Röko: New venture by CEO who 100x'd the value

Röko is a serial acquirer.

It is a serial acquirer, initiated in 2019, led by Fredrik Karlsson, former CEO of Lifco, and other veteran investors. Fredrik had disagreements about compensation at Lifco, which led to his dismissal, so he founded his own company. The company listed on the Stockholm stock exchange last March.

Fredrik grew Lifco’s value by approximately 100-fold in 20 years, so there’s plenty of track record. Now, the lessons of the king of serial acquirers have been refined and applied to Röko, which is still tiny compared to Lifco. Lifco’s EBITA is 6 billion SEK; Röko’s is about a fifth of that.

Röko acquires companies with a historical track record (>10 years) of growth and profitability (EBITA >15%), as well as an asset-light business model. An added bonus is that they should be leaders in their niche. The selling entrepreneurial family usually continues as a minority owner, as Fredrik found this model to work best at Lifco. At Lifco, frugality and simplicity were emphasized. These are values that are reflected in the numbers, for example, in the small headcount at headquarters and a flat hierarchy.

Furthermore, Fredrik seems to believe that the numbers speak for themselves. Historical track records serve as the basis for analyzing acquisition targets. Cash flow is important as it finances new acquisitions. Growing revenue itself is laborious because it requires more staff and inventory: margins must remain good with growth. All in all, management thus has a sensible, easily understandable philosophical basis for its operations.

Management with this track record are not idiots, so Röko does not distribute dividends. Instead, all cash flow after minor investment needs is used to create a snowball effect, i.e., for new acquisitions (either platform or add-on).

Plenty of Market

In Europe, there are approximately 12 million businesses with less than 50 MEUR in revenue. Annually, an estimated 1,500 suitable companies come up for sale for Röko, out of about 15,000 small firms sold annually in Europe. The company states it is a desired owner, as who would want to sell their “child” (business) to short-sighted and utterly greedy private equity instead of such a known eternal owner. But of course, there is competition for acquisition targets, as many industrial buyers and serial acquirers are in the same hunting grounds. At the same time, the market is so large that the greater focus should be on their own strict acquisition criteria and adhering to them strictly. Growing revenue through acquisitions is one of the easiest things in the world: extracting profitable cash flow from them above the cost of capital without the whole thing falling apart is the challenge.

The company therefore has no annual acquisition targets, which could encourage buying just anything for the sake of the targets themselves.

A Mixed Bag of Profitable Companies

A risk still creeps into my mind, however, that the company has been in too much of a hurry. Röko has about 30 companies. The group is a truly mixed bag of companies. Most were acquired in 2021 and 2022. From a buyer’s perspective, those years have not exactly been the most attractive. The company’s revenue is over 6 billion SEK, operating profit over 1 billion SEK. The adjusted EBITA for the last 12 months is 1.3 billion SEK.

The company has been primarily financed from the owners’ pockets in the form of share issues. According to the Q3’25 report, the company has interest-bearing bank loans of one billion and net debt of 0.5 billion SEK, but 2.6 billion in acquisition options, once Röko eventually acquires 100% ownership. Cash is just under 500 MSEK. Net financial liabilities are approximately 3.1 billion SEK.

ROCE is 14.5% and ROE is 13%. Naturally, for an early-stage serial acquirer, things move slower, and there is less organic growth, which is why capital return figures lag behind super-peers. ROCE without intangible assets is as much as +164%! The EBITA margin hovers around 20%.

Share Valuation is Not Overpriced, But Not Cheap Either

The company listed at a price over 2000 kronor, and the share even reached 3000 kronor in the summer. Liquidity is low, and as lock-ups expire, previous financiers have apparently sold shares. At the same time, the main owner Fredrik has bought them up with both hands.

There are 14.6 million shares. This means that the company’s market capitalization is 1900 kronor times the number of shares, or approximately 28 billion SEK. EV is thus 31 billion SEK. With realized figures, EV/EBITA is therefore approximately 24x. However, part of the EBITA goes to the minority owners of the companies, so the profit attributable to shareholders is smaller, and in this sense, EV/EBITA is a somewhat misleading multiple. Roughly, the P/E ratio based on consensus estimates for 2026e is 33x.

For example, the mentioned more mature Lifco trades at EV/EBITA 30x, respectively, but as a serial acquirer, it is a phenomenal machine whose pace does not seem to slow down due to its size, nor does its quality deteriorate. Röko’s journey is, of course, still at the beginning, but Lifco’s multiples well illustrate how even a larger-scale serial acquirer can have a long runway ahead. Smaller, also very high-quality Momentum Group trades at approximately 26x EV/EBITA, and Berner Industrier, which relaunched its career as a serial acquirer, trades at 22x. Sdiptech, which grew too fast, is indebted, and somewhat problematic, wallows at an EV/EBITA level of 11x. It is worth mentioning that Röko’s other main owner, Chairman of the Board Tomas Billing, previously worked at Nordstjernan, which in turn is Momentum Group’s main owner.

