HelloFresh SE - global food industry disruptor

I’ve only been familiar with HF for about a day, so the analysis is by no means as in-depth as it is for other retail companies I follow for work.
But I really like how differently and data-drivenly they have thought about this business model, and I’ve written a bit of my own stream of consciousness here.

When considering Kesko, I don’t believe they are interested in competing with HelloFresh due to the structural differences in their business models. Essentially, synergy would only come from purchasing volumes, but after that, everything in the business is done differently before the food reaches the consumer’s plate.

I’ve been thinking about the fundamental differences in my head:

  1. Kesko’s job is to procure products from the food industry to its own distribution centers, market and price them, and also brand its own private-label products (approx. 20% of sales), then distribute them to a nationwide store network. Kesko takes a sales margin and some other chain fees from this when it sells goods to the retailer, so that it can finance the aforementioned operations, and the remaining operating profit percentage currently hovers around 7%.

After this, Kesko’s retailer operates at the customer interface and again takes a sales margin when it sells the product to the customer, as it, in turn, has to finance store rents, staff, etc., and an operating profit percentage should also remain for the operation to make sense.

Consumers, in turn, are wanted to come to the store because it is more cost-effective within the current distribution framework. Online grocery sales are also growing for Kesko (approx. 3% of sales), but in this case too, online orders are fulfilled from the store. Currently, products are manually picked from shelves, and investments are underway in the first back-of-store picking automation (MFC) in Ruoholahti.

Consumers, on the other hand, must know what they want to buy when they go to the store. Kesko and the retailer, in turn, try to predict what consumers in the area want to buy from the store by optimizing store sales data and category management, which is why the SKU count is wide to offer a bit of everything for everyone. The SKU count in Citymarkets is, if I remember correctly, around 30,000.

  1. HelloFresh, on the other hand, does all this in what I consider an admirable lean manner, and it’s quite realistic that this leaves around a 10% operating profit margin.

Products come directly from producers through HelloFresh’s own automated distribution centers, from where they are delivered directly to the home. Volume is critical in transport, and HF has already managed to rise to an impressive level of over 5 billion globally, which is promising.

Large volumes can be achieved quickly in procurement when the SKU count is only a few hundred per week.

Consumers are offered some 50 meal kits, and they are asked about a week in advance what they want to buy from these for the following week. This means that demand is already known at this stage when procurement volumes are adjusted, there is no waste, and the raw materials are fresh (this is like something out of a Lean Management textbook).

There’s also no need to brand own products when the consumer isn’t choosing products from the shelf. Marketing can focus solely on the main brands and optimizing customer acquisition. (100% of sales are so-called Private Label).

The competitive advantage of Kesko and other grocery stores is still that consumers generally want all daily necessities at once, in addition to meal kits (milk, detergent, coffee). But that doesn’t mean that HF couldn’t come to the consumer’s home every now and then.

As a consumer myself, I have used Sanna’s Ruokakassi in Finland and I like the ease of the concept, as I don’t have to think about recipes or search for products in the store. The only weakness of Sanna’s concept is that they don’t have enough volume to bring consumer prices close to grocery stores.

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I came across this on Reddit, and even though it’s r/antiwork, there are still some concerning comments.

https://www.reddit.com/r/antiwork/comments/shnadr/hello_fresh_is_anti_union_boycott_them/

For example:

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HelloFresh apparently had to quickly backtrack on these words from December. This morning, at least in the German market, customers received a notification of a 4% price increase due to rising raw material and transportation costs. This is likely still a more moderate increase than what has been seen in the prices of traditional grocery stores, but they apparently could no longer absorb the entire cost increase without raising prices. Pricing power is now being weighed in this sector as well.

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@MolskisPabrai Do you have a link? I haven’t received/seen that announcement, and at least next week’s order still went through at the same prices.

I got an email notification, but I can’t find any mention of it on the website yet. The increase was probably 19 cents per serving, so it’s not significant for me, at least. But it means that increases haven’t been implemented throughout Germany yet if you haven’t received one, good to know!

I corrected above that the increase is actually 4%; I looked at it a bit wrong earlier in a hurry.

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HelloFresh’s valuation has now dropped back to the point where I sold it in 2020 because I thought the lockdowns had hyped the stock too high.

Timing is really difficult.

HelloFresh’s Q4 and full-year 2021 results will be published tomorrow morning. I’ve gathered the consensus of 16 analysts’ forecasts from HelloFresh’s IR pages into my own Excel sheet. The table shows the analysts’ medians, and I’ll update it with the actual figures in the morning if I have time and if there’s enough interest here. I don’t know how old some of the forecasts are, so this might not give a completely up-to-date picture.

