I have never heard that Nordea, OP or Danske would have given direct debt arrangements to anyone. Waivers, yes, i.e., forgiveness for breaches of contract, but they also charge fees for those.
Someone tell me if you know of a case, but in all corporate payment difficulties I’ve encountered, the bank has held firm to its 100% position and only tightens its grip the more trouble the debtor is in.
I’ve encountered a case where, in connection with a change of ownership, the bank granted a debt reduction on part of the debt capital. The condition was that the new owner invests significant cash into the company to strengthen liquidity. I suspect that, from its own perspective, the bank achieved a better position regarding the remaining debt capital through this.
Related to this comment, some movement seems to have occurred in the ownership of City Kauppapaikat Oy based on beneficiary data very recently:
It would now be really interesting to know if Omasp has increased its ownership in the company, or if Sarajärvi and Keskinen with their families have reorganized their own ownership in the company.
The bank has not announced any deal, so I would consider the bank increasing its ownership unlikely. However, I am willing to change my mind if the next interim report states that the bank owns 100% of these old shopping centers.
Even crazier things have happened at this bank.. 
Pasi Sydänlammi still appears to be the representative of the Töysä Savings Bank Foundation. The Ostrobothnians have trust in their own son even after the bank’s dismissal. Of course, it’s quite peculiar that the CEO and now former CEO is the manager of the affairs of a rather large shareholder, i.e., simultaneously an employee and an owner. It’s no wonder that control failed both in the bank’s management and among the owners. Typical savings bank governance, i.e., the problem of ownerless money. The owners are completely run by employees. With the current ownership structure, it’s difficult to believe in a better future.
The real challenge for this Oma Säästöpankki (OmaSp) is its ownership; the top 10 owners hold 75% of the votes, and 9/10 of them are these ex-savings banks.
The article linked earlier on June 17th explains how the foundations appear to be involved in local sports, culture, and charity.
I haven’t noticed it myself, but presumably, business operations have been transferred through a business transfer in exchange for an ownership stake, and the proceeds from these ownership stakes are used for charity.
Well, charity isn’t wrong, especially when wealth has accumulated.
However, the ownership structure matters, as the ownership by non-profit foundations might need some proper capitalists to push for more and better performance, instead of the management being allowed to engage in joint ventures with customers.
When the cat’s away, the mice will play, both on and under the table…
Largest Shareholders | OmaSp Suurimmat osakkeenomistajat | OmaSp
Large local foundations presumably also have an interest in maintaining a very extensive branch network so that services remain available in their own locality. This is a thought to consider when evaluating efficiency potential.
The preliminary investigation into suspected securities market offenses has been completed:
The article is at least still freely readable, but here is probably the most essential part:
Quite a few suspects remained, even though the investigation concluded for one.
According to the company’s statement, Pykäri is leaving his position at his own request.
Oma Säästöpankin riskienhallintajohtaja jättää tehtävänsä | Kauppalehti.
Is fine 
Yeah, I guess they started service on 1.12.23. Good or bad news. Did they already manage to do damage or couldn’t they get risks under control? Or are they abandoning a sinking ship? Many questions. Not necessarily good news either.
There has been no clear reaction from the markets yet. It’s hard to say what the impact should be. He had been appointed during the old administration, which didn’t care much for risk management, so in that sense, his departure could even be a good sign of the corporate culture improving. On the other hand, the aforementioned scenario of escaping a sinking ship also seems quite possible. It’s impossible to say when one doesn’t know the background.
Based on the given announcement, I interpret that the dismissal was initiated by the CEO/board.
The new Chief Risk Officer will start no later than the last day of August, meaning Oma Sp has 2 months to find a suitable person.
Severance packages are typical in the industry for management personnel, meaning several months’ salary is handed over so that they agree to resign themselves. It’s hard to imagine that a Chief Risk Officer who has spent their career in risk management roles would leave their position but remain within the organization for the rest of the year to work on other tasks.
I have been under the impression that Pykäri has played a significant role in bringing misconduct to light, and without them, many issues would have been delayed in surfacing. When Pykäri joined the organization, it truly took guts for a newcomer to address difficult truths. In my opinion, they have done an excellent job.
The continuation of the employment until the end of the year also suggests to me that the departure is on their own initiative. An understandable decision, considering the events during their employment at the bank.
Ok, nice to hear in a way. However, this raises the probability of a sinking ship scenario, at least in my eyes. If a person is ambitious and has the prerequisites for success in the job, they would surely want to see it through… Well, this is speculation in its purest form.
Ilkka-Pohjalainen reported today on the situation of the plot of land bought by Fincap from Vaasa:
Il-Po also reported on the same land deal less than a month ago:
Land deal summarized:
-The city of Vaasa organized a tender for the plot, which Fincap won with a bid of 5 million euros. A preliminary agreement for the land deal was concluded in August 2021.
