. I don’t fully understand why the company implies that billion-dollar giants wouldn’t be able to compete with their own technology investments – especially considering the huge advantage their vast customer data provides.

Undeniably, there are many points where one could start. But let’s start by asking the following: @Vichy, how do you see the company’s goal of growing at an annual rate of 30 percent from an investor’s perspective, when the company’s insurance business is not profitable? Now, we don’t even need to consider all the money that goes into customer acquisition and other growth investments, but simply just into claims and paying employee salaries. Why does an investor benefit from growth if nothing is left below the line?

Then another question: the company’s slides mentioned that the company would already be cash flow positive. Why doesn’t the cash flow statement reflect this? YTD 2024, the company’s operating cash flow is negative, and in addition, SBC inflates the figures by about 50 MUSD. Have I missed something essential?

Let’s return to valuation matters some other time. It’s obvious that Lemonade is not priced based on fundamentals, so it doesn’t make sense at this stage.

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I see many parallels here with bank disruptors or “neobanks.” On paper, the idea is good - large banks and insurers are undeniably sluggish behemoths, and their IT side is often fragmented → a place to strike?

On the other hand, insurance and banking could be described as a “balance sheet business.” Size, scale, and especially risk management matter. I am skeptical of bank challengers because ultimately they don’t have the same scale or cheap deposit funding, and they still have to operate in the same regulatory environment. Nor do I believe that the big players will be completely left behind in terms of development (AI utilization, etc.), and for a large operator, all fixed costs are ultimately distributed across a large mass → economies of scale are not easy to catch up with and require money. And it’s often forgotten that legacy operators already have a vast amount of customer data, hopefully neatly usable somewhere :smiley: This certainly applies to insurance as well.

In the financial sector, it’s also “easy” to grow fast; just underprice risks and customers will flock in. But at some point, it crashes, which is why I would see slightly more moderate growth, with profitability first, as good. On the other hand, the insurance business is fortunately not as sensitive to economic cycles as banking, but it is extremely competitive. (Except in Finland, where IF boasts an 80% combined ratio :sweat_smile:.)

But it’s an interesting company, and there is room for growth, at least if it succeeds. However, I think the industry is difficult.

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You should keep your hands off Lemonade…

Reasons:

  • In the insurance business, (long-term) historical data is everything – which Lemonade lacks. When you sell cheap, growth comes, but losses have to be paid for a long time.
  • Regulation in the insurance sector is very strict; what works in country X (or state Y) does not work elsewhere, which makes scaling very difficult.
  • At least previously, the company had quite favorable reinsurance agreements; if the insurance operations cannot be made profitable, this music will stop.
  • Ultimately, Lemonade is also an insurance company, whose fundamental value is determined largely by return on capital (not growth).
  • Slamming the digitalization of insurance companies is amusing in itself, because large insurance companies spend significantly larger sums on streamlining operations (e.g., IF).

In the insurance business in general, the most profitable companies are either the largest in the market (cost scale advantage) or those focusing on specific niche insurances (e.g., cyber).

Lemonade has no competitive advantage (i.e., no cost scale, no niche, no pricing advantage, no sales channel, no IT). Those working in the industry themselves smirk when they hear the company’s name.

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Great that the new thread is generating discussion! If you’re at all interested in the company, I think you’d get better and more lively answers to these questions directly from the webcast, but I’ll try to formulate them in my own words as well.

@Gadus Actually, I think @TurvaMarkka answers this question.

@Hapzu Yes, I quoted slide 27 of the same presentation; this will be clarified later. Adj. Free cash flow (kassavirta) has, as I understand it, been made positive specifically through the synthetic agents program. In this program, the financier also takes on risk if customers do not perform as expected. “Disruption” is indeed a strong word, but the winner of a pitching competition shouldn’t be too modest!

@Hades Integrating IT systems is a difficult task; for example, the European giant Lidl ended up wasting half a billion on a SAP project, after which it was terminated. Getting data into the right reports, let alone for sales use, can be surprisingly difficult.

