That’s just how it goes in this business sometimes, it seems. The stock gives, and the stock takes away. A sad story, complete with those bizarre snow removal costs and everything. Maybe there’s a lesson to be learned here.
I understand the word “insolvent” to mean that there’s nothing left to restructure. The cash is gone.
I’m returning to this reflection of mine from three months ago now that Dovre is perhaps seeking to avoid bankruptcy through corporate restructuring.
As I understand it, a condition for corporate restructuring is that there is healthy business to be saved, which makes my previous reflection a burning central question.
Dovre’s remaining parts are a bit of a mystery, at least they include:
The old Proha Finnish consulting business, likely a few employees and maybe €1–2m in revenue.
eSite, which was acquired from Fortum; I don’t really know what it does, but revenue is unlikely to be more than €0.5m.
Renetec—I wondered about its founding earlier, but perhaps trust in Suvic was already wearing thin, and that’s why it’s a separate company (though not for project execution, more for design if I remember correctly). Its revenue is unlikely to be over €1m; information has been quite scarce.
An associate company called Suvirasa or similar has been held for a long time, with a 20% stake; its value in the financial statements has presumably been around €2m.
Those elements can be made profitable, but the restructuring cuts would need to be massive to generate significant cash flow from those components. We’ll see if management still has the stamina to keep dragging this stone sledge; the upside is, however, quite limited. I’ve been involved in this for probably 10 years or more; at one point the choice was between Revenio or this, and I might not have picked the winning horse but I knew Dovre from before, and at the time there was a clear cleanup project underway that was progressing in the right direction year by year. Suvic was just a massive mistake; once again, a company from Oulu practicing “financially-driven project management” has been found, putting it in the same category as Lehto. This is actually even more shocking as losses are in the tens of millions and revenue hasn’t been much higher over the same period. Well, luckily I’ve been trimming my position, so maybe this adventure ended up just barely at ±0.
Finnish listed company declares insolvency – subsidiary to go bankrupt
Last one out, turn off the lights. Quite a mess. This was a rather promising and profitable company, though. It would certainly have had a different outcome with better management.
Is this the end of the Dovre story? A bad bank is offering to buy shares at a nominal price?
Won’t Koskelo, who defended Suvic and Dovre, make a counter-offer?
It’s strange that the discussion has died down like this.
It is also interesting what the actual role of the Chairman of the Board of Dovre Group is in this scheme. Kalervo Rötsä has at least been a prominent figure at the law firm Eversheds. Is his role here to be a front for the real power players, or what?
Well – it is probably useless to expect any comment from him or others who know the situation better. However, it is strange that out of Suvic’s €133M debt, €84.7M was debt to the parent company Dovre. Was it real or something else entirely?
This whole Suvic/Dovre case doesn’t just smell – it reeks!
The company is currently applying for corporate restructuring. There hasn’t been any news reported on the progress of this process yet, has there? Whether Dovre is admitted into such a process likely depends largely on the creditors and how significant hair cuts they are willing to make to the loans. And of course, also on whether there are seen to be realistic possibilities for the company to become profitable again with its remaining parts (following Suvic’s bankruptcy).
As I understand it, the revenues of the remaining parts are quite marginal compared to Suvic and its previous expectations.
Restructuring negotiations can last a long time, and even if a restructuring program is reached, the final result can still ultimately be bankruptcy. Shareholders are unlikely to be left with anything.
In that sense, it might be quite sensible to sell the shares at a nominal value to be able to make tax deductions. However, there is a risk that the tax authorities might nowadays interpret that kind of “selling shares of a bankrupt company to a friend for a euro” type of sale as tax evasion.
Has anyone already taken up that offer from Evon Capital? Any experiences?
I guess someone will eventually write a book about this too and tell us what the hell really happened there. Like with ICON. Though the author of that book mostly seemed to blame others and defend himself.
It certainly looks like Ilari has had enough of board responsibility, as long as the discharge from liability for the previous term is hammered through at the meeting. No one is held accountable for the fact that a previously net debt-free company was driven into liquidation in just a couple of years.
I intend to vote, with my small number of shares, against granting discharge from liability. Things have clearly been badly bungled for the company to end up in this state. Hopefully, Kyösti Kakkonen will give the management a hard time for their incompetence, so we would get at least some bread and circuses instead of the destruction of shareholder value. I am also a bit puzzled by the authorization to print 400M new shares and what the plan for them is. I also wonder about the high meeting fees relative to the assets of a company on the brink of bankruptcy, and whether it is truly necessary to appoint a new board member when the value they add remains unclear.
16. Authorizing the Board of Directors to decide on share issues and the issuance of special rights entitling to shares / Authorizing the Board of Directors to decide on the repurchase of own shares
The Board proposes to the General Meeting that the Board be authorized to decide on
(i) the issuance of new shares and/or
(ii) the transfer of the company’s own shares and/or
(iii) the issuance of special rights referred to in Chapter 10, Section 1 of the Limited Liability Companies Act under the following conditions:
Based on the authorization, the Board may decide on share issues and the issuance of special rights also in a directed manner, i.e., in deviation from the shareholders’ pre-emptive rights, under the conditions mentioned in the law. A maximum of 400,000,000 shares may be issued based on the authorization.
The Board may use the authorization in one or more installments. The Board may use the authorization to strengthen the capital structure of the company and its subsidiaries, to reduce guarantee liabilities, to improve liquidity and the company’s financial position, to execute corporate acquisitions and other arrangements, to issue convertible bonds, or for other purposes decided by the Board. New shares may be issued and the company’s own shares may be transferred either for consideration or without consideration, provided that no more than 125,000,000 shares may be issued without consideration. New shares may also be issued as a share issue without consideration to the company itself. The Board is authorized to decide on other terms of the share issue and the issuance of special rights. Based on the authorization, the Board may decide on the realization of any own shares held by the company as collateral.
The authorization is proposed to remain valid until the Annual General Meeting to be held in 2027, but no later than June 30, 2027. The authorization cancels previously granted authorizations regarding share issues and the issuance of stock options and other special rights entitling to shares.
I suppose these are being used to try and raise funding to continue operations (and of course, at the same time, dilute current shareholders to near zero)