The latest book order arrived last week! 
Theyâve been on my acquisition list for a while, and I finally got them to fill my shelf. Now Iâm wondering which one to read first. 
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As a tip for those who might be looking for book inspiration here, a new episode of the Finanssiflikat podcast was just released, on the topic of investment literature. The episode shares a long and diverse list of book recommendations. 
Here are the books highlighted in the episode:
Lauri Nummenmaa: Talous & Tunteet
Maarit Lassander: Rahaviisaus
Paulina Bren: She-Wolves: The Untold History of Women on Wall Street
Ratia & Saukkomaa: Pelastaja
Marko Junkkari: Vallan linnakkeen viimeinen taisto
Björn Wahlroos: Markkinat ja demokratia
Pat Dorsey: The Little Book That Builds Wealth
Juha-Pekka Kallunki: TilinpÀÀtösanalyysi
Peter Lynch: Beating the Street
Anitra Komulainen: Rohkea kauppajÀtti: Keskon historia
Ben Cohen & Jerrt Greenfield: Ben & Jerryâs double-dip â How to run a values-led business and make money too
Charles Fishman: The Walmart Effect â How an out-of-town superstore became a superpower
Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.: Who says elephants canât dance â Inside IBMâs historic turnaround
Kurt Jacobsen: Novo Nordisk
Terho Puustinen: Mahdoton: Kempowerin lapsuusvuodet
Terry Smith: Investing for Growth
Björn Wahlroos: Barrikadeilta pankkimaailmaan
Björn Wahlroos: SateentekijÀt
Jorma Ollila: Mahdoton menestys â Kasvun paikkana Nokia
John Simon: Koneen ruhtinas â Pekka Herlinin elĂ€mĂ€
Heikki Herlin: TuollapÀin on highway
Jack Welch: Straight from the gut â What Iâve learned leading a great company and great people
William Green: Richer, Wiser & Happier
Kantola & Kuusela: Huipputuloiset
Kuisma, Siltala & Keskisarja: Paperin painajainen â MetsĂ€liitto, metsĂ€t ja miljardit Suomen kohtaloissa
Kuisma & Keskisarja: ErehtymĂ€ttömĂ€t â Tarina suuresta pankkisodasta ja liikepankeista Suomen kohtaloissa
Edwin LefĂšvre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator
Benjamin Graham: The Intelligent Investor
Heikki KeskivÀli: TÀhtÀimessÀ osakkeet
Kim Lindström: Puoli vuosisataa pörssin sisÀpiirissÀ
Kim Lindström: Onnistu osakemarkkinoilla
Esa Juntunen: Viisas sijoittaja
Esa Juntunen: Vaurastu viisaasti
HÀmÀlÀinen, Oksaharju, Walker: Sijoita kuin guru
HÀmÀlÀinen, Oksaharju, Walker: Arvoguru
HÀmÀlÀinen, Oksaharju, Walker: Laatuguru
HÀmÀlÀinen, Oksaharju, Walker: Pikkuguru
Rappaport & Mauboussin: Expectations Investing
Peter Lynch: One Up on Wallstreet
Peter Lynch: Learn to Earn
Tren Griffin: Charlie Munger: The Complete Investor
Robert G. Hagstrom: The Warren Buffett Way
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Darwin and Investing
I recently finished reading âWhat I learned about investing from Darwinâ by Pulak Prasad, the founder of Nalanda. The book discusses Nalandaâs investment philosophy, inspired by Darwin. Itâs an amusing blend of investment principles and evolutionary biology, which, alongside investing, is Pulakâs other passion. Thus, in addition to investment ideas, the book serves as a good biology refresher and is written in a humorous tone, lightening dry subjects.
By the way, the bird on the bookâs cover and its evolutionary story will become clear when you read the book!