The investor is rewarded when the whole thing turns profitable, whether that happens sooner or later. From Lemonade’s perspective, the loss ratios of different segments are already at an acceptable level, after which it’s more pleasant to scale the business. For example, as shown below, auto has been somewhat weak until now, so the product has been refined. That last Q3, according to LMND, includes approximately 10% one-off costs, which would make the auto loss ratio around 82%.

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@Con4n good points, I think LMND has aimed to grow moderately and by refining the product, rather than in an all-in manner. For example, when the stock market crashed, cash was, so to speak, taken care of.

@AP_1981 I tested IF’s car calculator; after entering my license plate and personal ID, I received a worse offer than I currently have. In addition, within the past year, I’ve received calls from IF and Lähitapiola; my car insurance is currently with Fennia. At least in Finland, customer acquisition seems to be based on human effort and manual processes. LMND claims they do this differently.

Furthermore, I have experience with my employer’s Pohjola insurance; with that insurance, I receive paper mail from the handler for every taxi receipt and doctor’s visit. Even there, the level of digitalization doesn’t get cheers from an IT guy when I can’t even prevent those physical letters; a PDF version would be perfectly sufficient for me.

If you work in the industry, what is your opinion on LMND’s telematics for car insurance? When will such options become available in Finland?

Undoubtedly, Tesla was scoffed at back in the day; now VW and MB are the ones in trouble. You certainly brought up very valid risks, and if they materialize, one might be left empty-handed.

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Can you find Lemonade’s combined ratios from some reporting (10-K?), either by product group or even generally? Loss ratio tells a big part of the truth, but in Lemonade’s case, profitability, balance sheet, and income statement are burdened by those megalomaniacal personnel, marketing, and technology costs, which are completely genuine costs (and approximately 2x the company’s net premiums for this year). Why doesn’t the company report all of them in the same key figure, as is generally done in the industry?

I can’t name a single other insurer offhand that doesn’t report the figure that best indicates whether or not it’s profitable to run an insurance business. And this isn’t the only peculiarity: Lemonade seems to like its way of reporting opex without “growth investments,” which makes the figures look significantly better than the corresponding ones on the income statement. The same phenomenon recurs with FCF: the company doesn’t report it using the traditional formula (i.e., OCF - capex), but adds borrowed money to the sum (precisely page 164). Is the company truly cash flow positive, or is it misleading the reader? Does this repeated cultivation of strange key figures raise concerns, alarm bells, or other gray hairs? I won’t even go into the numerous chart manipulations that Lemonade’s presentations contain, but they don’t inspire an ounce of confidence.

Then there’s the synthetic agents scheme you mentioned. An interesting model, there’s no denying that. I have three questions about it:

  1. Do I interpret correctly that if Lemonade is financed for growth worth 100 units of money in period XYZ, then Lemonade pays back approximately 16% of the premiums from new customers acquired in period XYZ for about 3 years, until the financing and the 16% annual return have been paid back – after which Lemonade pays nothing, regardless of whether the investment was profitable or not?
  2. Can you say where in a traditional combined ratio calculation Lemonade would record the compensation for financing growth that the agent receives? I can’t think why they would be losses, so do they just go into “general expenses”?

I ask because I want to properly grasp this math. Everyone who follows the insurance sector more broadly understands what a tough achievement it is to keep CR below 90 – it’s such a strong figure that the company can withstand weaker investment performance. If Lemonade, with its current model, has to give 16 percent of its new premiums to the financier to pay for its growth, then selling them becomes profitable at an 84 percent CR. And this is just for the company to break even. A break-even result is hardly the goal if the aim is to run a publicly traded company. Of course, it’s another matter how large a part of Lemonade’s insurance portfolio will fall under this financing in the long run (presumably about 40% with current retention, but this can certainly change) – in any case, it’s obvious that operational efficiency must improve incredibly much for Lemonade to have realistic chances of succeeding. This brings us to question number three:

  1. What kind of time bomb is it for Lemonade if the financier doesn’t get their investment back and announces that the financing agreement will not continue? The current cost level is already very high – what if Lemonade still has to bear all customer acquisition costs itself? This question can be approached in two ways: both operationally and through the investment story. It is not inherently a bad thing if an insurance company has to slow its growth (only profitable growth makes sense), but as an investor, one can suffer if the company has advertised tenfold growth and then has to explain what’s happening now.

