I finished reading Nalle’s latest book, Nurkkahuone (The Corner Room). The book is very interesting, and I recommend it to everyone here. It’s a kind of history of Sampo, and it very openly reveals everything that happened behind the scenes. People are also discussed very openly, similar to previous memoirs. Since I have followed Sampo’s story very closely during this period (2005-2010 as an investor and 2010-present as an analyst), this book was incredibly interesting to me. I’ve compiled my own reflections that emerged from the book here. Note, contains spoilers from the book! Additionally, I want to point out that the intention is not to criticize Nalle, but rather I just wanted to highlight my own observations/interpretations of the book 
There were a lot of arrangements in the works behind the scenes, and it’s even a wonder that more didn’t happen between 2010-2020. The fact is that “Nalle’s next big move” never happened, even though the market constantly speculated about it. I remember when I, as an analyst, sometimes wondered if this speculation was going a bit overboard since nothing was happening, but after reading the book, it’s easy to conclude that we were on the right track. Serious attempts were made to find a suitor for Nordea across countries and continents, but the timing just wasn’t right. Regarding If, it seems it was at least partly luck that Allianz or Zurich did not bite on Sampo’s asking prices 
Nordea was a mistake investment 
Nalle states in the book that he and Stadigh wanted to get rid of Nordea surprisingly early on, as the market situation changed dramatically in the European banking market. Furthermore, Nordea clearly proved to be a worse company than they had originally thought. Based on the book, Nordea seems to have been a constant stone in Sampo’s shoe, from which they sought a quick exit but couldn’t find one. Yes, the investment’s return of 9%/yr was okay, but far from what they originally aimed for. In addition, the ownership period stretched out for an incredibly long time, when the original playbook was likely to make a quick arrangement with a few years’ horizon.
Regarding Buffett’s takeover bid 
, Nalle, in my opinion, regrets rejecting it, even if he doesn’t admit it directly. For example, in Sampo’s podcast number 3 ( Inside Sampo episode 3: Back to the roots, through a detour in banking Sampo plc 139 subscribers Subscribe Like - Inderes ), he appeals to the absence of an official offer letter, and it generally shines through the communication that this matter has been bothering him. The book discusses a lot why on earth Buffett just stopped negotiations and did not react to the marginally increased counter-offer in any way. As Stadigh stated in the book, Buffett’s offer for Sampo would have been an elegant ending to Sampo’s story, and it’s easy to agree with this. Was the rejection a mistake? In my opinion, it’s a matter of taste. The price was very good, and at the price of Buffett’s offer, Sampo’s annual return since then, including dividends, has been ~5 %/yr according to my calculations. On the other hand, selling Sampo would have triggered significant tax consequences, and Nalle himself emphasizes these. It is clear that, considering taxes, Sampo’s annual return would have been higher than this 5%. I think it’s good to note that Nalle’s attempted 4e/share last-minute price hike would not have significantly changed this calculation one way or another. Well, luckily he didn’t sell, because If’s absence from our stock exchange would be a real shame 
I’ve known before that Stadigh’s role has been significant, but it is further emphasized in the book. He was the one who believed in If at the time, he found Torbjörn, he was If’s chairman of the board when the company was built into what it is today, he received a takeover bid from Buffett, etc.
Nalle’s communication regarding the acquisition of If has clearly changed. Previously, Nalle openly stated that he himself would not have bought If, but Stadigh persuaded him to do so. Now the tune has changed, and credit for this acquisition is also being taken for himself, and not all given to Kukk (in fact, he receives surprisingly little credit for this in the book). Whether time has sweetened the memories, or what, but the story has changed a lot in any case 
When listing Mandatum, Sampo’s price tag for it was 2 billion. They did not receive offers at this price, so they decided to list Manda. It’s funny that now the market gives Mandatum a value of over 3 billion. Is it that buyers (PE investors and industrial buyers) did not understand Mandatum’s true value, or does the stock exchange just give Mandatum unnecessarily high multiples? 
In Nordea’s CEO recruitments, Nalle, in my opinion, has a rather clear blind spot. Regarding Claussen, the book makes it clear that Nordea was in surprisingly poor condition when von Koskull started at the end of 2015. The suitability of Claussen’s leadership profile for the changes Nordea required is also questioned, but still, it is not directly stated that he was allowed to continue as CEO for too long. Regarding von Koskull, Nalle gives full understanding that Magnusson replaced him immediately, but Nalle still does not criticize von Koskull’s period at Nordea or his appointment in any way. Although von Koskull inherited a Nordea in very poor condition from Claussen, his CEO term cannot be called a success.
Nalle gives even a surprisingly lot of weight to analysts’ talks and especially to the reactions of the stock market and the media. It feels like the capital market’s verdict (which usually boils down to share price development) is the one and only decisive metric for whether something was done smartly. Of course, in the long run, the stock market is always right, but one-day reactions are highlighted surprisingly often. References to individual analyst reports or target prices are also surprising. This, in my opinion, is somewhat contradictory to the fact that Nalle and Sampo have always done things their own way, and disregarded what others thought. 
The UPM/Fortum merger is something I cannot understand. I understand that in the 90s, arrangements were carried out with little regard for shareholder value, and often the reason was empire building or some other similar non-sensical reason (this refers to part 2 of Nalle’s memoirs). However, in the 2010s, the situation has been completely different, and arrangements have practically always been based on shareholder value. This arrangement doesn’t even make sense on paper, as Nalle himself states in the book. 
I am somewhat surprised that the mistake of not making a takeover bid for Topdanmark is not openly admitted. The fact is that Sampo played a cat and mouse game for too long, and eventually painted itself into a very deep corner. Even the famous granny from Pihtipudas knew that Sampo wanted to buy Topdanmark, and because of that, the price hovered at an absurd level. If Sampo had acted earlier and more aggressively, this arrangement would have been completed years and years earlier.
I find it even touching that when Nalle started at Sampo, their idea was to make Sampo the leading asset management firm in the Nordics (back then, there was more talk about selling investment products and life insurance), and now, 20 years later, Mandatum is largely what they envisioned Sampo to be back then. There’s wonderful symbolism in this 
Indeed, a warm reading recommendation to everyone for this latest, and of course, also for Wahlroos’s two previous memoirs. If reading isn’t your thing, Sampo’s three-part podcast series is also interesting: ( Inside Sampo episode 3: Back to the roots, through a detour in banking Sampo plc 139 subscribers Subscribe Like - Inderes )