With dividends or without? Dividend thread

No need to ask that. There are various potential factors that increase EPS (such as reducing the share count and revenue growth) and other factors that decrease EPS (such as a collapse in total earnings or raising the CEO’s salary by a billion).

Reducing the share count by canceling shares belongs to the first group (of course, only if EPS is a positive figure), regardless of whether EPS rises or falls in a given year.

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I mean, just above, I tried to spell it out as clearly as possible. In that scenario, you can also consider that in the 2nd year, earnings drop by half and the entire result is distributed as dividends or share buybacks.

Is there something there that you disagree with? The discussion isn’t fruitful if we are talking about different things.

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What I meant was that I really don’t understand at all when everyone here keeps insisting that you can always just sell as many shares as the amount of dividend you “missed out on.” For instance, in this case, Sampo is paying out some dividends and doing share buybacks.

If I sell shares, the pot gets smaller.

For example, Paapaa’s comments miss the point I was trying to make, and I admit that this is a difficult topic to discuss on a forum.

One more disclaimer: I haven’t read any further down the thread yet, so there might be something enlightening there.

I guess you didn’t read my example carefully?

……………….

In the example, you seem to have made the mistake of showing that you are also reducing the dividend paid to yourself by, for some reason, locking the dividend at €1/share, which would mean the company distributes a smaller total amount of funds every year.

The company buys back its own shares and cancels them. When the company’s funds distributed as dividends remain the same, the dividend per share increases every year because the funds are distributed among a smaller number of shares.

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The point was that if a company decides to buy back its own shares with the same amount instead of paying dividends, and you still want cash in hand and would have preferred dividends, by selling an amount equal to the profit distribution, you get more cash in hand than if the company had just distributed dividends. And after this move, you are left with the exact same ownership stake in the company as if it had distributed dividends and hadn’t bought back its own. So future returns are identical – you just got more cash in hand because the taxation was lighter. Or alternatively, you could have sold a bit less, received the same net amount in hand, and your portfolio would have been left with a larger ownership stake than in a dividend distribution. Buybacks are a win-win because of taxation.

In Sampo’s case, however, we cannot influence Sampo’s method of profit distribution. If Sampo decides to pay a dividend, we cannot prevent it. Taxes will be paid, and there is nothing we can do about it. We can only ask Mirko nicely to talk some sense into Anni Mäkinen :blush: But if Sampo then decides to change its policy so that the entire sum (or a larger portion than before) is used to buy back shares, you can counter in this situation and create your own dividends with lower taxation. Buybacks always provide more flexibility because there is no forced tax consequence.

Your example was not related to this, as we are not talking about reducing our ownership stake from the original by selling in addition to dividends. That is not the topic of discussion. Nor is it relevant here. If the ownership stake decreases, then naturally future returns will decrease. But that is not related to the discussion on the method of profit distribution, where the ownership stake does not decrease but stays the same.

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And what exactly is this assumption of yours based on? I feel that you just don’t understand the problem in your example, even though it has been explained to you by many people. Again, it makes no sense to compare two scenarios where in one you assume the dividend amount stays the same and in the other it drops. In that case, you are comparing two different situations and it is not relevant.

I rest my case; read Mirko’s excellent post first, since you like to use Sampo as an example. If, after that, you are still of the opinion that share buybacks aren’t reflected anywhere, then there is probably no point in continuing this topic.

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Exactly. When comparing distribution methods, you have to compare situations where the company distributes the same amount either as dividends or through share buybacks. And from an investor’s perspective, you must either compare a situation where you take the maximum cash flow from the distribution without your ownership stake changing, or alternatively, reinvest the maximum amount back into the same company. Once these are held constant, you can compare the effects of the distribution methods. And nothing else in the comparison changes. Ceteris paribus, ftw.

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I haven’t had time to read the whole thread, so I’ll jump in with some questions about share buybacks since I haven’t looked into the topic much yet.

It is said that whether the share price is high or low doesn’t matter when shares are bought back and canceled. In principle, I understand that company funds are used for buybacks at the prevailing share price and the activity is “efficient.” But wouldn’t the same amount of money improve valuation multiples more when the share price is low? Why are buybacks usually timed for when the share price has dropped somewhat from its previous peaks? Why do investors generally feel that shares should be bought when their price has decreased?