(edit: one follow-up question. How would you react if Lemonade published a stock exchange release stating that this financing model had been changed to be perpetual under current terms?)

In addition to these, general questions arise, for example, about the balance sheet – Lemonade advertises itself as a capital-light insurer, but even AI-generation insurance requires capital and reserves on the balance sheet. But we’ll get to those later.

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Here are the numbers. Anyone who understands the insurance industry realizes that this company makes no sense at all.

Also note the reinsurance: "The Company maintains proportional reinsurance contracts which provide protection on covered risks. The Company agreed to the terms of a reinsurance program effective July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024 which included Whole Account Quota Share Reinsurance Contracts by and among the Company, Lemonade Insurance Company (“LIC”), Metromile Insurance Company (“MIC”) and Lemonade Insurance N.V. (“LINV”), and each of Hannover Ruck SE, MAPFRE Re, and Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation (collectively referred to as “Reinsurers”) (“Reinsurance Program”). Under the Reinsurance Program, which covers all products and geographies, the Company transfers, or “cedes,” a share of premium to the Reinsurers. In exchange, these Reinsurers pay the Company a ceding commission on all premiums ceded to the Reinsurers, in addition to funding the corresponding claims, subject to certain limitations, including but not limited to, the exclusion of hurricane losses, and a limit of $5,000,000 per occurrence for non-hurricane catastrophe losses. The overall share of proportional reinsurance under the Reinsurance Program is approximately 55% of premium.The Per Risk Cap across the contracts is $750,000. Additionally, the contracts are subject to loss ratio caps and variable ceding commission levels, which align the Company’s interests with those of its Reinsurers, and is settled primarily on a funds-withheld basis. The Reinsurance Program was renewed effective July 1, 2024 and will expire on June 30, 2025, with similar terms to the contracts that expired on June 30, 2024, except for the limit per occurrence for non-hurricane catastrophe losses which increased to $10,000,000.

So, a 55% QS (Quota Share) exists – which was renewed until 2025. If that is pulled, the company will collapse immediately. Regarding the question of telemetry: large insurance companies had telemetry tariffs, but due to low demand, these have been withdrawn from the market: ultimately, telemetry prices were often close to fixed contracts, and few consumers want their driving monitored (e.g., speeding monitoring in an accident situation – meaning there is no demand).

Metromile, which Lemonade acquired, was practically a bankrupt company, so it’s unlikely anything good will come from combining them.

It’s also worth considering that if Lemonade truly had something brilliant, some major insurance industry player would have acquired the company.

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Good points from @AP_1981 and @Hades. I’ll have to get back to the more detailed points later. I’m sure you both have a better understanding of the insurance industry than I do. But these are good pointers for researching this investment case. As a tech-believer, I sometimes have a childlike faith in tech and its possibilities!

On a general level, I also don’t assume that LMND is in any way fully developed. It’s quite clear that growth must continue and operations must improve for the business to be profitable in the future.

Regarding the last point about acquisitions, of course, large insurance companies cannot buy every startup that claims to revolutionize the market. But regarding LMND, it’s a good question whether the business is for sale, at least for a small sum? Insiders own a good 8%, and at least in the IPO, Softbank took almost a 30% slice, and currently appears to own a 17% slice. In the first posts, Daniel talks about his motivation; apparently, he has enough money, and yachts and jets don’t interest him.

Daniel has also mentioned in other interviews that the insurance industry has a bad reputation. A regrettable and tragic example of this was seen today when the CEO of United Healthcare was shot, HS article on the topic. On Reddit, there are many posts on the topic that do not speak highly of the insurance industry or the company in question.

