Sanlorenzo - To the portfolio or to the harbor?

[Ituhippinen]

Sanlorenzo S.p.A. (SL) is an Italian company specializing in the design, manufacture, and sale of luxury yachts, operating since 1958. The company has become one of the world’s leading players in its field, known for its craftsmanship and custom-made yachts. While these boats are quite appealing, the next Inderesmiitti (Inderes meeting) should still be held on dry land: buying these requires pockets a bit deeper than average.

What does Sanlorenzo do and what does it consist of?

Sanlorenzo manufactures individual yachts and superyachts, focusing on exclusivity and high quality. The company consists of four divisions:

Yacht Division: 24–38-meter composite yachts (approx. 50% of Q1 2025 revenue).

Superyacht Division: 40–73-meter aluminum and steel superyachts (approx. 30% of Q1 2025 revenue).

Bluegame Division: 13–23-meter sporty yacht ranges (9% of Q1 2025 revenue), emphasizing sustainability and innovation (e.g., Siemens Energy and Volvo collaborations).

Nautor Swan (acquired 2024): Luxury sailing yachts, expanding the offering. (11% of Q1 2025 revenue).

As the graph shows, the availability of products is quite limited, and this is an attempt to maintain the brand’s exclusivity. Through Nautor, boats will certainly move in larger quantities, but the product is cleverly branded under a different name, and they are not the “authentic” Sanlorenzo.

Geographical diversification

Revenue is globally distributed (FY 2024): Europe (61%), Americas (16%), Asia-Pacific (10%), and Middle East/Africa (13%). The distribution and service network supports an international customer base. Growth is expected to continue, especially from the Americas and the Middle East.

Business model

Sanlorenzo generates revenue by manufacturing custom-made yachts tailored to customer wishes. The model relies on a few basic ideas:

• Exclusivity: Limited production and premium pricing
• Advance payments: Customers pay a reservation fee in advance, reducing production and financial risk.
• Aftermarket services: Maintenance and refit services generate high-margin revenue.

With refit services, the product (yacht) can be customized to each customer’s personal needs. Its technical parts can be serviced or modified. The interior and exterior can also be modified to suit a new owner, if the buyer doesn’t have enough money for a new vessel and has to settle for someone else’s old model…

Recollections of the past and guidance

The company has a good track record in achieving its guidance: 2020–2022 grew +10–15% during the pandemic, 2023–2024 revenue +8–10% and EBITDA margin ~18–19%. Q1 2025 revenue +17.8% and EBITDA +20%.

Now the most significant guidance for 2025 is:

• Revenue 960-1020MEUR.
• EBITDA margin 18.5-19%
• Net profit 103-110MEUR.

Competitive advantages

To achieve these goals, something probably needs to be done. There’s a reason why Sanlorenzo is one of the world’s top brands. As a side note, it’s surprisingly not very well known in Finland. The reason is probably the weather conditions (otherwise, the Kauppatori harbor would be full of Sanlorenzos). Competitive advantages and moats could be outlined something like this:

• Brand: Synonymous with craftsmanship and luxury. Founded in 1958, deep roots.
• Customization: Individual solutions attract wealthy customers.
• Innovations: Sustainable and renewable technology (e.g., hydrogen, green methanol by 2027).
• Order book: Although the order book has not grown since the 2022 peaks, there is still plenty of demand for ultra-luxury.
• Network: Strong distribution and service network.

Insider ownership
The Perini family owns ~55% of the shares, with Massimo Perini in a leadership position. 2023–2025 small purchases (e.g., ~10,000 shares in 2024, ~€0.4 million), no sales.

Future outlook
Luxury demand remains strong (USA, Asia, Middle East). Investments in sustainability (e.g., green methanol) strengthen its position, but geopolitical risks and material costs are challenges. Globally, the number of ultra-high net wealth individuals (UHNWI) is expected to grow quite rapidly in the coming years. At the same time, the construction of yachts over 24 meters is increasingly in demand. It can therefore be assumed that the need for these superyachts will continue to exist, and for these people, it is not so dependent on market cycles: money seems to be available even in “bad” times.

One interesting observation is that ultra-rich individuals are now younger than before. Whereas in the past, wealth was only attained in old age, today’s magnates are already under fifty. These youthful, Helly Hansen-clad seafarers also spend considerably longer periods at sea than was previously the case. A final observation on this (which is also a competitive advantage!) is customer retention. On average, a boat is replaced with a newer one every 4.5 years, and the next boat is about 70% more expensive than the previous one. The old wreck can then be sold to some pauper who gets to feel wealthy for a moment.