A mixed group of 30 companies, generating approximately one billion kronor in cash flow annually, would not, of course, as such, be worth 30 billion in the stock market. Roughly, one could estimate that this group barely carries a value of 10-15 billion kronor (minus debt liabilities), so the remaining approximately 20 billion kronor of the company’s market value relies on future value creation in the hands of Fredrik and other management. And of course, this is a gap in financial time-space that needs to be filled to the brim so that an investor buying shares at the current price would receive a satisfactory return, considering the risks. Considering the company’s 15% long-term growth target and an excellent, committed leadership team, a P/E of 33x on next year’s estimated earnings may not necessarily be too much, but of course, in terms of safer investing, it would be delightful to get such a treat into the portfolio a bit cheaper.

Röko’s investor pages https://www.roko.se/investors

Addition. Here is a screenshot from the Q3’25 presentation of the acquired companies. Owned businesses include, for example, car spare parts trade, software sales, lubricants for conveyor belts, a bathroom product designer, or even a golf equipment retailer.

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I had no idea back then when I bought Yleiselektroniikka shares on a whim about these series systems (“let’s try this”). And it’s certainly not the easiest kind, especially when they are often heavily dependent on the economic cycles of new construction activity.

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Interesting opening, and like other Swedish serial compounders, it’s on my watchlist. By the way, as I understand it, Röko is the largest position in REQ’s Nordic Compounders fund, with a weight of approx. 9% according to the H1 investor letter. The same letter contained a multi-page overview of the company, and the text was quite bullish, which is to be expected when a fund manager writes about their largest position :smiley: And of course, not a word about risks! :smiley: Here’s a link to the letter: https://req.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Investor-Letter-1H-2025-1.pdf

This indeed sounds like an attractive compounding machine, like its other Swedish counterparts, but the valuation is a major sticking point. It feels like Röko has benefited even more than others from its superstar CEO. Perhaps a suitable opportunity will arise for this someday, and it’s an interesting company to follow regardless.

Below are some excerpts from the REQ investor letter I linked:

Röko AB – A Compounder Designed for the Long Run

Some businesses are built for the next quarter. Others are built for the next generation. We believe Röko, a Swedish acquirer of niche companies, clearly belongs in the second category

Röko was founded in 2019 by Fredrik Karlsson, the architect behind one of Sweden’s most successful compounders, Lifco. With 29 profitable, entrepreneur-led companies across Europe, Röko is building what could become one of the next Nordic champions.

Designed to Compound
Röko’s model is simple yet powerful: acquire high-quality, asset-light companies with strong cash flows and hold them for the long term. The company targets niche companies with EBITA margins above 15%, stable historical profit development, low customer concentration, and limited capital intensity. In Karlsson’s own words: “The numbers tell the story. Consistent profit growth over time signals real quality.”

Each company in the Röko portfolio retains complete operational independence. There are no central ERP systems, no group-wide HR policies, and no top-down synergy programs. Röko only implies strict financial requirements, including a monthly Excel sheet with a P&L, balance sheet, and cash flow, as well as the transfer of excess liquidity to the Röko treasury. Beyond that, Röko’s central office (a lean team of just eight people) stays out of the way, but is quick to react when performance deviates

While traditional private equity models often introduce new management teams and three-year turnaround plans, Röko offers something different: a permanent home, long-term capital, and a trusted partner. This makes them a preferred buyer in competitive processes.

What We Like About Röko
From an investor’s perspective, we believe Röko stands out for a few important reasons:
• Experienced founder team with an extraordinary track record and high personal ownership
• A model that blends permanent capital with entrepreneurial autonomy
• Röko’s preference for quality over quantity
• Disciplined capital deployment in profitable, cash-generating businesses
• Sector-agnostic flexibility that enables intelligent capital allocation and growth durability
• A decentralized culture that champions performance and meritocracy
In many ways, Röko reminds us of Berkshire Hathaway—but for small private European businesses. The ambition is clear: to build a high-quality, compounding machine that lasts for generations. With a long runway ahead, a proven playbook, and founders still hungry to build and create shareholder value, we believe Röko is just at the beginning of its journey.