Telemetry in cars: Lemonade specifically wants those calm, young individuals who pay exorbitant amounts to traditional insurance companies. Not middle-aged speed demons. Similarly, in health insurance, I could see Lemonade in the future screening blood values with Nightingale’s technology before pricing health insurance; this would be a tasty scenario for the future, seen through Finnish glasses. Health is free to use the idea and warm up to collaboration; I’ll take the commissions. An individual with healthy lifestyle habits could get their insurance at a completely different price than someone living unhealthily. To my knowledge, currently, at least in Finland, the price is the same, regardless of what triglycerides and liver values show, as long as one is “healthy.”

I also believe that with Daniel’s and LMND’s ethics, this business can be made fair for the good customers LMND wants to insure. LMND already performs this customer screening using data; for example, information about what search terms you used to find their pages is used in defining the risk profile.

The situation with Metromile (Car) can be seen, for example, from the previously provided image, which is, by the way, from the Q3 letter. The situation has improved significantly over the past 5 quarters. To my knowledge, Metromile was acquired for approximately the amount corresponding to the company’s net assets. Time, and especially the year 2025, will show how car insurance develops.

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As someone working in the insurance industry - I agree. I wouldn’t invest a single euro in this company.

I don’t believe this business will ever be very profitable. Of course, this doesn’t mean one couldn’t make money with the stock in this speculative environment. There could be a lot of profit potential, all the buzzwords are mentioned in the investor presentation.

The insurance industry as a business in Finland is quite different from elsewhere in the world, so one cannot draw very direct conclusions when comparing Finnish insurance companies and Lemonade.

P.S. If you want to change something - never ask the experts :wink:

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As someone working in the IT sector, I’m a bit wary of the loose use of the term AI, which has now continued for a couple of years.

To LMND’s credit, it can be said that they were already promoting that in investor presentations over 2 years before the release of ChatGPT, source. And allegedly, this would have been the company’s strategy since its founding:
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I don’t quite grasp this logic. From an insurance company’s perspective, there isn’t really a concept of a good or bad customer. Instead, there are well-priced and poorly priced risks. Sometimes, of course, taking a certain risk might not be worth it at any realistic price point, but to my ears, it sounds very problematic to “target” certain types of customers based on a low claims risk – aren’t they already the more price-conscious crowd? And secondly, what does Lemonade know about low risks when its combined ratio (which the company doesn’t disclose) is closer to two hundred than one hundred?!

Lemonade has certainly chosen its path and narrative – technology – and doesn’t intend to deviate from it, but the insurance business doesn’t operate on stories. Insurance is not an interesting sector where innovation changes the playing field and dynamics just anyhow. It’s about correctly pricing risks, and if you can’t do that right, you lose the game. A balance sheet can withstand heavy systems and poor, slow customer service, but it cannot withstand unprofitable business.

I also somewhat understand @TurvaMarkka’s point that Lemonade would follow a Costco-like “grow, achieve economies of scale, share them with customers, grow more, repeat” strategy. There’s just one small problem: Lemonade has no economies of scale to share. Attracting customers with good customer service and pricing that is too low from the company’s perspective is certainly effective for top-line growth, but this is completely the wrong industry for that strategy.

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Synthetic agents press release and Daniel’s blog. Additionally, a press release about the program’s extension until 12/2025.

  1. The 16% IRR is undoubtedly a bit unclear, as for example Paperipussi says this is 16% in total, not annual.

This is also supported by the wording found in Daniel’s blog:

After approximately 2–3 years, the stream of synthetic ‘commissions’ from any one cohort will tally to the Synthetic Agents’ Spend on that cohort plus a fixed return (16% IRR). Once that capped return is reached, ‘commissions’ from that cohort terminate, and 100% of their premiums, thereon out, accrue exclusively to the benefit of Lemonade.

  1. Rebellionaire’s Synthetic agents video clarifies that the entire CAC is booked to the P&L of the quarter in which the money is spent.