Then, regarding the situation in cyclical sectors: if it’s known that the industry is cyclical, wouldn’t it make sense for a company to build up some cash during the upcycle and buy back its own shares like crazy during a recession with that money? This would create shareholder value.

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Yes, they can. But this doesn’t matter when considering profit distribution. It has no significance because if an investor feels the multiple is too high to increase their ownership stake, they can sell that portion of the profit. When Nokia bought at high prices, an investor could have freely sold because their own favorite metric (it doesn’t have to be P/B as many imagine regarding buybacks) was too high. The investor made an active decision by not selling, instead accepting a higher ownership stake. Another investor, on the other hand, sold and waited for the share price to collapse to a tenth, and then bought the stock and got more for the same money. In some other situation, the price might not drop but continues to rise.

So, the company doesn’t need to worry about that; it can just keep buying back its own shares every year, and the investor decides when the valuation is too high or not.

There is no need for that, because the investor can make that decision for themselves. The share price might never drop to the target level, so the company would be hoarding cash on its balance sheet for years in vain. This would, of course, be reflected in the share price development, but I think accumulating a massive cash pile for an uncertain crash is not in the companies’ interest.

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I’m joining the thread because the recent discussion pivoted to Sampo. Personally, I’m a supporter of the hybrid model. A good start to a calculation was made earlier, but a small error was noticed. However, the calculation wasn’t extended further to let compound interest really take off. Share buybacks have a mechanism that leads to EPS growth and subsequently, usually, to a share price increase. The significant benefit only starts to show after buybacks have continued for years. There are fewer “sharers” of the profit, and the long-term investor wins in terms of taxes compared to dividends. If Sampo buys back its own shares and pays out the same total euro amount in dividends the following year, the dividend per share grows. This is why I personally support the hybrid model. If dividends are paid and they grow, and buybacks are done, very few people are dissatisfied. If neither is done, dissatisfaction arises, which isn’t necessarily good for the share price. (For example, Sampo has large institutional owners who require cash flow). On the other hand, I think it’s worth it for private investors to consider whether they want to put dividend money back into the same company or if there are better alternatives.

I disagree with palse that the price of buybacks doesn’t matter. I believe price does matter, and buybacks shouldn’t be done, in my opinion, if management expects a bad or weak report. Management can buy shares themselves if they feel the timing is right. However, we then come to the point that the driving factor isn’t price but the outlook. The whole discussion about buyback prices reminds me of Buffett’s quote: “Watch the game, not the scoreboard.” If Finland was losing 0-2 yesterday and the coach keeps looking at the scoreboard saying we need to defend better and score more goals, it doesn’t help the team. You have to focus on what is being done well, maintain that, and improve where there’s room for improvement. Similarly, Sampo’s management should focus on what’s been done well in the business, keep it that way, and then improve the areas that need it. Regarding buybacks, the scale of profit distribution and how it’s divided must be evaluated. This should involve considering the stock’s valuation and future prospects.

I think there’s a conceptual bias in opposing buybacks. Management’s job is to allocate capital. Excess capital is returned to the owners. In investment literature, positive profit is distributed rather than left sitting in the cash pile, whether it’s done through buybacks or dividends. Now, if we want to jump to the scoreboard, the share price usually eventually follows the rising earnings per share (EPS) resulting from the decrease in the number of shares, as well as the potentially rising dividend when it’s paid. A stagnant dividend doesn’t usually cause cheers or a rise in the share price. In many cases, it would then be better to invest in a bond providing a similar return. Currently, in many cases, people want a high dividend yield, say 5%. Then they jump to the scoreboard and make the assumption that the price will drop. Why not aim for the highest possible total return for the investment (in the long run)? I recommend every “dividend investor” rethink their logic and consider what they actually need the dividend for. I’ve done this thinking myself, and for me, the answer has been: is there a long-term need for that dividend money besides reinvesting? Buffett has said that investing is simple, but difficult. For me, it has been mentally extremely difficult to admit and steer my investing in a direction where, for tax reasons, it’s better to reduce dividends. Of course, the Equity Savings Account (OST) helps with domestic shares. Still, one should perhaps choose the best foreign low-dividend stock with the best expected return instead of a domestic dividend powerhouse.