Order book

The development of the order book is the biggest reason why I haven’t yet taken an opening position in the company. It has been declining since 2022. In itself, there may be a logical reason for this, as people ordered boats during the COVID-19 craze: no one knew how long the pandemic would last. It’s better to spend your time on a luxury yacht than at home in sweatpants within four walls. COVID-119 demand was largely met in 2022, from which point the decline in the order book has continued. This is a confirmed order book, which is binding. 2025 could be the first year in five years when revenue exceeds the order book. Let’s hope for a surge in this by the end of the year.

I tried to find out if it’s due to market weakness or a company-specific reason. I found press releases from another luxury yacht listed company, The Italian Sea Group, which provided good comparative material on the order book. It thus seems that the issue is more about market cooling than an internal problem for Sanlorenzo. This is a good situation in itself, because in the market, everyone suffers together.

Valuation

MCAP: 1.06 billion EUR.
Revenue (FY): 963MEUR
Net income (FY): 103MEUR.

As a simple guy, I like simple metrics:
P/E 10x (LTM), three-year average 15.5x.
EV/EBIT 8.1x (LTM), three-year average 10.8x.
EV/GP 3.8x (LTM), three-year average 5.4x.

Even if I’ll never be able to afford a Sanlorenzo yacht, the stock can hardly be called terribly expensive. Is the ultra-rich’s interest in boating coming to an end, or what’s the catch?

Just a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation: if analyst forecasts for 2027 materialize, the company would make 3.3 euros profit per share. Then, apply a multiple… If we return to the three-year average of 15.5x, the share price would be around 51 euros vs. approx. 30 euros now. Of course, it’s possible that the targets won’t be met and that the multiple will never rise from that ten (P/E), but it’s also possible that the “hubbabubba” times will return, and the company will get a multiple that better reflects the value of this luxury.

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As of this publication, I do not own shares in the company (nor a boat), but I am seriously considering taking a position. The information above may contain errors, or I may have misunderstood some things.

[KohtiVapautta]

Quite an interesting company, and in itself, there’s nothing to fault in its ability to generate profit in that segment.

However, Nautor historically didn’t perform very well in this regard (a significant reason why UPM sold the company back then), but during the previous owner’s (Ferragamo) time, the finances apparently became more profitable.

A bit about the market, which I don’t actively follow, but I’ve had enough contact over the years to gather some small bits of information. SanLorenzo itself has been less known to me. Even among builders of the largest yachts (>50m), there are quite a few, such as AzimutBenetti, Feadship, Amels, Oceanco, Nobiskrug, Lurssen, etc.

Furthermore, there are significant differences in quality and desirability among these manufacturers. As I understand it, Feadship, Oceanco, and Amels are quite at the top, and Lurssen is likely absolutely premium.

And then, when we move to the sub-50m series (where, for example, AzimutBenetti’s Azimut and partly also the Benetti brand are active), many more brands and manufacturers can be found. Even in China, quite high-quality large boats are manufactured nowadays.

But all this matters less if demand exceeds supply. And the market is divided into many parts, so we talk about Custom, semi-custom, or Production, depending on how unique the product is. Fully custom means it’s made entirely from start to finish, including hull design, according to the customer’s wishes, which naturally gives the manufacturer fewer opportunities to push down costs. On the other hand, even those Production series are not so long that one could speak of any real mass production and its associated benefits, especially in larger yachts. In Semi-Custom, the owner can significantly influence material choices and, to some extent, even arrangements (e.g., number of cabins, etc.). Based on their website, SanLorenzo seems to be in this Semi-Custom market, which offers customers advantages like faster delivery times and a clearer acquisition process.

Additionally, they seem to strive to take care of the resale market (as does Nautor), whereby these vessels can also be refurbished according to new customers’ wishes, thus enabling the preservation of resale value and a more stable revenue stream for the manufacturer. And it helps in retaining customers in the long run. Fully custom projects are typically one-off processes for customers (with exceptions). And there is also the charter market, which SanLorenzo also appears to support, meaning the owner can, if desired, entrust their vessel to the company’s care and thus receive a share of the rental income. It’s interesting that this “service” side is entirely under the brands, and thus its share of the overall business is not disclosed (Nautor also has this service business); it would be quite interesting to know, especially what kind of margin they aim for from this side.

In recent years, many of these luxury brands seem to have taken small hits in sales, especially in the Asian (particularly China) markets, as I understand it. In a way, luxury products are becoming accessible to an ever-wider group, but on the other hand, does this fragmentation of the global market support this development, or are we moving into a different era? I don’t know, but these issues concern me regarding luxury products.