  2. It would undoubtedly be a very bearish signal if General Catalyst decided to withdraw from this arrangement. So far, since the launch of this program, it has been extended once, so I believe they see a benefit both as a direct investor in Lemonade with approximately a 1% stake and as a growth financier through the SA program. Rebellionaire’s video also mentions that GC sees the data generated by the program in real-time.

One more essential point is that it is cohort-specific, meaning if a batch of bad customers happens to be included, GC might never profit from that particular cohort. Presumably, they have been satisfied with the program for at least 2023, as it has been extended well in advance to cover 2025 as well.

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It might be that the terms I used are a bit rough, but I think here’s a link to a point where Daniel talks about Home policy cancellation in 3½ minutes, for example, if it turns out that a building is a ticking time bomb, it might not necessarily be desired to insure it. A similar thought undoubtedly comes to mind with car insurance, if an individual has a very aggressive and risk-taking driving style.

Is it possible to start an insurance business from scratch and be profitable immediately? Especially if the goal is to grow big.

Thanks, I got a couple of clarifications from that. IRR should indeed refer to an annual interest rate, and the fact that the number is fixed doesn’t mean it couldn’t also be an annual interest rate.

GC shouldn’t care how much or how little profit Lemonade makes, as it receives its commission from premiums anyway as the company grows. The worst thing for them would be if Lemonade’s growth investments proved ineffective, because then the premiums from new customers might not cover their investment. If, on the other hand, Lemonade had to make a profit for GC to get its commission, then this model would never have been adopted.

I’m not sure if Rebellionaire’s video fully understood the situation, as they did not deduct GC’s 16 percent share from Lemonade’s premiums, which I believe it should be deducted from. Instead, they recorded 80 percent of “net income” for GC until repayment (and they also failed to point out that it wasn’t net income, but income before remaining operating expenses). In my eyes, that doesn’t at all match what Lemonade has reported about synthetic agents.

If that previously mentioned 16% return is indeed an annual interest rate, and it’s not just about reporting numbers in a peculiar way again, then this is almost a perfect model for GC, which has an entry ticket worth approximately 30 MUSD invested in Lemonade shares. If they can finance Lemonade’s growth ambitions and get a 16% IRR on their investment as long as Lemonade’s balance sheet can sustain its own underwriting capacity, then they will not stop this model. My original assessment seems to have been totally off, as I didn’t immediately grasp that GC doesn’t seem to care whether Lemonade’s other shareholders benefit from growth or not. GC wins, no matter what.

I know an insurance company similar to Lemonade (about twice its size) whose pricing is also based on the use of AI and algorithms, and which made a profit in its second year of operation with a CR below 100.

Okay, admittedly: the company didn’t start completely from scratch; it was born as an internal innovation within a traditional legacy insurance company. Its algorithms were based on the parent company’s vast customer data spanning two decades, meaning it had a huge advantage compared to Lemonade. But who said the insurance industry would be an easy market to disrupt?

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LMND also published that model as part of their investor day presentation, link to the section where it’s discussed, and a tweet about the model.

https://investor.lemonade.com/IRRModel

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I wonder if insurance companies in the United States have the same system as here in Finland?

My memory might be fuzzy, but I once understood that in Finland, insurance companies all use the same historical data???
For example, accident history is available to a new insurance company just like to the old one.

-Tauno

These comments are certainly pleasant to read. The Lemonade bears on the forum clearly know the insurance industry well.

First, I state: If one could read the potential of the best future companies from 10K reports or income statements, as these experts do, there would not be a single accountant practicing their profession in the world. They would all be investors, even multi-millionaires.

Yes, the Combined Ratio is in the gutter. Yes, the company is making a lot of losses. Yes, the company’s expenses are far too high compared to current revenues. Yes, the company’s book value has been constantly decreasing – of course, because they are making losses.

But what happens when we fast forward a few years in this story? What happens when expenses barely grow at all? What happens when auto insurance gains momentum and the company finally starts receiving so-called big money alongside Renters and Pet insurance? What happens when the book value starts to grow? Slowly at first, then quickly? What happens when customer acquisition costs are paid back to GC in 2-3 years and GC exits the equation?