For example, how do bees democratically yet unanimously decide on the location of their next hive? A few sisters scout and investigate potential sites and signal locations to the rest of the colony through dance. The length and choreography of the dance indicate the direction and quality of a potential hive. The higher the quality of the hive, the larger the proportion of bees embarking on the next scouting round will follow that observation. When this repeats enough times, eventually almost 100% of the bees endorse the best hive location. Studies show that bees almost always arrive at the correct solution this way. The process is facilitated by the fact that the standards are precisely the same for all bees. If only I, as an investor, could adhere to such a strict process!
Nalandaâs philosophy is one of almost puritanical quality investing. The fund extremely rarely sells stocks (according to the book, this has happened only once). The quality criteria are strict: for example, high ROCE, predictable business in a stable industry, target companies must not have obvious weaknesses, almost no debt, and excellent management/main owners.
Refraining from excessive trading forces a pure focus on the business.
As in natural selection, Pulak believes that evolution in the corporate world is slow in the long run, paradoxically despite rapid short-term changes. The short term in investing is easily just noise.
Excellent companies tend to remain excellent, and poor ones remain poor.
Like scientists, Pulak relies solely on empiricism and the analysis of already observed evidence. Nalanda does not look at or make forecasts! Forecasting never hits the mark and is a waste of time. I myself am increasingly leaning towards this way of thinking. Pulak sits on the boards of numerous companies of various sizes, and he states that even management teamsâ own forecasts practically never come true! However, investing is always implicitly forecasting. A companyâs current value is not based on its past, but on the cash it holds and its future cash flows. By always buying a stock, one takes the view that those cash flows will continue in the future.
Even shares of high-quality companies sometimes dip, though rarely. In practice, the fundâs most active buying years have been 2008â09, 2011, and 2020. Pulak otherwise describes the fundâs trading activity as super lazy. Companies identified as high-quality are bought at a trailing P/E of 15-20x (or below index-level pricing), which provides a margin of safety.
Throughout the book, I naturally reflected a lot on my own omnivorous investing style. Historically, I have also traded stocks, not usually after months, but after ownership periods of some years, in the name of âfaster capital accumulation.â But is this ultimately the right path? When one trades more, one has to use limited cognitive resources for trading decisions. When one trades more, one has to research a wider array of all kinds of companies, but knowledge about, for example, the secrets of the structurally weakly profitable steel industry is not as valuable as knowledge about the technology sector.
I myself know very well that in investing, the maximum loss is 100%, but profits can be many times over 100%. This fact also supports long holding periods, where the winners overwhelmingly offset the losses.
Warm recommendation for the book!
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Recommendation for this book as well; I read it some time ago, and it has partly pushed my own philosophy a bit more towards investing in so-called quality companies (an imprecise term, if I may).
A long holding period is also supported by the fact that if the goal is to keep the stock allocation roughly constant, then after exiting an investment, a new good target should be found relatively soon; otherwise, one inadvertently tries to time the market. And in addition, of course, Finlandâs rather high capital gains tax when operating with a book-entry account; when selling at a profit, the new investment must yield quite well just to cover the taxes caused by the saleâŠ
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Must add to the reading list, there are a surprisingly large number of analogies between evolutionary biology and the investment world.
I guess that largely depends on oneâs suitable investment style. From a broad group of mediocre companies, one can find very interesting special situations where the price is really attractive, the company is on the verge of a major change, thereâs a favorable trend in the industry, or the companyâs quality is better than the prevailing perception. In the longer term, one will probably see if their own accuracy in these is good enough for the activity to be profitable. However, Inderesâ trading restrictions probably donât make things easier.
