Odotukset ovat korkealla, mutta pelkokin on perseessä kurssin lasketellessa maailmantalouden myllerryksessä. Diamydin rahoitustilanne on hyvä, mutta jos luenta ei saa kurssia rakettiin, tullaan rahaa tarvitsemaan uudella kierroksella. Lopulliset tulokset tulee vasta 2027 kesällä, mutta kassan venyttäminen sinne asti olisi aika riskaabelia.
Odotukseni DIAGNODE-3:n suhteen ovat todella korkealla, mutta pakko myöntää, että tuo rahoituskuvio hirvittää vähän. Diamyd tekee loistavaa tiedettä, mutta yhtiön rahoitusstrategia on ollut paikoin tosi kulmikasta, kuten vuoden 2025 annissa nähtiin. Silloin eniten yhtiöön uskovat sijoittajat käytännössä puhallettiin tyhjäksi, koska warrantin merkintähinta oli epärealistisen korkeaksi jo kauan ennen merkintää. Nyt ollaan siinä tilanteessa että To5-warranteilla on taas kiinteä vuosi sitten määrätty OTM-hinta ja yhtiön tulevaisuus on laajalti kuitenkin näiden merkintälappujen tuoman rahoituksen varassa.
Karrikoidusti voisi toki sanoa että warrantit ostajat ovat ostaneet arvan siitä onko interim-tulokset hyviä vai ei. Sikäli peli on “reilu” että tulokset reflektoivat sitä. Näen kuitenkin tämän binäärisen tapahtuman melko isona riskinä yhtiön tulevalle rahoitukselle ja siten olemassaoleville osakkeenomistajille riippumatta onko merkintäoikeuksia kupeessa vai ei. To5 312 miljoonan kruunun potti olisi toteutuessaan Diamydin historian ylivoimaisesti suurin osakeanti / oman pääoman ehtoinen rahoituskierros. Interim readoutin epäonnistuminen olisi tuhoisa kurssille, ja se tuhoaisi tämän annin. jättäen pitkät jäljet tulevaisuuteen. Sitten jouduttaisiin järjestelemään uutta antia epävarmassa tilanteessa halvemmalla hinnalla. Kun takana on jo yksi turpaananto-warranttianti, niin sijoittajien usko Diamydiin heikentyisi todella paljon. Kun lukee ruotsifoorumeita, sijoittajaluottamus näyttää todella kärsineen jo todella paljon aiemmista anneista. Osakekin näyttää olevan yllättävän alhaalla vaikka väliluenta häämöttää.
Käytännössähän warrantteja on juuri niillä uusilla ja jatkavilla sijoittajilla, joiden tuki olisi kaikista tärkeintä jatkossakin. Ne on jaettu aiemmille merkkaajille, ja ne ovat jälkimarkkinoilla liikkuneet ja optimoituneet markkinavoimin niille jotka haluavat varata pääomaa yhtiön tulevaan kasvuun. Kokonaan uudet jaetut warret nollaisi tämän allokaatioprosessin (toiseen kertaan!) ja päälle vielä tuhoaisi näiden halukkaimpien sijoittajien omistaja-arvoa. Viime anti onnistui koska alennus oli valtava. siinä palkittiin warreilla ja se turvasi horisontin Faasi 3 väliluentaan. Jos väliluenta epäonnistuu, niin tilanne synkkenee hyvin paljon ja tarvitaan sijoittajien luottamusta erityisen paljon. Pitkään tätä olen pohtinut ja tullut siihen tulokseen että warranttien pelastaminen olisi tälläisessä tilanteessa itse asiassa kaikkien osakkeenomistajien ja yhtiön kassan pelastamista.
Siispä kokosin seuraavanlaisen kirjeen yhtiön hallitukselle ja johdolle:
Appeal to the Board of Directors and Management of Diamyd Medical AB: Financing Strategy and Protecting the Value of Warrants
Dear Board of Directors and Management of Diamyd Medical,
We are writing to you as an independent group of long-term and deeply committed investors in the company. You may have noticed the share of Finnish investors in Diamyd increasing during the past few years. We are proud to be part of that growing demographic. We have supported Diamyd’s journey and are now awaiting, alongside you, the historic interim analysis of the DIAGNODE-3 trial in March 2026. I have personally been following Diamyd for the past decade, and I cannot express how excited I am.
However, as this pivotal moment approaches, we are deeply concerned about the recent share price development and its impact on the outstanding warrants (TO), whose subscription period is fast approaching. These warrants are currently significantly “out-of-the-money” (OTM). This raises a justified concern among investors that the company might repeat a heavily dilutive financing round, similar to the one in early 2025, which rendered the warrants at that time worthless and severely punished the company’s risk-bearers.
Our primary appeal is clear: We request that you do not make any hasty and dilutive financing decisions prior to the publication of the clinical results in March. Let the science and data speak first, allowing positive results to naturally lift the share price above the warrants’ strike price, thereby securing the planned capital inflow for the company.
However, if the share price, even after the March results, does not allow for the subscription of the current warrants and the company must, for compelling reasons, strengthen its cash position, we strongly oppose a traditional, heavily discounted rights issue (företrädesemission). Instead, we strongly suggest that the Board prepares a structural solution permitted by the Swedish Companies Act (Aktiebolagslagen, ABL) that secures the company’s financing while protecting the current risk-bearers: **A directed issue combined with an exchange offer to current warrant holders (Riktad emission i form av ett utbyteserbjudande).
**
We propose the following legal procedure:
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The Board convenes an extraordinary general meeting (Extra bolagsstämma).
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A new warrant program is proposed to the general meeting, executed by deviating from the shareholders’ preferential rights (frångående av aktieägarnas företrädesrätt).