One commenter, apparently an insurance industry employee, stated here that “Lemonade is chuckled at in our workplace when the company comes up.”

Do you chuckle in the same way that Amazon was chuckled at in 1997?

Or how Microsoft’s Ballmer chuckled at the iPhone in 2007?

Or perhaps like Blockbuster chuckled at Netflix in 2000?

Or how hotel bosses laughed at Airbnb in 2017?

GM’s boss laughed at Tesla.

There are many other examples.

Next, you will surely state that “the insurance industry does not work like your examples, e.g., due to capital restrictions.” Until it does, because the company invents creative arrangements for this, such as Synthetic Agents.

What unites all these examples of mine? None of these products or services were created by industry veterans. They all faced belittlement and truly bloated and overwhelming balance sheets. They were all told that “competitors can easily kill the disruptor’s business with their balance sheets, and if there was anything special about them, they would have already been bought out.”

Why didn’t Blockbuster buy Netflix? Why didn’t Yahoo buy Facebook for “peanuts” when the opportunity was offered? How could Kodak, with its massive balance sheet, drive so thoroughly into a wall?

The reason is obvious: The leadership of these companies consists of individuals who do not share the same vision and understanding of where the world is going as the founders of the disruptors. Old dinosaurs are forced every quarter to maximize dividend yields for their owners. Owners who are not interested in innovation, but in everything remaining the same. These leaders receive tens of millions in annual income for not taking risks, because risks quickly reduce EPS. The difference is obvious when one looks at, for example, what Mark Zuckerberg did at the helm of Meta. He invested massively in the future in 2022. The industry’s best analysts declared the company’s story to be nearing its end. And what’s more.

In the US, a large portion of insurance is still sold by insurance brokers, and companies’ business models are built around using brokers. What do you think, do these brokers have the enthusiasm to innovate their industry towards automation and AI? When a company is developed to meet the needs of the modern world, it won’t succeed unless the company’s personnel offer a DNA match for development. Innovation is shunned and its progress is hindered.

And what do you think, do Gen Z and young millennials want to interact with insurance brokers by phone or email? They don’t even want to call their friends or family members? If these giants cannot offer a seamless digital experience, they are doomed as insurance providers, not quickly due to their massive balance sheets, but gradually.

“But they can drive Lemonade out of the game by lowering prices and even making losses,” some have sometimes said. Firstly, selling insurance intentionally at a loss is, to my understanding, illegal at least in the US? Secondly, and even more importantly, it is crucial to understand that the younger generation will not switch to their father’s or grandfather’s insurance company, even if it offers a cheaper product, if the brand does not appeal or the user experience is clunky and old-fashioned.

Ajit Jain of Berkshire Hathaway, responsible for Geico’s business, stated at BH’s 2023 annual meeting that Geico has 600 different systems that do not communicate with each other.

And he continued: "We’re trying to compress them to no more than 15, 16 systems that all talk to each other. That’s a monumental challenge, and because of that, even though we have made improvements in telematics, we still have a long way to go because of technology.”

“Because of that, and because of the whole issue more broadly in terms of matching rate to risk, GEICO is still a work in progress.”

Such problems are not solved with “AI.” The advantage for a player like Lemonade, which has built its entire existence on AI and automation, is obvious. And what’s more, on ITS OWN system. They are not dependent on a third party. I believe that large insurance giants buy these services externally.

It is also good to note that from 2022-2024, we experienced the wildest inflation of our generation. This has not made Lemonade’s journey easier, and they bit off too big a chunk in the aforementioned operating environment in the field of home insurance.
Large insurance giants have made losses on their insurance business in recent years. This is certainly due to the inflation situation. Profits have been made through investment activities. For Geico, this happened in 2022. For State Farm, at least in 2022-2023.

Whether Lemonade succeeds remains to be seen, but from an investment perspective, I recommend gentlemen/ladies to look at much more than just the income statement and book value in companies. Otherwise, you might miss out on the best investment stories.

Of course, if the investment strategy is safer and based, for example, on stable dividend payers, then that’s another matter.

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