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I finished reading Nalleâs latest book, Nurkkahuone (The Corner Room). The book is very interesting, and I recommend it to everyone here. Itâs a kind of history of Sampo, and it very openly reveals everything that happened behind the scenes. People are also discussed very openly, similar to previous memoirs. Since I have followed Sampoâs story very closely during this period (2005-2010 as an investor and 2010-present as an analyst), this book was incredibly interesting to me. Iâve compiled my own reflections that emerged from the book here. Note, contains spoilers from the book! Additionally, I want to point out that the intention is not to criticize Nalle, but rather I just wanted to highlight my own observations/interpretations of the book 
There were a lot of arrangements in the works behind the scenes, and itâs even a wonder that more didnât happen between 2010-2020. The fact is that âNalleâs next big moveâ never happened, even though the market constantly speculated about it. I remember when I, as an analyst, sometimes wondered if this speculation was going a bit overboard since nothing was happening, but after reading the book, itâs easy to conclude that we were on the right track. Serious attempts were made to find a suitor for Nordea across countries and continents, but the timing just wasnât right. Regarding If, it seems it was at least partly luck that Allianz or Zurich did not bite on Sampoâs asking prices 
Nordea was a mistake investment 
Nalle states in the book that he and Stadigh wanted to get rid of Nordea surprisingly early on, as the market situation changed dramatically in the European banking market. Furthermore, Nordea clearly proved to be a worse company than they had originally thought. Based on the book, Nordea seems to have been a constant stone in Sampoâs shoe, from which they sought a quick exit but couldnât find one. Yes, the investmentâs return of 9%/yr was okay, but far from what they originally aimed for. In addition, the ownership period stretched out for an incredibly long time, when the original playbook was likely to make a quick arrangement with a few yearsâ horizon.
Regarding Buffettâs takeover bid 
, Nalle, in my opinion, regrets rejecting it, even if he doesnât admit it directly. For example, in Sampoâs podcast number 3 ( Inside Sampo episode 3: Back to the roots, through a detour in banking Sampo plc 139 subscribers Subscribe Like - Inderes ), he appeals to the absence of an official offer letter, and it generally shines through the communication that this matter has been bothering him. The book discusses a lot why on earth Buffett just stopped negotiations and did not react to the marginally increased counter-offer in any way. As Stadigh stated in the book, Buffettâs offer for Sampo would have been an elegant ending to Sampoâs story, and itâs easy to agree with this. Was the rejection a mistake? In my opinion, itâs a matter of taste. The price was very good, and at the price of Buffettâs offer, Sampoâs annual return since then, including dividends, has been ~5 %/yr according to my calculations. On the other hand, selling Sampo would have triggered significant tax consequences, and Nalle himself emphasizes these. It is clear that, considering taxes, Sampoâs annual return would have been higher than this 5%. I think itâs good to note that Nalleâs attempted 4e/share last-minute price hike would not have significantly changed this calculation one way or another. Well, luckily he didnât sell, because Ifâs absence from our stock exchange would be a real shame 
Iâve known before that Stadighâs role has been significant, but it is further emphasized in the book. He was the one who believed in If at the time, he found Torbjörn, he was Ifâs chairman of the board when the company was built into what it is today, he received a takeover bid from Buffett, etc.
Nalleâs communication regarding the acquisition of If has clearly changed. Previously, Nalle openly stated that he himself would not have bought If, but Stadigh persuaded him to do so. Now the tune has changed, and credit for this acquisition is also being taken for himself, and not all given to Kukk (in fact, he receives surprisingly little credit for this in the book). Whether time has sweetened the memories, or what, but the story has changed a lot in any case 
When listing Mandatum, Sampoâs price tag for it was 2 billion. They did not receive offers at this price, so they decided to list Manda. Itâs funny that now the market gives Mandatum a value of over 3 billion. Is it that buyers (PE investors and industrial buyers) did not understand Mandatumâs true value, or does the stock exchange just give Mandatum unnecessarily high multiples? 
In Nordeaâs CEO recruitments, Nalle, in my opinion, has a rather clear blind spot. Regarding Claussen, the book makes it clear that Nordea was in surprisingly poor condition when von Koskull started at the end of 2015. The suitability of Claussenâs leadership profile for the changes Nordea required is also questioned, but still, it is not directly stated that he was allowed to continue as CEO for too long. Regarding von Koskull, Nalle gives full understanding that Magnusson replaced him immediately, but Nalle still does not criticize von Koskullâs period at Nordea or his appointment in any way. Although von Koskull inherited a Nordea in very poor condition from Claussen, his CEO term cannot be called a success.