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This new issue is directed exclusively to the holders of the current, expiring warrants as an exchange offer (utbyteserbjudande), where the old warrants can be exchanged for new warrants with a strike price and/or subscription period adjusted to the prevailing market situation.
We recognize that deviating from the shareholders’ preferential rights requires a qualified majority (2/3) at the general meeting. However, we are convinced that this is the most optimal solution also in the interest of the long-term shareholders and the company (bolagets intresse), and it can be justified to the general meeting as follows:
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No increased quantitative dilution (Ingen ökad kvantitativ utspädning): Since the new warrants are offered strictly in exchange for the surrender of the existing ones (on a 1:1 basis), and any untendered old warrants will simply expire worthless, the potential maximum number of shares does not increase beyond what the general meeting has already agreed to in its original decision.
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Securing capital inflow efficiently: Barring an exceptional and immediate market reaction to the upcoming interim results, the current heavily OTM warrants will fail to generate the necessary capital. Through a creatively structured, market-priced exchange offer—where the new strike price reflects the actual post-readout market reality—the company successfully secures future capital inflow. Crucially, this method bypasses the massive costs associated with a completely new traditional rights issue (företrädesemission), such as exorbitant underwriting fees (garantiersättningar), heavy advisory costs, and the severe downward market pressure that standard discount issues typically cause.
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Equality and fairness: Since the original warrants were initially distributed to shareholders as part of a previous issue, the current warrant holders are exactly the parties who have tangibly supported the company during its most critical phases. Protecting their investment is fair and maintains vital trust in the company’s financing policy.
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Robustness against predatory short-selling (Robusthet mot blankarattacker): The traditional binary nature of expiring warrants creates a perverse incentive for aggressive short-selling. Short sellers often target companies nearing a crucial warrant expiration, artificially driving the share price down below the strike price to ensure the warrants expire worthless. Their goal is to starve the company of capital and force a distressed, heavily discounted rights issue from which they can profit. By proactively implementing an exchange offer as a backstop, the Board effectively removes this binary cliff. This ensures that the company secures its vital funding regardless of temporary, manipulated price dips, thereby neutralizing the short sellers’ primary strategy and protecting the stock from artificial downward pressure.
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Preserving long-term investor trust and future valuation (Bevarande av långsiktigt förtroende): Diamyd’s journey has placed a heavy financial burden on its shareholders. The most recent rights issue was a success precisely because it offered participants the opportunity to finally reach the Phase 3 readout without facing further dilution beforehand. However, this was preceded by a bitter loss where the most steadfast believers in Diamyd saw their previous warrants rendered worthless. If history were to repeat itself—especially in a scenario where the Phase 3 interim analysis does not yet reach statistical significance and the trial continues—it would permanently damage investor confidence. This would severely impair Diamyd’s ability to raise capital at an attractive valuation in the future. We strongly believe that Diamyd has the potential to successfully reach the market and expand to stages 1 and 2 even without a commercial marketing partner, but executing such an independent strategy will absolutely require the unwavering trust and financial backing of your existing investor base.
A Strategic Playbook for Timing and Communication We fully understand the communicative dilemma the Board faces regarding such a contingency plan. Announcing a structural backstop prior to the data readout could easily be misinterpreted by the market as a lack of confidence in the upcoming clinical results. Conversely, waiting for the warrants to expire worthless and only then initiating a new, heavily discounted rights issue will inevitably be perceived by the market as a reactive, panic-driven bailout, destroying both momentum and shareholder value, and greatly reducing Diamyd’s ability to raise further capital in the future.
Therefore, we propose a proactive, carefully timed approach: We urge the Board and your legal advisors to prepare the framework for this exchange offer (utbyteserbjudande) and the notice for the extraordinary general meeting in advance, keeping it ready “in the drawer”.
In the scenario where the interim data supports the continuation of the trial (e.g., “continue as planned” with strong safety and efficacy trends) but the share price does not immediately react by climbing above the current warrant strike price, the Board should announce this exchange offer simultaneously with or immediately following the data release.
By communicating the data and the financial solution together, the move is powerfully framed as confident, proactive capital management ensuring the runway to the full 15-month primary readout for the entire cohort and improving investor confidence to support further capital raises in the future.
An Additional Request Regarding Corporate Communications As a final, additional request, I highly recommend that you prioritize English in all future investor presentations and corporate communications. As a Finnish investor who has followed Diamyd’s journey closely for around a decade, it has often been a struggle to stay fully informed, given that a significant portion of the presentations is still conducted in Swedish. Transitioning to English would dramatically broaden your reach and visibility within the global investor community. Considering that your pivotal clinical trials span both the US and Europe, and your primary regulatory focus is on the FDA, communicating exclusively in the universal language of the biotech industry is vital. It will naturally attract a wider pool of international institutional and retail investors, aligning your corporate communications with your global scientific and commercial ambitions.
We have full confidence in Diamyd’s science and your ability to lead the company through this critical phase. We hope that the Board will demonstrate exceptional leadership and choose a financing strategy that respects the company’s long-term supporters.
Sincerely, Finnish investors
Ehdotan kirjeessä menettelyä jota käytettäisiin sellaisessa tilanteessa että Interim Readout epäonnistuu ja To5-warrantit yhtiökokouksen päätöksellä poiketaan tyypillisestä osakkeenomistajien yhdenvertaisuuspykälästä, ja toteutetaan merkintäoikeuksien vaihto uusiin 1:1-suhteessa. Oman hataran käsitykseni mukaan tämä olisi ruotsin yhtiölain kanssa linjassa, mutta vaatisi 2/3 enemmistön yhtiökokoukseen.
Mitä mielipiteitä herää? Kuulostaako ihan hölmöltä, olisiko järkevämpää tehdä kokonaan uusi anti alusta, jos väliluenta epäonnistuu?