Well, that has grown by 10% in 2024 vs. 2022. Compared to 2021, over 60%?
Are you suggesting that only growth achieved in consecutive years counts as growth?
4 Likes
Insiders have topped up by approximately 20 thousand and 30 thousand shares.
8 Likes
Actually, this reply should have been made to user @capital’s message, but let’s go with this more recent follow-up. At first, I thought I wouldn’t participate in this discussion, but let’s at least try to stick to the correct figures. Those figures raised by Capital are Framery Oy’s figures. They aren’t the whole picture, which would be clear simply by looking at, for example, the listing prospectus or recent publications. The group’s revenues are as follows:
- 2021 - €93.8 M
- 2022 - €152.5 M
- 2023 - €151.0 M
- 2024 - €162.1 M and
- 2025 - €222.1 M
If we now take into account that the traditional old EMEA region grew by 19.5%, America by 52%, and APAC by 91.8%. Regarding APAC, it has been separately stated that it’s typical for the region to have larger project sales, i.e., fluctuations, but regarding the important America region, it was stated that the company expects growth to continue, and in the EMEA region, development is in line with expectations.
Somehow, it’s hard to understand this negativity. Though I suppose the CEO didn’t understand it either, as today he “stepped in to buy” as the price dropped.
16 Likes
Professional analysis below:
Why did Framery collapse?
Newly listed companies are expected to exceed their promises, but the office pod manufacturer’s last quarter result was at the lower end of the guidance range provided by the company.
8 Likes
Chairman of the Board has bought even more shares.
1 Like
Regarding Framery’s investments, the company is supported by a strong subcontractor network.
The company doesn’t need to invest “anything” itself to increase capacity; that is the subcontractors’ problem.
I work for one of these subcontracting companies, and there is plenty of room to increase capacity. I know the same to be true for the two other largest subcontractors.
Framery itself in Tampere basically just assembles demo pods and loading pallets; the pod components are manufactured elsewhere.
This is just a note regarding comments on why they aren’t investing in growth; I’m not saying whether this is a good or bad investment case.
For me, this is a good swing trading stock; I can use information from my workplace to deduce in advance what kind of quarter is coming up.
Of course, Framery could order pods from us for their inventory as well, but there’s a limit to that. The local truck driver who takes a load from us daily and brings back empty pallets tells us quite clearly whether the warehouse is full or empty.
11 Likes
But a truck driver can’t tell what the margins on the orders are, for example? A larger order is visible as an increase in activity throughout the entire supply chain, but to land a big order, Framery may have given significant discounts, and the quarterly result might end up being weaker than during a quieter period.
4 Likes
Exactly. I feel, however, that this is the home-field advantage one seeks by investing in the domestic stock market.
Even these small tidbits of information and personal observations are far more than what I can get from some company across the pond.
6 Likes
Cityvarasto’s CEO said in an interview today when asked about the small dividend (not a verbatim quote): “There is no sense in first raising money from the market and then distributing it out the other end.”
Sounded like a jab at Framery. 
17 Likes
Have I misunderstood something? I’m not yet a shareholder, but the market currently seems to be pricing Framery quite cautiously.
With my own DCF model, I reach a valuation similar to the current share price with fairly moderate assumptions: revenue growth of about 5% per year in the coming years, adjusted EBIT margin at around 20%, WACC of 9.8%, and terminal growth of 2.2%. With these assumptions, the stock’s value is practically in line with the current share price. Therefore, it appears to me that the market is pricing the company based on moderate growth rather than a particularly strong long-term growth story (below are the assumptions I used to arrive at my conclusion on how the market prices the company; feel free to grill me if the assumptions are completely off).