Nalle gives even a surprisingly lot of weight to analystsâ talks and especially to the reactions of the stock market and the media. It feels like the capital marketâs verdict (which usually boils down to share price development) is the one and only decisive metric for whether something was done smartly. Of course, in the long run, the stock market is always right, but one-day reactions are highlighted surprisingly often. References to individual analyst reports or target prices are also surprising. This, in my opinion, is somewhat contradictory to the fact that Nalle and Sampo have always done things their own way, and disregarded what others thought. 
The UPM/Fortum merger is something I cannot understand. I understand that in the 90s, arrangements were carried out with little regard for shareholder value, and often the reason was empire building or some other similar non-sensical reason (this refers to part 2 of Nalleâs memoirs). However, in the 2010s, the situation has been completely different, and arrangements have practically always been based on shareholder value. This arrangement doesnât even make sense on paper, as Nalle himself states in the book. 
I am somewhat surprised that the mistake of not making a takeover bid for Topdanmark is not openly admitted. The fact is that Sampo played a cat and mouse game for too long, and eventually painted itself into a very deep corner. Even the famous granny from Pihtipudas knew that Sampo wanted to buy Topdanmark, and because of that, the price hovered at an absurd level. If Sampo had acted earlier and more aggressively, this arrangement would have been completed years and years earlier.
I find it even touching that when Nalle started at Sampo, their idea was to make Sampo the leading asset management firm in the Nordics (back then, there was more talk about selling investment products and life insurance), and now, 20 years later, Mandatum is largely what they envisioned Sampo to be back then. Thereâs wonderful symbolism in this
Indeed, a warm reading recommendation to everyone for this latest, and of course, also for Wahlroosâs two previous memoirs. If reading isnât your thing, Sampoâs three-part podcast series is also interesting: ( Inside Sampo episode 3: Back to the roots, through a detour in banking Sampo plc 139 subscribers Subscribe Like - Inderes )
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In Nalleâs interview about a week ago, which is linked in the financial sector thread, he actually praised Von Koskullâs actions (âheavy liftingâ) in, for example, IT investments, putting things in order related to regulation and anti-money laundering, and moving the head office to Finland. The benefits of these big changes, which were initiated, only really started to show during his successorâs term (as my own observation, the zero-interest rate period also ended only then). 
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My favorite investment books from my bookshelf:
Howard Marks - Mastering the Market Cycle
Peter Lynch - One Up on Wall Street
Morgan Housel - Psychology of Money
Benjamin Graham - Intelligent Investor
Aki Hintsa - Voittamisen anatomia
Some might wonder why the last one is mentioned as an investment book, even though it isnât. For me, it certainly sparked a lot of thoughts that if I want to succeed as an investor, life needs to be in balance in many other areas as well.
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Funny observation that this book was available at a Singapore airport kiosk, it was among other books there. Such light and spontaneous reading for a long flight.
I also have that book, and it was quite entertaining at times but somehow quite difficult for me. I didnât understand almost everything; it went over my head. So itâs certainly a good work, but it really requires quite good background knowledge to be fully understood. (I have been investing and studying investing for 27 years now, so if it still doesnât quite open up to me, it might never open upâŠ)
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It is quite heavy reading at times, but Security Analysis was even heavier in my opinion. Perhaps thatâs why itâs still unfinished.
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Martin Paasi is writing
I was browsing online stores for investment books and lo and behold, it seems investment professional/podcaster/MP Mr. Martin PAASI is publishing an investment book in March:
Here is a sample from the book: âcost-effective index funds are the key to building wealthâ
Okay, I admit it. I added the previous line myself 
Co-author Ville Kormilainen has apparently also written the biography of âoat manâ Juha Kukkonen. There has been no shortage of twists and headlines in that manâs business and private life. Letâs see if we can get a hint of drama out of Paasiâs life 
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This book by Paasi has now been released. I guess Iâll have to listen to it during a walk.