The financial figures seem interesting, and I must examine the company more closely out of general interest.

[Ilkka6]

Gabe Newell, founder of Valve Software (Steam, Half-Life, etc.), earlier this month bought Oceanco, a competitor to Sanlorenzo.

Newell has at least six different yachts in his fleet, and reportedly has a new one under construction with Oceanco.

Oceanco has also built, among others, Jeff Bezos’s Koru superyacht.

Oceanco

An article about Gabe’s yacht collection from 2023: https://luxurylaunches.com/transport/gabe-newell-luxury-yachts.php

[Ituhippinen]

https://www.sanlorenzoyacht.com/uploads/filepub/5614-2025.09.04%20-%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Results%20H1%202025%20vFFF%20clean.pdf

Strong result!

Full-year outlook reiterated:
Revenue 960-1020m EUR.
EBITDA 178-194m EUR
EBIT 139-149m EUR. (EBIT-% 14.5).

Uncertainty is introduced by American trade policy (tariff on, tariff off). The order book for the rest of the year looks quite good, so no massive surprises should be coming from there (771m EUR from the order book for 2025). This is further complemented by new orders received in H2. 93% of the order book has already been sold to the end customer.

On valuation.

If the company achieves its guidance, the EV/EBIT at these share price levels (approx. 34e) (EV 1.23bn EUR, EBIT 144m EUR) would be around 8.5x. Not terrible in my opinion, considering the company has a great track record of its performance level. During H1, competitors have performed significantly worse.

(Source: x)

[Ituhippinen]

Hello fellow boaters!

UBS initiates Sanlorenzo stock with Buy rating on luxury yacht demand

Source.

UBS initiates coverage of Sanlorenzo with a target price of 47 euros (current price 35.3 euros) and a Buy recommendation.

Reasons for the target price include a strong position at the high end of the luxury segment, continuous pricing power, and integration benefits from the Nautor Swan acquisition. Cash flow is strong, and they can continue to acquire smaller companies for their portfolio. Analysts also believe the market is at a turning point after a slightly softer H1 (which was quite acceptable for Sanlorenzo).

[vanha_Qfwfq]

@Ituhippinen

Uncertainty is brought by American trade policy (tariff on, tariff off).

Do tariffs affect superyachts? Aren’t they registered in places like the Bahamas, Jersey, and similar, regardless of the owner’s country of residence?

[Ituhippinen]

@vanha_Qfwfq

Do tariffs affect superyachts? Aren’t they registered in places like the Bahamas, Jersey, etc., regardless of the owner’s country of residence?

Good question, and I want to point out that I am definitely not an expert on current tariffs (is anyone but Donald himself?), as it’s quite a murky business. However, here are a few of my own thoughts on the effects.

• As I understand it, if a vessel is brought into US customs territory and “permanently” to, for example, a Miami port for sale/use, it is an imported good on which tariffs are levied, even if the vessel is registered as Bahamian (assuming the vessel was manufactured in the EU). If a yacht merely visits US customs territory with a “cruising permit,” no taxes are, of course, incurred. But as I said, I don’t know this procedure well enough to say for sure! It should also be noted that the ultra-rich often have an ultra-ability to circumvent additional taxes and fees through careful tax planning.

• Sanlorenzo has its own distribution and service network in the USA, so all boats going there will have to go through some kind of customs formalities. This will either weaken margins or the costs will be passed on to the customer. Will it be reflected in demand?

• The service chain requires spare parts, components, and all kinds of materials that may be subject to tariffs. → Production costs may rise and delivery times may lengthen → negative impact on the brand?

• The American rich are a big part of Sanlorenzo’s clientele (was it about 30%). Inflation, weakening stock market, economic uncertainty… All have an impact on the general market sentiment and consumer confidence.

How concerned one should or needs to be about these, I cannot say. I’m not terribly worried about this temporary tariff mess, but I have considered these issues and accepted them as risks I can take.

[Verneri_Pulkkinen]

I got my hands on an article about Sanlorenzo that slipped under the table, which has an interesting take on the global yacht market. I tried to check the figures from the original source, but the Premium report is paid, so we’ll go with this.

In recent years, in a weaker market, the share of so-called speculative boats, i.e., boats that do not have an owner during the construction phase, has increased among all boats built in shipyards. The figure dropped very low during the COVID crisis, and previously it has been over 40% of the market.

Since there is no data for a longer period, I don’t think very scientific conclusions can be drawn from this. Of course, I sometimes like to repeat the phrase “the road to recession goes through normalization,” so one always has to be careful when assessing a company’s cyclicality.