More than the actual results, the following issues are probably of interest:

  1. Is there a need to change the 2022 guidance? Due to inflation, the earnings guidance might have to be lowered.
  2. Has the pricing policy changed? As stated, in December it was said that prices would not increase, but the price of my own order already increased by 4 percent a couple of weeks ago. Many friends living in Germany have not yet received this notification, so it may be that I was part of some test cohort.
  3. Is there any news to announce about new geographical expansions? 2-3 new openings are expected for this year as well. Perhaps Finland next?
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Please, by all means, update us and share any other thoughts that may arise.

Do you have any idea when the results will be published? I couldn’t find the information myself. The .ics file to be added to the calendar says 12-17. :slightly_smiling_face:

TIKR.COM gives a full-year estimate of EUR 5,877 million and an EBITDA of EUR 521 million. I don’t know how up-to-date these figures are.

It will indeed be interesting to see the Q4 profitability. Historically, Q4 has seemed to be the most profitable quarter of the year. Now, the Omicron wave hit this quarter. As was mentioned here earlier, the company experienced supply chain issues at the end of the year. Whether this was due to strong demand or employee sick leaves, or something else, will become clear tomorrow.

The IR communication states the following about the conference call, so the results will probably be released first thing in the morning:
HelloFresh SE Q4 and FY 2021 Earnings Call: March 1st, 2022 at 08:45 AM CET

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The report can be downloaded here.

No big surprises regarding the numbers:

Also, no changes were made to the 2022 guidance; revenue growth of 20-26% and AEBITDA between 500-580 MEUR are still expected. The report still states that expansion into two new countries will occur during 2022, but they are not yet named. So, no drama. I still need to read the entire report and listen to the call for any other interesting insights.

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Indeed, not much new came out. The results met expectations and the guidance was not changed. At least for now, there are no signs of a post-pandemic return to old habits, unlike many other e-commerce companies. However, a few observations from the report and the call:

  • Prices have indeed been raised in a couple of geographical areas, but not at the company level. They said it looks like they are able to pass on costs to customers effectively if they want to, but the current focus is on making their product relatively more affordable, e.g., compared to grocery stores.
  • There was a shortage of labor during the Omicron wave at the end of the year, but despite that, the boxes were delivered. Now, the labor situation has returned to normal.
  • Previously announced growth investments are largely timed for H1 2022, so margins were warned to temporarily decrease significantly. In Q3, earnings are expected to return to the current level. Investments are going into increasing automation in distribution centers and expanding the tech team to better utilize data in the future.
  • The contribution margin has dropped from 30% to 25% in a couple of years, but according to them, this is due to the current underutilization of the capacity of new distribution centers. Once the full capacity is utilized, for example, at the new distribution center in Arizona and in new countries, it is expected to return to around 30% at the company level.
  • There was no mention of a new share buyback program yet, but I suspect one will be initiated in the coming days. The company’s shares were bought back at a 20% higher price before, so why not now, as there are still funds unused in that program.

All in all, it seems that things are rolling forward as planned. However, the stock took another 7% hit today, but I can’t find any clear reason for this reaction in the report. Maybe someone else will!

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I tried to roughly estimate what assumptions could justify the current stock price. I’ll also explain my way of modeling HelloFresh’s next 10 years. However, it would be great to hear if there are any fundamental errors in my thinking. This is one of the first times I’ve tried to model future cash flows myself. It’s a long text, let’s see if anyone bothers to read it.

I’ll start by defining TAM (Total Addressable Market). The company itself defines TAM as the highest-earning 40% of households that HelloFresh’s current offering geographically reaches. I accept this definition. Currently, the size of the TAM is 176 million households. If we assume that HelloFresh expands to two new markets each year for the next 5 years, according to its strategy, we can assume these markets to be Spain, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, Greece, the Baltic countries, and parts of Eastern Europe. These expansions could increase the TAM by an average of 5 million households per year for five years, after which I assume the TAM will grow by 1% per year as living standards rise.

HelloFresh had 7.11 million active customers at the end of December, which means a 4.1% penetration of the current total TAM. I understand that penetration in mature markets is currently around 5%, while in new markets it is still close to zero. I assume that penetration will remain at the same level for two years, after which it will slowly rise to 4.7% over the next ten years as new large markets mature. This would mean 9.93 million customers in 2031.

Revenue in 2021 was EUR 5993 million, or simplified, EUR 830 per customer per year. HelloFresh aims to increase this figure with new products and services, and it has been steadily rising. I assume that revenue per customer will increase by 6% per year during the five-year growth phase and then by 3% per year. When this is multiplied by the number of customers, we get the revenue for the coming years.