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I made a thorough calculation that should illustrate every situation under discussion, cleaned of random noise in stock value, over- and undervaluations, multiplier fluctuations according to the alignment of the stars, etc. I’m putting this here so it can be posted again and again if necessary… :slightly_smiling_face:

Note: For some reason, the notation yyy.yy(x) where the x in parentheses means an infinitely repeating sequence of numbers isn’t well-known in Finland. Sorry, I’ve learned to use it and I’m not going to stop because it’s so convenient.

A company has 90,000 in capital, 1,000 shares outstanding, and the investor has 1 share. For simplicity, shares can be sold in fractions and we live in a tax-free world. Additionally, the company’s valuation is always P/B 1, meaning the share value is always equity divided by the number of shares. So, the share value at the start is 90,000 / 1,000 = 90. The starting value of the investor’s assets is thus the one share’s 90 plus zero in the bank account.

A year passes, and the company’s return on equity (ROE) is 11.(1)%, meaning a profit of 10,000 was made, which is 10,000 / 1,000 = 10 per share. At the same time, the company’s equity is the starting point plus the profit made, i.e., 90,000 + 10,000 = 100,000. The share price is still P/B 1, i.e., 100,000 / 1,000 = 100. There are four scenarios for the use of this profit amount, stretched over two years—and with profit distribution only in the first year—to illustrate the investor’s wealth:

  1. No profit distribution; instead, the funds are invested at the same 11.(1)% return on equity. Before the second year’s profit distribution, the equity has grown to 100,000 * (1 + 0.11(1)) = 111,111, and the share is approximately 111,111.(1) / 1,000 = 111.(1). The value of the investor’s total wealth, i.e., the bank account’s 0 plus their one share, is that same 111.(1).

  2. Dividend distribution. The company pays out 10,000 from its balance sheet as dividends; the share is (100,000 - 10,000) / 1,000 = 90. The investor has 10,000 / 1,000 (= dividend per one share) * 1 (number of shares owned) = 10 in the bank account and one share worth 90 in the brokerage account. The investor’s total wealth is 100. The company is in the exact same situation as at the start, so the same can be repeated. In the second year, the investor has 10 + 10 in a zero-interest bank account and a share worth 90, totaling 110. However, the situation is unfair compared to point 1 because the company was able to generate a better return on the earnings than the investor. If we assume that the investor also puts their dividend into an asset yielding 11.(1)%, we reach the same total wealth result as in point 1: 100 (share value) + 10*1.11(1) (the first year’s dividend having grown with interest) = 111.(1).

  3. Share buyback. The company buys 10,000 worth of its own shares, i.e., 10,000 / 100 = 100 shares. The balance sheet is now 90,000, but there are only 900 shares outstanding. The share price is now 90,000 / 900 = 100. When the second year passes, the firm makes another 10,000 profit and the balance sheet is 100,000. Before profit distribution, the share is 100,000 / 900 = 111.(1). If the investor does nothing, the value of their wealth—i.e., one share and an empty bank account—at the end of the second year is 111.(1).

  4. Share buyback and the investor creating their own dividends by selling a piece of their share. In the first year, the investor wants to get 10 units of money into their bank account—i.e., an 11.(1)% return on their original 90-value investment—so they sell 10 / 100 = 0.1 of their only share. Now they have 0.9 shares worth 0.9 * 100 = 90 and 10 in the account, totaling 100. In the second year, before profit distribution, the share value is 111.(1) and the investor has 10*1.11(1) = 11.(1) in the account and share assets of 0.9 * 111.(1) = 100, i.e., a total of 111.(1).

When moving to dividend payment after buybacks, 10,000 / 900 = 11.(1) per share is distributed. Like in point 4, an investor who made their own dividends gets 0.9 * 11.(1) = 10 for their partial share, just as always before.

Note! The point is not how many shares you own, but how large a share of the company’s balance sheet you own. By making your own dividends, you maintain the ownership stake as relatively the same size, even though the absolute number of shares owned decreases. In a pure buyback, the stake just grows if the investor does nothing with their one share.

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This is all clear stuff, thumbs up for that.

My main arguments since last autumn, and after reading through the entire thread, are based on the suboptimal real-world scaling of the correct but theoretical calculation described above.

For some reason, at least in the United States, profit distribution consisting of dividends and buybacks shifts almost entirely to dividend payments during a downturn. The distribution policy of the Finnish companies mentioned above seems to be a positive exception to this, which is appreciated.