After my first purchase, in my usual style, I have examined the company with even more critical eyes, thinking about potential weaknesses. Perhaps the biggest question mark is the improvement in the company’s margins and, consequently, its capital returns in recent years. Is the margin improvement sustainable, or is it just residual steam from a good market? If the company turns out to be cyclical and I bought it at the peak of the cycle with “cheap multiples” based on a rule of thumb, the timing of the investment might prove suboptimal.

The EBIT margin was 6.4% in 2018, but recently it has been over 14%.

Overall, based on preliminary research, Sanlorenzo appears to be a well-managed company in a structurally growing market. In this sense, even if one accidentally bought the company at the peak of a cycle, the damage should be less significant than if one bought a bad company with peak cycle results.

[Ituhippinen]

About the Competitor

https://www.ferrettigroup.com/en-us/News-and-events/Detail/t/Ferretti-SpA-approves-the-consolidated/y/2025/n/2505

Ferretti has released its Q3 results. Otherwise, nothing terribly surprising in my opinion, but this sounded good: “The current level of ongoing negotiations is also exceptionally high, reflecting steadily growing demand.” (Unless these were Sanlorenzo’s customers, of course ).

Revenue has grown moderately, but grown (2.5% YoY) with margins remaining the same.
Order book grown 12.9% YoY.
Related to Verneri’s post, at least for Ferretti, the made-to-measure segment is pulling its weight. (+185% YoY). More profitable yachts than those made “ready for the shelf”.
Ferretti reiterates its guidance.
The CEO says that the situation has eased compared to before (macro), but the board states that the macro is still challenging, but the company has performed well. So, interpreted as a turn for the better.

Let’s hope that Sanlorenzo’s order book is also strongly increasing, and customized boats are selling well. Apparently, these allow for extracting a bit more cash from customers than off-the-shelf products. Hopefully, even a small easing of the macro situation will also benefit Sanlorenzo’s coffers!

[Ituhippinen]

5705-2025.11.10%20-%20Sanlorenzo%209M%202025%20Results%20Presentation%20-%20vF.pdf

5703-2025.11.10%20-%20Consolidated%20Financial%20Results%209M%202025%20vF.pdf

If I calculated correctly, Q3 revenue was 236m EUR.

• Guidance reiterated

A quick thought on the guidance and achieving it, which the markets might have been spooked by today:

Revenue target 2025: 960m EUR, of which 690m EUR has been accumulated so far. In Q4’24, Sanlorenzo’s revenue was 272m EUR, and reaching this would be enough to achieve the guidance.

EBITDA target 2025: 180m EUR, of which 128m EUR has been accumulated so far. In Q4’24, Sanlorenzo’s EBITDA was 53m EUR, and reaching this would be enough to achieve the guidance.

Not a super quarter, but achieving the guidance should be quite feasible! Especially since the guidance was reiterated again, with November already halfway through.

[Verneri_Pulkkinen]

@Ituhippinen

• Guidance reiterated

Quick thought on the guidance and access to it, which the markets might have been scared by today:

The company didn’t technically issue a negative outlook, but it “clarified” the guidance to the lower end of the previous range. At the same time, it communicated that it was “reiterating” the guidance.

Guidance still H1:

Guidance now:

However, quite small changes and at the same time, there’s plenty of work in the order book.

[KohtiVapautta]

I happened to come across a few other luxury yacht shipyards based in Italy:

The Italian Sea Group Homepage - Investor relations
A listed company; I haven’t studied the figures in detail other than that it also seems to be making some profit. This also provides a good comparison for San Lorenzo.

Then, on the Ancona side, there is Palumbo Superyachts Palumbo Superyachts | Leading Italian Yacht Builders & Innovators
It appears to be privately owned. I don’t know this one any better than a quick glance.

There are really a lot of these, and I wouldn’t be surprised if even more could be found in Italy. The Netherlands and Germany are also countries where such larger boats are made. And nowadays, there are also some shipyards in Turkey that make them.

It’s also interesting to consider why domestic marine industry companies haven’t wanted to enter this market more significantly (motor yachts have also been made in Finland, although one was bombed by the United States in 2003 [ Al-Mansur: The unexpected fate of Saddam Hussein’s largest yacht]).

[Verneri_Pulkkinen]

Long article about Ferretti and Sanlorenzo.

The growing use of yachts as trading offices was surprising.

Italian luxury yachts – two undiscovered growth plays - Undervalued Shares

[Verneri_Pulkkinen]

A takeover bid has apparently been made for Sanlorenzo’s peer and competitor Ferretti, but based on the news I’ve read, this offer has been rejected. In any case, the stock has seen a brisk 25% rise this year.