The operating result last year was 6.54% of revenue. I assume it will decrease to 4% this year due to growth investments (some of which go to marketing and personnel costs) and then gradually rise to a 10% level as the contribution margin normalizes. This allows us to calculate the operating result for the coming years. I assume a tax rate of 30% for Germany, which helps calculate NOPAT.

A large portion of this sum is reinvested into the business during the current year, as explained above. From next year onwards, the company’s CFO has stated that approximately 2% of revenue will be reinvested annually into the business. I accept this assumption. When this is deducted from NOPAT, we get an estimate of the annual free cash flow.

When these cash flows are discounted with a 10% expected return, a terminal growth of 1.5% is applied, and cash and debts are taken into account, the fair price for the stock is €46.26, which is slightly above yesterday’s closing price. I took into account the 2.2 million shares bought back earlier this year in the calculations.

However, these assumptions are very conservative for several reasons:

  • The TAM growth assumes expansion only to small European countries, and not, for example, to Korea or Latin America. Last year’s expansion to Japan would suggest a desire for even more challenging markets.
  • At the penetration level, the assumption is that mature markets can no longer improve, and 5% of TAM is the absolute ceiling that HelloFresh can achieve.
  • With these assumptions, the revenue growth for the current year would be 6.5%, while the company guides for 20-26% revenue growth. We are therefore assuming that the company’s guidance for the current year is completely incorrect.
  • The revenue calculated with these assumptions only exceeds the 10 billion mark in 2028, while the company’s own target is to exceed it a couple of years earlier. At the December CMD, it was hinted that the company expects this target to be easily exceeded. Revenue growth in this model is also well over 20% below analysts’ consensus forecasts.
  • The assumptions do not show the company’s operating result growing above 10%, while the company itself has estimated it can achieve a 15% EBITDA margin. For example, in 2020, the operating result was 11.4% of revenue.
  • My rudimentary modeling does not take into account the continuous negative net working capital that HelloFresh’s business model enables (customer pays on delivery day, producers are paid a couple of weeks later).
  • The model does not fully account for new verticals, such as new brands in the ready-to-eat segment.

It can therefore be concluded that the market currently does not believe the company will come close to its own long-term or short-term targets. This is probably quite understandable, as there are plenty of uncertainties and the business model is new, so full confidence is probably not quite there yet. However, the track record so far for achieving and even exceeding its own targets is very good. Last year, 20-25% growth was originally guided, and ultimately 61.5% growth was achieved.

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Thanks for your thoughts. Do you have any idea how well HelloFresh has penetrated the US market? Are there areas where it doesn’t operate yet? Recent growth figures in the US have been quite strong, however. How have you taken that into account in your calculations?

The USA is, as I understand it, an already quite mature market, with penetration at 4.5% in the latest report. Based on the company’s reported US TAM (77 million households), there’s probably not much geographical growth potential left. The US TAM is calculated from 60% of households because they also offer a lower-priced product there. So, in the scenario I presented, the number of customers in the US would not grow much anymore, only the average revenue per customer. This is also a conservative assumption, as it’s hard to believe that growth rate would suddenly stop.

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HelloFresh’s Careers page is now looking for a brand manager to develop their Finnish business operations. So, the opening in Finland should be known during this year. This would be one of the two or three openings promised for this year, hopefully the other markets are a bit larger. Last year, there were three openings: Norway, Italy, and Japan.
https://careers.hellofresh.com/global/en/job/4020696/Brand-Manager-Finland-m-f-x

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Thanks, @MolskisPabrai, for the great overviews! I find it amusing, as I thought I had found an undervalued foreign gem, and now I’m down 50% from my first buys :sweat_smile: I’ve had a strong principle of only investing in familiar companies followed by my own team, and almost every time I’ve strayed from this, I’ve taken a hit.

But seriously, the case now looks proportionally much cheaper, meaning either my original investment thesis was badly flawed and the company’s fundamentals are deteriorating… or the market is wrong, and now would be the time to lower that famous average price.

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You’re welcome, I’m happy to update these here if they are useful to someone. It also helps to organize my own thoughts.

I find it difficult to see any fundamental problem with HelloFresh’s operations. Based on the company’s reports and numbers, no disruptions are yet visible, nor is there a direct dependency on Russia. Instead, the risk level has, in my opinion, increased, and this is reflected in the valuation. This is, of course, pure speculation, but I suspect the decline in recent months is due to a few factors.