| DCF ASSUMPTIONS | |
|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (%) | 3.8% |
| Equity Risk Premium (%) | 5.6% |
| Beta | 1.30 |
| Cost of Equity (%) | 11.0% |
| Cost of Debt (pre-tax) (%) | 4.5% |
| Target D/E Ratio | 0.20 |
| WACC (%) | 9.8% |
| Terminal Growth Rate (%) | 2.0% |
| REVENUE BY REGION | FY25 | FY26E | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E | FY30E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMEA | 118.3 | 123.0 | 128.0 | 133.1 | 138.4 | 143.9 | |
| YoY Growth (%) | 19.5% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% | |
| Americas | 65.9 | 69.9 | 74.0 | 78.5 | 83.2 | 88.2 | |
| YoY Growth (%) | 51.8% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | |
| APAC | 37.9 | 40.2 | 42.6 | 45.1 | 47.8 | 50.7 | |
| YoY Growth (%) | 91.4% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.0% | |
| Total Revenue | 222.1 | 233.1 | 244.6 | 256.7 | 269.4 | 282.8 | |
| YoY Growth (%) | 36.9% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 5.0% |
| PROFITABILITY ASSUMPTIONS | FY25 | FY26E | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E | FY30E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin (%) | 48.0% | 45.0% | 46.0% | 47.0% | 50.0% | 50.0% | |
| Gross Profit | 106.6 | 104.9 | 112.5 | 120.6 | 134.7 | 141.4 | |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin (%) | 25.4% | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% | 23.0% | |
| Adj. EBITDA | 56.4 | 53.6 | 56.3 | 59.0 | 62.0 | 65.1 | |
| D&A | 5.9 | 6.5 | 7.2 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 9.0 | |
| Adj. EBIT | 50.5 | 47.1 | 49.1 | 51.0 | 53.5 | 56.1 | |
| Adj. EBIT Margin (%) | 22.7% | 20.2% | 20.1% | 19.9% | 19.8% | 19.8% | |
| Items Affecting Comparability | 5.9 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.0 | |
| Reported EBIT | 44.6 | 43.1 | 46.1 | 49.0 | 52.0 | 55.1 | |
| Tax Rate (%) | 20.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | 20.0% | |
| Capex | 3.1 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.0 | |
| NWC as % of Revenue | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% |
| DCF | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY26E | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E | FY30E | |
| Unlevered FCF | 34.8 | 36.8 | 38.9 | 41.2 | 43.6 |
| Discount Period | 0.5 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.5 |
| WACC | 9.8% | ||||
| Discount Factor | 0.954 | 0.869 | 0.792 | 0.721 | 0.657 |
| PV of FCF | 33.2 | 32.0 | 30.8 | 29.7 | 28.6 |
| DCF SUMMARY | |||||
| Sum of PV of FCF | 154.3 | ||||
| Terminal FCF (FY30 * (1+g)) | 44.4 | ||||
| Terminal Value | 570 | ||||
| PV of Terminal Value | 375 | ||||
| Enterprise Value | 529 | ||||
| Less: Net Debt | -67 | ||||
| Equity Value | 462 | ||||
| Shares Outstanding (m) | 79.1 | ||||
| Implied Share Price (EUR) | 5.84 | ||||
| Current Share Price (EUR) | 6.10 | ||||
| Upside / (Downside) | -4.3% |
| KEY METRICS | |
|---|---|
| Current Share Price (EUR) | 6.10 |
| DCF Implied Share Price (EUR) | 5.84 |
| Upside / (Downside) | -4.3% |
| Enterprise Value (EUR m) | 529 |
| Market Cap (EUR m) | 483 |
| Net Debt (EUR m) | 66.9 |
| FY25 Revenue | 222.1 |
| FY26E Revenue | 233.1 |
| FY26E Growth | 4.9% |
| FY25 Adj. EBIT Margin | 22.7% |
| FY26E Adj. EBIT Margin | 20.2% |
| EV/Revenue (FY25) | 2.4x |
| EV/Revenue (FY26E) | 2.3x |
| P/E (FY26E) | 15.2x |
And if anyone is interested in the WACC / TV matrix:
| SP (EUR) | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.6% | 7.79 | 8.41 | 9.16 | 10.07 | 11.20 |
| 8.1% | 7.14 | 7.66 | 8.28 | 9.01 | 9.90 |
| 8.6% | 6.59 | 7.03 | 7.54 | 8.14 | 8.86 |
| 9.1% | 6.10 | 6.48 | 6.91 | 7.42 | 8.01 |
| 9.8% | 5.67 | 5.99 | 6.36 | 6.79 | 7.29 |
(I always create models in English because my language of study is English.)
