Analysts’ price targets rose by approx. 10%, but at the same time, recommendations dropped from the buy level. It’s understandable; perhaps a sufficient target for 2026 is for the share price to head towards 2, as that price can be justified by EV/EBIT or P/E metrics and HK should have a discount of about 10% compared to peers. Because of the debt. In the market this year, there will certainly also be a need for profit-taking by those who got in at prices <1 EUR and, on the other hand, by those who are now reaching break-even after a long wilderness period – “never again.” And funds and institutions will likely stay away.
However, HK still looks cheap. The discount to peers may disappear as financing costs decrease, first when the bond (Jvk) maturing in 2027 is rolled over or replaced with bank loans, whereby the interest on 90m changes from 10 → 5-6%. This would mean annual savings of at least 3m. And then when the hybrid is paid off in 2028, this will save at least 1m, even if part of it is paid with other debt financing. Financing costs from the aforementioned will drop by 4-6m/year.
Looking a few years ahead, when the company’s revenue exceeds 1.1 billion, assuming the operating profit is 4% for the full year, financing costs are 6m, the hybrid is gone, and assuming a corporate tax rate of 18%, the EPS is approx. 30c/share. Half of this is paid out as a dividend, and if, for example, a 5% dividend yield is the valuation basis, then the base case price for the share is 3 EUR. The biggest question mark is the operating profit %; it’s not worth putting the company’s 5% target into the calculator, but it’s good that the target exists to keep eyes firmly on the ball, and one could assume that a 4% level is not satisfactory, making it a viable base case assumption. HK’s investments, or lack thereof, have been criticized; now it seems that since depreciation equals investments, over 30m/year remains for investments. Is that enough? I don’t know. Probably and hopefully, the current management won’t start making any major adventure investments; those have been bitterly experienced by the company. Organic growth is no more than 2-3%/year, but with good operational execution, HK has the potential even with that growth to be what it’s supposed to be – a defensive dividend machine.