To prevent the discussion from getting out of hand again, I want to emphasize in advance that I am not against share buybacks (and cancellations!), but I do question their suboptimal implementation. In addition to the timing of purchases, there is also room for improvement in the cancellation process.

Another factor weakening the optimality of buybacks relates to the previous point. When a share price crashes, especially due to external reasons, the dividend amount typically drops very little or not at all, but the price crashes significantly relative to the dividend. In this case, an investor who relies on their income stream and creates their own “dividends” by selling shares is forced to sell an unreasonably large portion in a weak market, exposing them to sequence of returns risk. This is not an argument against buybacks either, but rather justifies the wish to keep part of the distribution as a dividend and reflects an owner’s caution to avoid selling at the bottom.

Share buybacks and cancellations have an EPS-increasing effect regardless of what happens to earnings. Whether the company’s earnings stay the same, grow, or shrink, EPS will be higher as a result of share cancellations than without them. I am a bit surprised that the impact of buybacks (and cancellations!) on EPS even needs to be discussed, but if it’s not clear to everyone yet, it’s good that it was revisited.

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Indeed. EPS and key figures are rising, and the CEO can just kick back and relax.

With a clear conscience, they can then collect their bonuses, even if they were slacking off at work just like before.

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This is not true. If you sell the same proportion that the company buys back, the price doesn’t matter. When the stock is cheap, the company can cancel more shares with the same amount of money.

I don’t understand how you can argue that timing is poor when buying high, while simultaneously arguing that buying low is also a risk. The price doesn’t matter to the company when buying back its own shares. It gains nothing. The owner can decide whether they want tax-efficient homemade dividends or to increase their ownership stake.

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The idea behind presenting the calculations I made is to first establish a clear theoretical foundation.

The next expanding step would then be a short and concise question: “Would you rather take the 85% taxable portion of a dividend, or—depending on capital gains—the 0%–80% taxable portion of ‘homemade dividends’ created by selling shares, based on the gross amount paid out in profit distribution?”

Once these basics are clear and understood, we can start talking about how, considering taxes and other costs, most investors actually only want to receive the amount they need for expenses. In a dividend distribution, you cannot choose this amount; you must politely accept the money and pay taxes on it, even if you could just as well leave the funds tax-free in the company or for share buybacks, and especially for the resulting (at least for now) tax-free capital appreciation.

Once the points directly related to the topic have been covered, we can move the discussion to a higher level, to so-called external factors that, in a scientific sense, shouldn’t be considered because they are under the control of neither the company nor the investor, nor do they stem from or otherwise relate to the profit distribution or the choice of its method, but which still collectively affect what the investor is left with:

Nothing guarantees that the share price will even budge from share buybacks, cancellations, or the news about them. And nothing guarantees that someone making “homemade dividends” will time it exactly so they get a corresponding benefit from buybacks (@KalleH, I ended up assuming that 740_GLE means this—it is, of course, not the fault of the buyback logic or the company). Valuation multiples fluctuate randomly anyway. A dividend, along with its total wealth effects for both the company and the investor, is at least independent of the share price and its fluctuations, and is “nearly risk-free” once that dividend has been locked in at the Annual General Meeting (AGM).

To the previous point, it can be said that with buybacks and making homemade dividends, averaging out nevertheless removes the noise, and in the long run, we approach the theory I posted, as exemplified by Mirko_Sampo_IR’s post about Sampo.

But then comes the point that 740_GLE rightly raised: Buybacks tend to be concentrated during moments of overvaluation without a corresponding balancing buyback during periods of undervaluation. So, averaging out doesn’t necessarily help.

This bad habit of doing buybacks at high prices isn’t a “flaw in the theory”; rather, it can be explained by, among other things, investors’ dividend preference: stopping dividend payments causes more fear, anger, and rage among shareholders than stopping buybacks. Stopping the profit distribution entirely, regardless of its form, is actually quite smart when the company’s performance is poor. Undervaluation usually stems from the market’s fear of declining earnings. But despite this, people want dividends, even if the company has to take on debt to pay them…

Of course, when we remember that an investor doesn’t actually want the whole dividend in their account, but only the part they need for something else, one can argue that even if you liquidate your shares at an unfavorable valuation for only the amount you need, the loss will probably still be smaller than the disadvantage accumulated from dividends. Unless, of course, the intention is to live hand-to-mouth and every cent is precious—but then one could say the investor’s problems lie elsewhere than in the company’s profit distribution strategy. Namely, in risk management.