This seems somewhat odd, as the company’s historical development and profitability have been quite strong. If the quality of the business, market position, and growth outlook are genuinely sound, the current valuation does not, at first glance, appear particularly demanding.
Therefore, the question is probably more about this: does the market primarily doubt the sustainability of growth? In other words, is Framery seen as a business where the current position is good, but the competitive advantage is not strong enough to protect higher growth and high margins in the long term?
A possible bear case could be that, even though Framery has built a strong brand and position, the product category itself may not have an exceptionally deep moat. If the market believes that as demand grows, competitors can practically replicate the product, enter the market with a larger balance sheet or more aggressive pricing, and drive down profits, the current valuation is easier to understand.
Still, I’m not entirely sure how realistic this risk actually is. In practice, in a business like this, competitive advantage may not be based solely on the product idea, but on the overall package: brand, distribution, project sales, acoustic expertise, delivery capability, certifications, references, and the fact that customers, especially large companies, prefer to buy a known and tested solution rather than a cheaper copy. If this is the case, the market might currently be overly skeptical.
My own feeling is that the weakness in the share price seems more like sentiment and risk pricing than a purely fundamentally driven collapse. However, I am not yet an owner, as the situation has long looked like a bit of a falling knife. Despite this, the fundamentals no longer fully support such cautious pricing in my eyes.
Where am I thinking wrong? Do you think the market’s caution is primarily a result of cyclicality and short-term uncertainty, or is there genuinely some structural weakness in Framery’s competitive advantage that justifies the low valuation?
9 Likes
A quick tip: If it’s not a significantly larger company, it’s worth rechecking the cost of debt for WACC if you can get it well under 7%. Just a quick calculation of interest payments/long-term debt gave me around 8%. But yeah, the total WACC of ~10% is quite reasonable.
That’s why I don’t really like DCF models; by tweaking the numbers, you can make even a bankrupt company look good
To stay on topic: I believe the market doesn’t really know how this phone booth market will develop, and the competitive advantage is a bit “meh.”
14 Likes
Thanks for the tip, I’ll double-check the cost of debt again. Good point.
However, may I ask a follow-up question: what would you consider the most sensible way to look at a company like this if you don’t want to rely too heavily on DCF?
I understand the criticism of DCF well; with small changes in assumptions, the outcome varies greatly, making it easy to create more of a “nice-looking story” than a very strong truth. But at the same time, it feels like one still needs to try to form some view of the future.
I’m currently thinking about the best approach for a company like Framery. Comps don’t seem entirely unproblematic, as there aren’t really any perfectly pure comparables. The asset base, on the other hand, doesn’t intuitively sound like the best way to look at this type of business, unless one specifically considers some kind of downside or liquidation-type floor.
So, if one is trying to value a company like this as reasonably as possible, what would you emphasize?
Would you think about this more:
- earnings-based (e.g., EV/EBIT or EV/FCF),
- through comparables, even if they are imperfect,
- as a scenario analysis, where the most important thing is not one “correct value” but a range with different competitive advantage and growth assumptions,
or in some completely different way?
I’d be happy to learn more, as I’m currently figuring this out myself.
4 Likes
I have nothing against the DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) model per se, but as a layman, it takes a lot of time and still goes awry If I do it, I make 2-3 year forecasts.
I do a kind of “napkin” analysis based on the latest report and consensus estimates - just a quick check to see if the company’s numbers look relatively okay. I can’t model the future accurately enough, so it remains more of a qualitative valuation. I try to look more at management, owners, and analyze the company’s moat a bit.
So, basically, the balance sheet is okay and no impossible investments are coming → Earnings & Cash Flow / Key figures are okay → Qualitative analysis of the company’s future; Growing market → Competitors & Moat (biggest focus) → What’s in the R&D pipeline → Management’s track record → Owners (Is Buffett an owner? ) → Other things (e.g., open positions, employee sentiment on Glassdoor).