-Of the three bidders, the bids of the other two were under one million euros:
-The final deed of sale for the plot was made in October 2022, when Fincap paid 920 t€ of the purchase price to the city of Vaasa. In March 2023, the city granted an extension for the remaining part, so that 770 t€ was to be paid by the end of 2023 and the entire purchase price by the end of April 2024.
Fincap paid a portion of 422 t€ of the agreed installment at the end of 2023, but no payments have been made since then.
What makes it interesting regarding the bank are the mortgages applied for on the plot, as according to the encumbrance data, Omasp applied for a 3.5 million euro mortgage on December 20, 2023, on this largely unpaid plot, where the city of Vaasa already has a priority mortgage of 4.1 million euros:
This happened just before the bubble burst and the problems were revealed. Other construction companies (I believe Peab and YIT) valued the plot at less than one million in their own bids, but Omasp believes its collateral value exceeds 7.5m€ with junior mortgages.
I believe this is an extreme example, but I don’t have much confidence in the bank’s collateral.
Chairman Ossa declared a year ago that OmaSp’s loan portfolio is otherwise completely healthy, with the exception of a customer entity related to one responsible person, where regulations have been violated. Similarly, Ossa has defined that the new CEO’s most important task is to return OmaSp to the path of profitable growth. Representatives of the owner foundations also speak primarily about pursuing growth. Risks have been brought to light, and now we move forward. This is the mantra repeated by the bank externally. The Chief Risk Officer’s job has been “easy” for so long, as issues could be blamed on those who have left the bank. Time has now passed, and the Chief Risk Officer has been made to understand, or has otherwise sensed, that bringing problems to light is no longer as desirable, now that the responsible persons have changed. A difficult situation for him if the problem still remains.
So apparently OmaSP was still planning to finance the land deal in autumn 2023. At that time, those mortgages would have been perfectly fine, if the credit was €5M, then there would have been room for unpaid interest and costs.
A fine house would have been built there, had the world stayed on track and Pasis as bankers.
It seems that Chairman Ossa’s declaration, as well as the speeches of the representatives of the owner foundations, currently have at most entertainment value. The speeches and declarations have repeatedly been just talk, meaning they are inaccurate. Unfortunately, this is the level at which the bank’s largest owners and the representatives of the administration operate. It is therefore not very easy to reach a reliable level.
Thanks again for the information you dug up! However, it’s good to remember that mortgages are often applied for above the fair value of the property, so that the mortgage deeds also cover the value of a building to be constructed later. Therefore, one cannot deduce the assumed value of the property at that given time from the number of mortgage deeds. It is, of course, clear that those mortgage deeds exceeding the fair value have no collateral value.
A large collateralization secures potential follow-up financing or otherwise provides future protection, ensuring that no other financier or creditor makes an intervening pledge that would have better priority in the future if the financing of the entity in question grows with capital or even unpaid interest. As a precaution, collateral is pledged slightly more than necessary.
Large corporate mortgages have been applied for in May 2025 for companies related to the Pasila/Vallila workshop. The group’s current parent company is TF Holding Oy, through which Sarajärvi joined the project in late 2021 with a one-euro equity investment and tens of millions in loan financing from Oma Säästöpankki for the companies of the workshop project. At that stage, the group led by the former US ambassador had hit a dead end regarding the project’s financing.
https://www.hs.fi/talous/art-2000008749396.html
In May 2025, TF Holding Oy applied for a 126 million euro corporate mortgage, held by Oma Säästöpankki:
According to the latest financial statements, TF Holding’s assets under corporate mortgage are insignificant at book values; the book value of Tre Train Factory Holding shares is 2 euros:
The Train Factory Holding Oy, 100% owned by TF Holding, has also applied for a 126 million euro corporate mortgage in May 2025, and the holder is Oma Säästöpankki:
The balance sheet of The Train Factory Holding also contains very few assets under corporate mortgage relative to the size of the applied corporate mortgage, and they consist of investments made in real estate-owning companies (previously lost):
Under The Train Factory Holding, there are two companies in the chain: Train Factory Parking Oy and Kiinteistö Oy Train Factory. These have also applied for 126 million euro corporate mortgages in May, and the holder is Oma Säästöpankki:
Even these companies’ balance sheets have hardly any assets under corporate mortgage relative to the size of the corporate mortgage:
The real estate in the workshop area is owned by the latter two companies, and according to the latest 2023 financial statements, Oma Säästöpankki had mortgages on these properties totaling 52 million euros and receivables from the companies of 40 million euros:
After this, additional mortgages of 28 million euros were applied for on the property in April 2024.
Of course, it is possible that a reasonable explanation for these applied corporate mortgages will be found later. However, it is difficult to see any collateral value for these corporate mortgages exceeding half a billion euros from publicly verifiable information. These properties are already mortgaged “100 meters above the chimney,” and it is difficult to see the bank’s collateral position having improved significantly with these corporate mortgages.
The actions under the new management certainly do not convince me; things seem to be getting even crazier.