For an investor, clinging to dividends and buybacks is generally silly if they are able to assess whether the stock is over- or underpriced:

If an investor knows a stock is overvalued, why do they even own the stock and wait for a profit distribution they know will lose out to a future downward price correction? Well, the answer, of course, is that they don’t know for sure if the stock is overvalued. They also don’t know for sure when the overvaluation will dissipate. Nor do they know if they can buy the stock back at a suitable price even if the overvaluation ends (the damn thing has to drop enough for the benefit to cover the capital gains taxes that become payable).

Both making homemade dividends and profiting from price fluctuations are games of luck, whereas a dividend distribution is at least like the interest on a bond: You know at least in advance what the return on the original investment is, no matter how much the price fluctuates between being a profitable and unprofitable investment in the meantime. Except that you don’t, because a stock has no maturity date or a par value paid at the end, and the dividend is much more volatile than a nominal interest rate.

But regardless, a company’s stubborn adherence to a predictable dividend policy is comforting knowledge that frees up time for things other than constantly assessing reporting and news, guessing price movements to choose the right moment to liquidate, and other stressful activities. In the end, it doesn’t require more work (or rather, different work) than what one would do as a lender, because you don’t have to worry about anything other than the company’s earnings not falling below a critical point. A stock speculator must also consider earnings movements above that critical point.

I probably forgot a bunch of other arguments for and against dividends and buybacks, but these came to mind while writing in the absence of anything better to do.

Theory says unequivocally that buybacks are a winning strategy if the company has no better use for the money, but psychological and cumulative pragmatic factors then make the matter more a question of opinion. Due to my own limited mental resources, I prefer to direct my cash flow into buy-and-forget stocks that pay dividends with guaranteed certainty, and only a few speculative targets that require focus and rely solely on price appreciation (where, however, it would be nice to expect a change from zero dividends to dividend payments, as that usually leads to significant price jumps after which the shares can be sold).

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This assumption of yours does not hold true in the real world. Nordea and Sampo, which I already mentioned, are positive exceptions, but on average, S&P 500 companies at least do not buy at the bottom. I will quote the same post you replied to below. You can find the justifications for the quote a bit further up in this discussion.

I don’t understand how you can claim that I’m accusing buying low of being a risk? Can you provide a quote where I said that?

On the contrary, I am complaining that if buybacks have been chosen as a method for profit distribution, then shares are not being bought back enough when prices are low!!! I stated very clearly that I am in favor of a well-communicated profit distribution consisting of both buybacks and dividends.

I have disapproved of the way many companies reduce the share of buybacks in their profit distribution when stock prices fall.

The voting power of a minority shareholder is not enough to continue buybacks when shares can be bought cheaply. The end result is that someone creating their own dividends by selling will sell in all market conditions, while the company concentrates buybacks at the most expensive moments. If this is the optimal way to execute buybacks, then I have run out of arguments.

I join the ranks of those who believe it would be good to read what has already been discussed on the topic before commenting.

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Thank you for this message. I read through your entire text carefully and, even at the risk of some repetition, I subscribe to everything you said in this post.

The basics have already required so much explaining that I haven’t even dared to address in much depth why share buybacks usually slow down as stock prices decline. Protecting the company’s cash position by reducing profit distribution is a well-justified action when earnings collapse, but the way it is done in practice is suboptimal.

At least in the closely followed S&P, profit distribution as dividends continues almost as before, but buybacks slow down significantly exactly when even the most stubborn opponent of buybacks is forced by the facts to admit that it might be a quite clever time to buy more!

And that is exactly why the dividend policies communicated by Sampo and Nordea are a refreshing exception to prevailing practices, made by people who can do the math.

If you always sell as much as the company buys back, the price cancels out of the equation. According to financial theory, dividends and share buybacks are identical except for costs and taxes.

Reading the thread isn’t enough; you also need to understand it.

If you always sell what the company buys back, the income stream for someone generating dividends by selling collapses much more sharply than for someone collecting dividends, because share buybacks are slowed down more drastically than dividend payments. This is not a flaw in the method but is due to how the method is used.

Let’s turn our attention to the major crashes of recent years in 2008–2009 and 2020. Even for those collecting dividends, income fell during the crashes, but if the income was “always sell as much as the company buys back,” starvation set in by late summer 2009 at the latest.

Absolutely agree!

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