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Message was merged into the thread: Inderes Coffee Room (Part 10)

Rökos Q3’25 webcast:

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Röko also presented at Avanza Börsdag in May, which we filmed. Röko starts at 02:30:00 into the clip. At that time, they were newly listed on the stock exchange. :slight_smile:

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This might be slightly off-topic for the thread, but in the recent book “The Compounders” by the guys from REQ, there was an interesting story about Röko’s CEO Fredrik Karlsson from the time when he got into disputes with Carl Bennet over compensation matters while still leading Lifco.

I can’t immediately think of another case where a newly dismissed CEO eagerly buys shares of the same company as the market reacts with a -10% drop to the news of the dismissal :grinning_face_with_smiling_eyes: It probably says something about the disciplined culture he had built at Lifco.

100× return and unexpected exit

In early 2019, following a bonus disagreement with Carl Bennet, Fredrik Karlsson had to leave Lifco. On that very day, the 7th of February 2019, one of our team members had scheduled a regular meeting at 9 a.m. with Karlsson in his office at the World Trade Center in Stockholm. On our way up in the elevator to the office, a press release appeared in our email inbox. It stated that “Lifco’s Board of Directors has today taken the decision to terminate Fredrik Karlsson’s position as CEO since the Board of Directors and Fredrik Karlsson have not succeeded in reaching an agreement about his future remuneration.” Imagine our shock. Needless to say, the meeting did not unfold as expected. Following the press release on that cold and rainy February day, Lifco’s share price fell sharply by around 10%. As our team member sat in Karlsson’s office that morning, Karlsson picked up his phone and called his broker with one clear instruction: buy Lifco shares. He knew that the company he had built was so strong that it would continue to thrive under the new leadership of Per Waldemarson, appointed by Bennet as CEO on the same day. By the time Fredrik Karlsson left, he had achieved an impressive 25% annual earnings growth since 1998, effectively compounding Lifco’s earnings 100 times. Under Waldemarson’s leadership, Lifco has continued to thrive, underscoring the robust corporate culture and business principles Karlsson instilled over his 21 years with the company.

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Will lock-ups still potentially pressure the stock at some point? Is there any information on how much of the total number of shares is tied up in lock-ups?

In my opinion, the stock is still priced quite aggressively.. It would require long-term continuation of growth? Perhaps that western neighbor knows how to do it :+1:

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As far as I understand, the lock-up concerning some B-shares expired at the beginning of September!

That is definitely expected from Röko. EV/EBITA 22x or forward P/E 30x are pricing multiples for an “ok” serial acquirer.

I would say that if the company grows by approx. 15% per year for a while, those multiples are well justified

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I will continue the discussion on Röko’s valuation, inspired by a recent reading experience, the book The Compounders. The book presented many arguments for why one should pay traditionally “expensive” multiples for serial compounders operating with a proven model. An absolute recommendation for the book, by the way, I should probably write about it separately in the book thread.

In the book, the key parameters for a serial compounder’s value creation were defined as:

  • Reinvestment rate, i.e., how much of the business’s cash flow is reinvested back into growth (organic and M&A).
  • ROIC, i.e., return on invested capital %
  • Time, i.e., how long the compound interest machine can be run

One textbook example of the outcome produced by ideal parameters was, of course, Lifco. Since its IPO in 2014, Lifco has reinvested 85% of its business cash flow into growth and has achieved an average ROIC of over 20% on it. With these parameters, the result is, of course, beautiful; the investor has thus multiplied their money 21-fold from the IPO to today.

The book thus argued that an investor could pay seemingly exorbitant multiples if the aforementioned parameters are favorable.

The messy chart below illustrated what PE multiple an investor could pay to achieve a fair market return, i.e., 8% CAGR, over a long 20-year time horizon.

This is not really a groundbreaking insight, but rather very simple mathematics :smiley: It is crystal clear that an investor is guaranteed to get excellent returns even with high initial multiples if the so-called snowball rolls for 20 years straight and the pace hardly slows down along the way :smiley:

It is more fruitful to consider why a serial compounder, such as Röko, would have the prerequisites for such a so-called long bet.

Röko is in a good starting position in that it has an experienced, rational, and ambitious team. No dividend is distributed, not a single cent, and as much cash flow as possible is certainly reinvested back into growth, perhaps around 80-90% over time, as the owned businesses are capital-light.

The return on invested capital is currently around 15%, and management strongly indicates it will rise closer to peers, i.e., around 20%, once the company gets properly up to speed with its owned businesses.

Then there’s the last parameter: time. Verneri already ably argued in the opening post of the thread how Europe is full of suitable target companies for Röko, meaning that, in theory, acquisition targets cannot run out in such a broad playing field when hands are not tied to a specific industry. B2B, B2C, all relatively capital-light industries are acceptable, as long as other strict criteria are met.

