I also noticed yesterday that there was an issue with that and I confirmed the matter with the company.
That +9.9 MEUR is a correct figure and it consists almost entirely of reinvestments of detached income units. That -112 MEUR, on the other hand, is an incorrect figure (I don’t know where they got it from).
So that -56 MEUR is a correct figure for those deferred redemptions paid in April (the 75%).
Generally speaking, the Fund Report very regularly contains errors when it comes to individual product levels. This is somewhat logical when considering what kind of Excel monster the system running in the background is. In addition, companies’ reporting differs somewhat from each other, which further increases the risk of errors.
On the product side, eQ has focused on alternatives. Aktia, on the other hand, practically lacks alternatives entirely and has positioned itself largely in traditional asset management. Product side compatibility would be excellent and would offer clear cross-selling opportunities.
On the client side, eQ is fully focused on institutions. Aktia, in turn, is strong especially among wealthy private investors, but Aktia naturally also has many institutional clients and some international clients. Here too, compatibility would be excellent, as the client bases complement each other, enabling cross-selling. In addition, eQ would gain some kind of international channel for its products through Aktia.
Regarding cross-selling, I believe that the new Aktia-eQ’s position in traditional asset management would improve with the merger, and this would facilitate the growth of traditional asset management on the institutional side (both have had difficulties here). New sales potential in alternatives would focus especially on Aktia’s private clients. So, regarding the top line, it’s easy to conclude that this would make a lot of sense.
On the cost side, the situation is made challenging by eQ’s “too good” cost efficiency. eQ’s cost efficiency is incredibly good, and there’s nothing to trim (quite the opposite). Certain overlaps would naturally exist (IT, offices, administration, etc.), but in the big picture, cost synergies would play a minor role in this arrangement. Another challenge with costs is the differences in personnel expenses. eQ’s salary levels are, at least according to our calculations, among the highest in the sector, and this would naturally be a problem if the organizations were merged. The same applies to eQ’s very generous option programs. Should the salaries of Aktia employees doing similar jobs be raised, or should eQ employees’ salaries be lowered? A “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario.
Structural factors. The structure of both companies is pleasantly clear, and neither has significant minorities. Thus, minorities or other structural factors would not cause problems (Aktia’s 20% ownership in Aktia Alexander Corporate Finance would be on the wrong side of the comma in this dance).
Ownership structures. To my understanding, eQ’s owners do not have any particular sentimental attachment to the company, and shareholder value acts as the guiding factor for decisions. Aktia’s ownership structure is quite fragmented, and it’s hard to believe that they wouldn’t be interested in a smart arrangement. Therefore, I don’t see ownership structures as an obstacle.
Cultural factors. In my opinion, this involves the biggest risks of a hypothetical arrangement. eQ has a very entrepreneurial culture, and there is significant internal ownership in the company. Aktia, on the other hand, has experienced a lot of turnover in recent years, and employee satisfaction has also been low (eNPS has been in the negative at its worst). Aktia’s eNPS has improved significantly over the past 12 months, and the new management seems to have initiated a cultural change, which is of course very important. However, it is still too early to say how permanent and significant the cultural change has been. I believe that reconciling two different cultures would be challenging and involve significant risks. For eQ, in addition to the previously mentioned salaries, the risks are also raised by how eQ’s veteran team can be motivated for the next phase in the company’s story (money made, etc.)?
Companies’ need for arrangements? In my opinion, eQ has some pressure to consider various arrangements, as the company needs to get back on a growth path, and organically there is no single silver bullet for this (see the recent eQ video 
What would the new company look like then? The new company, measured by 25 billion AUM, would be Finland’s third-largest asset manager (only Nordea and OP ahead). In institutions, the company would be one of Finland’s leading players, and its foothold among private investors would also be strong. At this size, I also believe that more effort would be put into sales in international markets, similar to Mandatum and Evli. With a profit of 130 MEUR and a market capitalization of over one billion euros, the company would be a very big player in the asset management field, and for example, Evli would be less than half of this market capitalization. As I said earlier, the arrangement would not be based on cost synergies, but above all on cross-selling synergies. The realization of these, in turn, requires successful integration, which involves clear risks as noted earlier. Of course, the valuation of this new asset management giant would be quite low on paper (P/E 12x), and it’s certainly a relevant question whether there would be room for it to rise. Could Aktia-eQ escape the low multiples of banks? I give this some probability, especially if the new company’s growth strategy were credible.
What would the arrangement itself look like then? The arrangement would have to be done as a share exchange (capital requirements), and at current market values, the exchange ratio would be 60/40 in Aktia’s favor. However, there is a huge difference in valuation multiples, and thus, based on the results, the distribution ratio would be 77/23 for Aktia. Here lies a key question mark related to the arrangement. Why would Aktia’s owners exchange a P/E 9x share for a P/E 19x share? Does the merger create enough value for this multiple discrepancy to be swallowed by Aktia? Of course, it is clear that eQ must be priced at significantly higher multiples than Aktia, as bank business multiples are structurally very low (ties up capital, no growth, etc.), but is this difference too big from Aktia’s perspective? I want to remind you that even though RG is playing a double game here, their 10% ownership stake cannot decide anything, and thus the arrangement needs broad support from Aktia’s other major owners.
So, in summary, eQ would most likely be interested in this arrangement, but I’m not entirely sure about Aktia. On paper, the arrangement would make a lot of sense, but one must, of course, remember that those “soft challenges” (culture, etc.) are very significant. Aktia’s acquisition of Taaleri Wealth Management serves as a cautionary example, from which over 80% of employees have left 4 years after the acquisition. If successful, the arrangement would have the prerequisites to create clear value.