I do some type of analysis like this, whatever the investment case may be. For me, it’s still mostly a hobby, so it leans a bit towards gut feeling.
4 Likes
DCF is the graveyard where analysts go to die, and it’s particularly dreadful for companies like Remedy. No one in this world can possibly forecast cash flows even 5 years ahead, let alone over a 20-30 year period.
As I’ve often said, the only useful aspect of a DCF model is the magnitude of the TERM portion of all cash flows, which tells you how much of the valuation is in the distant future.
8 Likes
Now we were talking about Framery, not Remedy. Cash flows are perhaps a bit easier to predict in manufacturing than in a game company, but the crystal ball still has to be quite clear.
3 Likes
If Framery’s order book is mainly for a few months, the company itself doesn’t know what will happen next year. Of course, they hope that business will continue. Based on this information, some eager external “analyst” can, of course, make cash flow calculations and analyze the fair price for the stock 5 years from now. If the guessed numbers are correct, Excel might look good in hindsight 5 years later, or quite embarrassing. Framery doesn’t know today whether, for example, tech giants will order a lot, a little, or none of these next year. Orders might go to a competitor if a good one emerges from somewhere, or to a different kind of office structural solution, the selling price might change by over ten percent (and the gross margin even more) due to price competition, or 10 other things might change. The cash flow calculation could then be completely redefined based on that.
If you scroll through 100 cash flow calculations from old analyses of other companies, you’ll often notice that the predictive value is quite poor.
9 Likes
13 Likes
Framery Q1 results.
January–March 2026 in brief
Revenue remained stable with a change of -0.1% compared to the comparison period, totaling 58.4 (58.4) million euros. Calculated at comparable exchange rates, revenue growth would have been 2.4% and revenue would have been 60.9 million euros*. Excluding the share of the largest single end customer, revenue grew by 15.2% from the comparison period.
Operating profit (EBIT) was 13.9 (15.4) million euros, or 23.8% (26.3%) of revenue.
Adjusted operating profit was 14.0 (16.7) million euros, or 24.0% (28.6%) of revenue.
Operating free cash flow was 4.4 (7.9) million euros and cash flow conversion was 28.6% (43.3%).
Net debt was 64.8 (98.5) million euros. The leverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of net debt to the adjusted EBITDA of the last 12 months, was 1.2 (2.0).
Earnings per share (basic and diluted) was 0.13 euros per share (0.12).
7 Likes
Wasn’t this supposed to be a growth company?
Revenue remained flat with a change of -0.1% compared to the reference period, totaling 58.4 (58.4) million euros.
…
The first quarter of 2026 started favorably for Framery. Revenue developed well and reached the level of the reference period.
No point making excuses about revenue adjusted for the largest customer or the war in Iran. Either the growth is there or it isn’t. Now it looks like they only went public to cash out via the IPO just as the company’s growth figures started to weaken significantly.
36 Likes
Framery’s results are nothing to cheer about. It was presumably known that the high purchase volumes from the largest customer couldn’t continue forever, so the detail that sales to other customers are still growing is a positive sign. Otherwise, I would be even more worried about the situation. Sales are coming in and cash is flowing into the coffers. At this growth rate, it will be a long wait (years) before a 10-euro share price is justified.
At least this isn’t a completely questionable listing like Modulight’s. Modulight included research projects in its revenue and accounts receivable that customers didn’t even intend to pay for when the desired results weren’t achieved. Or the probability of payment was low. Once the IPO had been pushed through and the money collected from investors, it was announced that the majority of the projects in the receivables had failed, and customers weren’t asked for payment. Without this window dressing of the prospectus, the offering surely wouldn’t have gone through. They were moving in a very gray area, but this too was apparently legal, as no other actions seem to have been taken afterwards, at least publicly, aside from the grumbling on the discussion boards. The profitable growth company turned out to be a loss-making laggard once management’s discretionary, overly positive future outlooks were left out of the guidance. Try analyzing the financial statements of listing companies as an outsider in a situation like this.
8 Likes