The bigger question mark regarding time thus focuses on top management, who are everything in a serial compounder’s operating model. This is not where Buffet’s, or was it Munger’s, wisdom applies, where one prefers a business that even an idiot can successfully manage, because one day that will happen :smiley:

I watched CEO Karlsson’s appearance at RedEye’s serial compounder seminar, and we got a strong statement on this matter there (this is where biases from management’s spells arise! :melting_face:)

Karlsson emphatically stated at the beginning of the presentation, “We will stay on forever, as long as the health stands by,” while referring to himself and to Johan Bladh (Deputy CEO/CFO) and Tomas Billing (Chairman of the Board) who were in the audience. As I understand it, Johan, the Deputy CEO, is already naturally being groomed as the next CEO. Johan was born in 1989, so in that sense, “forever” could be quite a long time for him :smiley:

So, by gut feeling, Röko could be fitted with quite juicy parameters for the coming decades. Not an entirely hopeless assumption, provided that strict acquisition criteria are not compromised and the decentralized operating model is maintained across the owned companies, which ensures that new fuel is constantly shoveled into the compound interest machine.

For a serial compounder operating in this way, it is easier to model long growth paths, as they are not actually tied to a single product, market, customer, etc., but rather, every morning, a very diverse group of entrepreneurs and their employees wake up to work, being very close to the customer and the daily operations. It is somewhat different to predict the growth of a company operating with a single market or product, where situations can change rapidly.

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Good reflection!

Of course, the higher the multiples you pay, the more you take a stand on the company’s future success and the more… risk. :rofl:


A purchase after a long time, for the first time from Italy!

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Yes, there’s no getting around that fact :smiley: One of the biggest risks is likely that acquisitions meeting Röko’s criteria can no longer be found to maintain the desired growth rate. After all, there’s a large number of aggressive private equity firms in the same waters, who might slap a 30-40% higher offer on the table for an entrepreneur looking to sell. Then there are strategic/industrial buyers and other serial consolidators who can offer the entrepreneur the same promise of an eternal home as Röko. It largely depends on the management’s skills how well this process succeeds and their ability to identify targets that are suitable for Röko also from the buyer’s perspective.

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Good discussion!

I usually just read discussions and don’t comment. Even now, I don’t really have anything to add that would bring significant value, but I would hope for more high-quality discussions like this about serial acquirers here on the Inderes forum. In discussions about foreign serial acquirers, companies’ results are posted when earnings are released, but there isn’t deeper discussion. By deeper discussion, I would perhaps specifically hope for critical valuation mechanisms, as @JP199 summarized very well. If one looks deeper into these companies, one should also examine how much goodwill they have written down or removed over the years. This significantly affects one of the most important key figures, namely ROCE/ROIC. The price paid for acquisitions is money paid and will not come back, even if it is removed from the balance sheet. In addition, for these companies, it would be much more important to look at Proforma EBITA figures and not necessarily just accounting figures. This can have a significant impact on the valuation of companies, especially smaller serial acquirers.

Regarding Roko, I have followed the company even before its listing. After the listing, however, I have found the price to be quite high, as mentioned in this thread. Now, with a small drop in the share price, it might be time to update the valuation outlook and see if the risk and return are such that one could jump on board.

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I definitely hope for more discussion about foreign serial acquirers as well, welcome aboard :handshake: The threads are so quiet that I don’t think every message needs to be article-length or create extreme added value :smiley: These threads don’t have the same problems as, say, the Faron thread :smiley: Rather, they threaten to wither away or become mere linking of press releases.

Good points on goodwill and EBITA. These themes were actually questioned to the CEO during the Q&A section of Röko’s presentation at Avanzan pörssipäivän. If you can manage a bit of Swedish, you can get a pretty good grasp of the presentation with the help of YouTube’s automatically generated subtitles and their translations.

Additionally, when considering Röko’s valuation, one should take into account the minority owners of the acquired businesses! That is, for example, EV/EBITA does not account for them; the impact of minorities only becomes visible on the bottom line. Of course, I consider minority owners an absolute strength in Röko’s model. It ensures that the entrepreneurial spirit of the acquired company continues even after the transaction. In my opinion, there is no better way to commit local company management. Problems in acquired companies tend to resolve themselves from the perspective of the serial acquirer’s headquarters, as if by magic, when someone is there on-site in the acquired company, hands-on, equipped with good incentives :smiley:

image

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Yes, I had to bring up the same point, but I thought we shouldn’t write too much. Roko’s CEO has stated many times how the only way to motivate companies is to leave equity to the sellers, but it must be remembered that at some point that minority ownership will also have to be redeemed. It should significantly impact the company’s value whether you own 75% or 100% of the EBITA according to the income statement.

