I used the Inderes MCP to do a quick comparison of what has changed in this comprehensive report compared to the previous one (August 12, 2025). Apologies if some find it a bit too AI-heavy, but the AI did a great job spotting the key changes.
Recommendation downgraded, even though the company has grown in the meantime
The recommendation has been downgraded to “accumulate” (previously “buy”) and the target price to EUR 10.5 (previously EUR 13.00). This change has been made in a situation where the company’s revenue has increased from EUR 35.1 million to EUR 39.6 million (+13%), the customer base from around 6,000 to over 8,000, and the stream of acquisitions has continued uninterrupted. Therefore, it does not seem to be a disappointment with the company’s performance, but rather a change in the assumptions under which it is considered justified to discount cash flows today. The same observation repeats throughout the reports: the nature of the business remains unchanged, but the assumptions do not.
The AI disruption has risen from a footnote to a structural uncertainty factor
This is clearly the most significant substantive change in the comparison. In the August 2025 report, the industry was discussed in three sections, and digitalization was named as the driver of the disruption; the heading for the risk profile was “Overall low risk profile.” The new report features a completely new industry section on the threats and opportunities of AI, and the risk profile heading reads “AI disruption creates uncertainty over an otherwise low risk profile.” The organizational restructuring has dropped off the list of risks and been replaced by the impacts of AI on the industry.
The argumentation in the new report is entirely new in this regard: AI is assessed to increasingly turn core bookkeeping into a commodity and homogenize software, shifting differentiation and value back to service, trust, advice, and responsibility. Value is not seen as draining away from the service company as long as it owns the customer relationship, data interpretation, and responsibility. Aallon Group is considered to be well-positioned given its scale, but the outcome is stated to be difficult to predict and is already reflected in the industry’s lower acceptable valuation multiples.
The technology strategy has been reversed
The previous report had a dedicated section titled “Bookkeeping is done using commercial software,” and reliance on off-the-shelf software was justified by capital-lightness, low risk, and light M&A integrations. In the new report, the corresponding heading is “In-house accounting software being developed alongside commercial software”: at the beginning of 2026, it was announced that proprietary general ledger accounting is being developed for Aallon Portti, and the first customer pilots are underway.
The impact has also been quantified. Less than 10% of the company’s approximately 7,500 customers currently use the paid features of Aallon Portti, and increasing this share by 10 percentage points would, according to the company’s estimate, have a positive earnings impact of approximately EUR 0.5–0.6 million. The stance in the report is cautious: development investments capitalized on the 2025 balance sheet (EUR 0.5 million) indicate that investments are on a very modest scale compared to established players in the software market.
Organic growth has lagged behind previous expectations, and the braking factor is partly new
In the August 2025 report, organic growth for 2026 was forecasted at 1.7%. In the new report, organic performance for the current year is forecasted to be -3.5%. Part of the reason is familiar, namely the weak development of the Finnish economy, which has weighed on transaction revenues and increased customer churn. A new factor is the consolidation of the property management sector: significant property manager clients have been acquired by larger property management firms, leading to the internalizing of services. Current year growth (2026e +5%) thus relies entirely on acquisitions, with 14 of them falling into the current year.
The industry background has also changed. According to the Association of Finnish Accounting Firms (Taloushallintoliitto), the revenues of companies in the sector fell by about 0.2% in 2025, which the report describes as an extremely poor year for the industry. As a point of comparison, it is mentioned that the industry survived both the financial crisis and the euro crisis without a drop in revenue.
Organizational restructuring has moved from a risk to a matter of proving results
In the previous report, the organizational restructuring had its own line item in risk factors and a short-term cost item. In the new report, the profitability performance of H1’26 (adj. EBITDA 18.4% vs. 17.9%) is interpreted as a sign that the restructuring is starting to bear fruit. The next phase is named as the lean development program launched in the spring, the rollout of which is stated to last at least until the end of 2027 and the success of which is considered a prerequisite for successfully deploying AI and automation solutions at the group level.
Forecast levels are close to each other, but the profitability path has flattened
| 8/2025 Report | 9/2026 Report | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue 2026e | EUR 41.7 M | EUR 41.8 M |
| Adj. EBIT-% 2026e | 12.0 % | 11.3 % |
| EPS (adj.) 2026e | EUR 1.02 | EUR 0.96 |
| EPS (adj.) 2027e | EUR 1.14 | EUR 1.07 |
The most essential change is not in the levels, but in the shape. Previously, the EBITDA margin was forecasted to rise to the 16.7–17.3% level in 2026–2028. The new report forecasts that the EBITDA margin will no longer improve in the coming years, even though it states there are clear opportunities to do so as the strategy progresses. This is therefore a matter of conscious caution in the face of the AI disruption, rather than an assessment of a weakening in the company’s performance.
Valuation assumptions have tightened significantly
| 8/2025 | 9/2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| Value indicated by DCF | EUR 15.2 / share | EUR 11.8 / share |
| Long-term growth / terminal growth | 2.0–2.5 % / 2 % | 1 % / 1 % |
| Long-term EBITDA-% | just over 17 % | just over 16 % |
| WACC / cost of equity | 8.6 % / 9.2 % | 9.1 % / 9.8 % |
| Share of terminal value | 54 % | 44 % |
| Acceptable adj. P/E | 14x–16x | 10x–13x |
The DCF value has dropped by 22% without practically changing the earnings level for the near future. The drop is explained almost entirely by the terminal growth assumption and a higher required rate of return, which is justified by the AI disruption, higher interest rate levels, the company’s small scale, and the poor liquidity of the stock. The terminal period’s 44% share of the value is already considered a fairly low level in the report, which partly reflects the moderation of expectations loaded onto the stock.