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In todayâs (March 31, 2026) Vernerâs Quarter, Inderesâ books were nicely displayed in the background. It would be interesting to know more about the books Inderes has, a little about their content, how they ended up on the shelf, and maybe a quick review. Is there any book that no one has read? Looking forward to new episodes of the Inderes book club.
P.S. I hope that Lessons from the Titans ended up on the bookshelf because of my recommendation 
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Sometime back in the day, in Verneriâs videos, there was a stack of books on the floor that, according to my observations, seemed to gradually grow taller. I guess the stack eventually grew so high that there was a need for a bookshelf
Where is Sinuhe the Egyptian?
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Martin Paasi & Ville Kormilainen: The Hidden Truth About Wealth Creation
Martin Paasi is an experienced finance shark who has operated in the financial circles of Stockholm and Helsinki, and is currently a politician. Quite a few investors know him from recent years at Nordnet and now from his own Paasipods.
Looking at the current carnival-like market atmosphere and the impatient behavior of investors, Martin Paasiâs book is quite a resistance movement. Start, automate, let it be. The stock market industry tries to give the impression that investing is complex, but it can be made simple, and boredom produces results, he argues.
Martin Paasiâs biggest investment mistake has still been doing the opposite of what he teaches. An advocate for starting early, he only truly woke up to long-term thinking late in his adult life. He has suffered for this both in his own wallet and in his professional life.
Compared to other asset classes, the returns on stocks are in a league of their own. If all else fails, go with index funds. Contradictorily, however, he claims that due to the zero-sum game of the stock market, stock picking is not worth it, but at the same time, he emphasizes the Fama-French quality company theory: high-quality, low-risk, long-term owned companies lead to alpha (excess returns).
Why invest, according to Martin Paasi: âMoney does not define human worth, but it defines room for maneuver and is a tool for organizing freedom of choice, independence, and quality of life. The filthy rich are still at least as unhappy as the poor.â
The first part of the book deals with his personal life from childhood and subsequently, especially from the perspective of work life and being an investor. He writes openly about his background and success, but also about mistakes and failures. He has been at the top, but has also come crashing down, and long-term unemployment in particular was a mentally difficult period for him.
Perhaps it is partly due to these personal trials that he was recently appointed head of his partyâs AI groupâas programmers, financial management professionals, and many others now find themselves on the scrap heap in the AI turmoil. An interesting observation in the book is his transition into politics. The announcement of starting active political involvement immediately ignited a vast amount of hostile feedback. It unfortunately speaks to a societal âdiscussionâ that has turned into mud-wrestling, where people no longer listen to one another and labels are brandished as one instance of performative outrage follows another.
And then, the icing on the cake: what is this âhidden truth about investingâ? Firstly, financial wealth is easy (as long as you follow the teachings of this book :)). Secondly, financial wealth brings opportunities to do other things, from studies to career, children, and reflectionâyou prosper mentally. The bookâs closing words summarize: âIt doesnât really matter which kind of wealth is more important to you personally, but without one, you ultimately wonât have the other.â Amen!
Ps. Ville Kormilainen is listed as the second author of the book, but it remains unclear what his role was. The book contains a lot of first-person narration from Martin Paasi.
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Reading recommendation for this: Mineral War: Chinaâs Quest for Weapons of Mineral Destruction : Nadrowski, Tomasz: Amazon.de: Books
It gives a good account of how systematically China has been operating regarding critical minerals for a long time. By only following individual news items, itâs easy to miss the big picture, but when you connect the pieces, it shows how systematically China has built its stranglehold on the entire value chain. I hadnât realized before that when China keeps, for example, rare earth metal prices artificially low and supports its own industry with cheap loans, commercial Western supply simply doesnât emerge easily. And once they have secured processing in their own hands, they can use export restrictions to control which part of, for example, the magnet value chain they keep for themselves. As a person from the mining industry, the author went into great detail at times, but for the most part, itâs perfectly readable for a layperson.
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