Update: This entity thus made an offer to buy more shares at a price of 3.5 euros.

KKCG Maritime to launch a voluntary partial tender offer for Ferretti S.p.A.

KKCG Maritime announced today its intention to launch a voluntary partial public tender offer to acquire up to 52,132,861 shares of Ferretti S.p.A., with the intention to increase its stake from 14.5% to 29.9% of Ferretti’s share capital. Following completion of the offer, KKCG Maritime intends to exercise its increased voting rights to support the election of its proposed nominees to the Board of Directors at Ferretti’s next Annual General Meeting.

The offer is not intended to result in the delisting of Ferretti’s shares and will not lead to KKCG Maritime exceeding the 30% threshold that would trigger a mandatory takeover bid under Italian and Hong Kong regulations.

“This offer reflects our intention to build on our long-term investment in Ferretti and contribute to its future growth and development. Our track record of value creation is rooted in an active investment approach, centred on engaged governance, experienced management teams and long-term strategic commitment: we will leverage our proven expertise to support Ferretti’s organic and inorganic growth opportunities amid the current global sector dynamics.”

Karel Komárek

KKCG Founder and Board Chair

[Ituhippinen]

@Ituhippinen

Revenue target 2025: €960m, of which €690m is currently achieved. In Q4’24 Sanlorenzo’s revenue was €272m, and reaching this would be enough to meet the guidance.

EBITDA target 2025: €180m, of which €128m is currently achieved. In Q4’24 Sanlorenzo’s EBITDA was €53m, and reaching this would be enough to meet the guidance.

With these in mind for tomorrow’s interim report, and since there has been no profit warning, I’m sure the targets will be reached! Though, I don’t know what the profit warning practices are like in that part of Europe…

I can’t get any sensible analyst expectations for the quarter from Quartr right now, but through TradingView, there is a revenue forecast of €273m (practically the minimum of the guidance), and earnings per share of €0.93. It will be interesting to see what comes out!

I managed to get the forecasts from Quartr as well before the results release (Q4):

Revenue 273M
EBITDA 50.9M
EBIT 42.2M
EPS 0.93

[Ituhippinen]

• FY NEW YACHTS SALES EUR 960.4 MILLION
• FY NET PROFIT EUR 107.4 MILLION
• FY EBITDA EUR 180.6 MILLION
• ORDER BACKLOG AT DEC-END AT EUR 1.96 BLN

The results are already available on Tradingview, but the report can’t be found yet. We hit pretty much the lower end of the guidance, as was somewhat foreseeable!

Edit: Now it’s out.

5771-2026.02.13%20-%20Preliminary%20Consolidated%20Results%202025%20vF.pdf

The company is very precise with its guidance; almost every line hit exactly.

[Ituhippinen]

5773-Sanlorenzo%20FY2025%20Preliminary%20Results%20vF.pdf

A few more slides to note from 2025.

Growth is slow, but orders are coming in at a good pace. So, one might assume there is some kind of turning point in the market. Investments in the USA (Fort Lauderdale opening), Brazil, and Mexico potentially open up a huge number of new buyers again. The Nautor Swan acquisition already looks quite successful, as Swan, which had been making a loss for a long time, has turned profitable after years in just one year under the new owners.

The graph below shows well that even luxury has had a hard time in this market. In my opinion, a direct comparison to the luxury sector isn’t entirely apt, but it does give some direction and an assessment that the company could indeed have some more sustainable competitive advantage. Support is provided by ultra-high net worth customers, whose stack (of cash) doesn’t run out even in the depths of a recession.

Growth is sluggish, but fortunately, profitability has been maintained: sales haven’t been made just for the sake of selling; instead, the brand has been looked after, and unnecessary discounts have been left for Tokmanni customers.

The slight softness in the Yacht class is a bit disappointing, but since only a hundred or so boats are made per year, it’s clear that individual deliveries have an impact on quarterly results. Nautor Swan still only accounts for 10% of revenue, but as I understand it, there is potential for it to take an even larger slice of Sanlorenzo’s cash flows.

Market penetration into new areas in Central and South America accelerated growth in the Americas by +35.5% YoY. This is about 20% of revenue.

Orders are coming in at a quite nice pace. At some point, this too will translate into revenue. Let’s hope that sales continue to go well and we get many more quarters of growth in terms of orders.

The area of operation in the future will again be a degree wider as new openings are made.

From the Q&A section

• A word on the outlook? No guidance, but there were already trade fairs in January and fairs are currently ongoing. The start of the year has kicked off better than '24 and '25. The beginning of the year is usually difficult, now a good start. Improvement is expected in sales for all four boat classes.