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EV/EBITA is, to my understanding, a perfectly valid metric, because the debts include options to buy out minorities.

I confirmed this with a few colleagues who know accounting better, although I might have explained it quickly in the hallway, so let’s leave a small margin for misunderstanding open.

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Good point. Here again, there would be a clear need for an independent analysis :smiley: Röko’s annual report is also only på svenska (in Swedish) for now, so it will take an amateur many long evenings before the numbers are crunched :smiley:

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As I understand it, in principle, yes, but a couple of points:

  1. EBITA is shown in the income statement, as I understand it, as if 100% of the companies were owned. Therefore, the missing 10-30% of the profit affects the multiple. In Röko’s case, with a reasonably large multiple if they are only considered as net debt when calculating EV.
  2. The “put/call debt and earn-out liabilities” shown on the balance sheet are, as I understand it, from companies where a redemption procedure has been agreed upon. I haven’t found any information, at least, as to whether it’s possible that this redemption procedure has not been agreed upon with all companies.
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I had a look at this matter in Röko’s annual report and Q3 report. NOTE, may contain errors, reading at your own risk :smiley:

Regarding EBITA, it goes exactly like that, meaning 100% is consolidated into Röko’s income statement.

Röko reports an alternative key figure, financial net debt (finansiell nettoskuld), which includes, in addition to interest-bearing debts, precisely that item “put/call debt and earn-out liabilities”.

The annual report goes deeper into how the value of this balance sheet item is determined. I understood it to mean that these liabilities are continuously revalued based on how the cash flows of the subsidiaries develop in relation to the agreements made for minority interests. The item should therefore reflect as accurately and up-to-date as possible the obligations related to the redemption of minority interests.

In other words, EV should therefore include the values of minority interests quite accurately when calculated as MCAP + financial net debt. At the same time, I got the impression from the annual report that such an arrangement has been made with every subsidiary. So, EV/EBITA calculated this way would be a very valid valuation metric, because both of its components include the effects of minority interests :smiley:

Below is an AI translation from the annual report from the section “Värdering av skuld avseende innehav utan bestämmande inflytande” (Valuation of debt regarding non-controlling interests):

Valuation of debt for non-controlling interests

Röko consolidates all subsidiaries in full and presents an income statement where the entire profit for the financial year belongs to the parent company’s shareholders.

Through binding put and call options, Röko has a financial commitment to pay a purchase price for the shares of non-controlling shareholders at a certain point in time at a price based on the earnings of the respective subsidiaries. From the Group’s perspective, such an option redemption is merely a transfer on the balance sheet and does not change Röko’s control over the earnings of the respective subsidiary.

Röko continuously revalues the debt related to put and call options using the most up-to-date expected cash flows to redeem all options. Binding put and call options represent on average 25.9% of the subsidiaries’ EBITA as of December 31, 2024.

In connection with the completion of acquisitions where less than 100% of the shares are acquired, put and call options are agreed with the non-controlling owners of the acquired company. The option agreements form the basis for the valuation of the debt, which is valued according to the expected outflow required at the time of option redemption. Thereafter, the put and call options are valued between the minority owner and Röko according to the valuation model agreed in that agreement.

The value of each subsidiary’s put and call option debt is calculated by multiplying the subsidiary’s average adjusted EBITA (Adj. EBITA) before option exercise by a multiplier and then adjusting it for the subsidiary’s potential net debt or net cash. Changes in the value of debt attributable to non-controlling owners are recorded in equity as transactions between owners.

In 2024, value changes amounted to 239 (179) MSEK. Transfers to non-controlling owners in 2024 totaled 387 (361) MSEK, and in addition to value changes, consist of dividends paid to non-controlling owners and any acquisition adjustments. A sensitivity analysis shows that if the average adjusted EBITA of the subsidiaries were to increase by 100 MSEK for three consecutive years, the debt related to put and call options would increase by 201 MSEK. All other conditions remaining equal, over 2/3 of the debt increase would be financed by an increase in free cash flow.

For more information, see notes 3, 17, and 30.

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I didn’t have time to reply yesterday, but thank you for confirming this, as I’ve had exactly this understanding, and that’s why EV/EBITA is a perfectly valid pricing multiple metric.

Perhaps EV/NOPAT would be even more descriptive, i.e., EV / (EBIT - taxes). Roughly rounded, NOPAT could be about one billion SEK.

EV/NOPAT would now therefore be roughly 30x.

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