  • HelloFresh’s operating model has proven effective in the so-called “old normal” market environment and during the pandemic, but what happens when it is challenged by inflation, slowing economic growth, and geopolitical tensions? If the economy stalls, are meal kits nevertheless a luxury product that will be given up first? I personally believe that the company’s operating model is flexible enough to overcome these challenges (for example, when discussing inflation, the CFO said in the previous Q&A that recipes can be easily and quickly adjusted according to which raw material’s price rises the most and avoid these), but I understand the uncertainty it brings. However, the business model is relatively new, and there is no evidence of operating in such a market for HelloFresh or anyone else. The strength in this scenario, of course, is that most of the revenue still comes from America, where consumer behavior has not yet shown major changes. Inflation is, however, rampant there too.
  • Due to rising interest rates, the market has started to value growth companies at lower multiples, and confidence has clearly waned, especially in e-commerce companies. Compare, for example, the share price development of Shopify, Chewy, or Wayfair. I don’t know if there have been significant changes in their fundamentals, but HelloFresh itself considers these to be its closest comparables.
  • Short-term large growth investments will likely raise earnings-based valuation multiples somewhat during this year, even if revenue continues to grow. Large investments also increase uncertainty in such an environment. What if the calculated return on those investments no longer materializes in the new market?

Below are the updated multiples and key figures from my own calculations, based on yesterday’s closing price. A couple of messages above, I pondered what assumptions would justify the current valuation. It seems that either the market is currently undervaluing the stock, or the company’s own guidance and long-term growth targets, as well as analysts’ consensus estimates, are completely unrealistic.

EV/S = 1.11x on realized earnings, 0.93x at the lower end of 2022 guidance
EV/EBITDA = 13.65x
EV/EBIT = 17.03x
P/E = 24.14x

ROE = 28.95%
ROIC = 18.93%

Net Debt/EBITDA = 0.99

Those still look good. So I’m pondering the exact same thing. I still believe the company will continue to perform, but many others’ confidence has waned. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to read the reports of the most bearish analysts, so it’s hard to say what thoughts they have behind them. We’ll see who’s right!

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I checked the website and couldn’t quickly find the macronutrient values (carbs, protein, fat) for the food/meals. Nowadays, many people go to gyms, train with goals in mind, and want to eat optimally. A significant portion of exercisers also calculates at least roughly their daily protein, fat, and carb intake. This group, in my experience, includes competitive athletes and recreational athletes (myself included).

The company’s financials seem to be in order, and I’m pondering the practical risks from my perspective:

  1. The rising cost of food. Do people want to pay extra for this kind of “luxury”? Food is already quite expensive even when bought from the counter.

  2. The boost the company received from Covid is still a bit unclear to me. That is, will there be enough paying customers in a scenario where Covid no longer has an impact?

Pros:

  1. People try to make things easy. I, for one, don’t enjoy grocery shopping on Friday afternoons at all.

  2. @MolskisPabrai has calculated the numbers more precisely in his previous messages. Thanks to him for that. More detailed justifications are in his messages.

  3. 63.04e = 6 servings. ~10e (Fit and Wholesome) package. Cheaper than going to a restaurant.

Risk 2 somehow weighs on my mind in a strange way, but maybe I’ll buy a small observation batch.

EDIT: Food box price converted from USD to Euros

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Thanks for your thoughts; here are a few comments of my own!

At least here in Germany, those nutritional values are visible both when choosing recipes and on the recipe cards delivered to your home.

The more mature the market, the more competitive HelloFresh’s prices are compared to grocery stores. Below is an image from the December CMD slides. This year, that difference will grow again if HF manages to raise prices less than grocery stores. In Germany, the price of the box is, in my opinion, such that you can certainly get food cheaper from Lidl, but if you’re looking for better quality ingredients from a grocery store (e.g., Edeka), the price is pretty much the same. My own subscription comes to €4.90 per serving, which is quite competitive. So, it is certainly a luxury product if compared to the cheapest possible food, but less so than one might expect.

This is true, and it remains to be seen whether consumer habits will return to old routines. There has been no clear change yet, but it may still be coming. So, it’s a clear risk.

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HelloFresh’s CEO International Thomas Griesel has apparently started trading options through his investment company. Could someone more familiar with options clarify how these should be interpreted as a signal? Below is a summary of last week’s trades. In January, through the same company, he had already bought over 12k shares at prices between 51-52 euros. As a founder, he, of course, already owns millions of shares.

  • Sale of 150k call options, strike 60 EUR, September 2022
  • Sale of 150k call options, strike 72 EUR, December 2022
  • Sale of 300k put options, strike 20 EUR, December 2022

Edit. Thanks for the excellent explanation @Almighty_Jerkules!

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