Exactly. I would also add that it has always been possible to buy the original (U.UN) from Finland, but it has required the use of an international broker (e.g., IBKR). I originally started my purchases from Uranium Participation Corporation, which could be bought even through Mandatum, until Sprott bought it out.
Two new DFC investments in Africa, yet to be named:
Would this have a positive impact on Global Atomicâs financing likelihood?
So DFC is still alive and kicking, but I, for one, think that GLOâs most likely path at this point is still the JV (which also seems difficult).
URNM call for January 2027, Lotus and GLO added. Towards the autumn season, itâs been dead quiet for too long. Summerâs over, Sputâs 200M artificial respiration and EFâs rise caused a bit of a stir on Twitter. One would think LT volume would now rise to over 100mlbs for this year. And more volume in LT contracts for next spring. With prices rising, of course.

"cheat code is whatâs going on downstream. Downstream, we have a lot of contracting going on.
The fabrication space, nearing record high prices; the enrichment space, nearing record high prices, above replacement rate contracting; the conversion space, conversion has never been higher priced at absolutely record prices, above replacement rate contracting going on in conversion for a very good reason. The market is trying to solve the problem of getting off the addiction of Russian fuel.
And as a consequence, itâs driving a lot of attention downstream. So the good news is we know that demand is building and we know that demand is coming into uranium. The bad news is it hasnât shown up in uranium yet in a full way. Utilities are still pretty distracted downstream for good reason. They are still really tied up looking for the enrichment, looking for the conversion, but we know that, that demand has to come. They eventually need to come by the product for which there is no substitute." -Grant Isaac
Global Atomic has released a new announcement about financing, which is typical Global Atomic â more of the same. No financing is materializing. This endless loop of a story is starting to become quite a joke.

GLO is undeniably in an interesting situation (again). A new dilutive share issue is currently still a big risk, perhaps even the most likely scenario even if financing is arranged, because it probably wonât be on time.
I have heard from my own sources that quite a few investor parties would have gladly seen GLO take the JV opportunity even on worse terms, but either the management has not wanted to seize it, or the opportunity has only truly existed on paper, who knows.
Financing with a DFC loan is, in my opinion, a gamble both in terms of obtaining it and its timing, but I still consider it possible - at least at some point.
Bridge financing through URC? Even if it materializes, itâs unlikely to be very favorable for GLOâs owners: Amir Adnani is the counterparty there, and I can well imagine URC buying a large royalty from GLO for a couple of pennies, but I donât believe Stephen Roman will sell⊠yet.
Contrary to what has been trumpeted in the news, I am not yet concerned about the intentions of the Niger junta towards Dasa, but of course, it is difficult to accurately and impartially assess the situation from here.
The best risk/reward, in my opinion, would be to jump into this story at the earliest when/if financing is confirmed. The price could then, âwith very good luck,â still be even lower than the current level, if potential interim financing is a painful pill for investors to swallow.
This rule generally applies to investing in mine builders: first, get the team, DFS, permits, and financing in order, and then see if thereâs any return left for retail. By following that, I would have avoided probably 95% of the losses Iâve made in junior mines.
Disc: I am recklessly long (again) in GLO, probably under the illusion of previous successes, and I may very well take a loss here finally, but the upside is too tempting to play ![]()
More nuclear power for data centers
The contract period is finally starting to kick off after a very long quiet period. Requests for proposals at this stage are experimental and moderate in size, but it can be said with reasonable certainty that the final bottleneck will open up within the next 6 months.
Mines starting their old-new projects have initially had to sell with rather thin margins (sometimes even negative due to âunexpectedâ cost increases) as the need for money is great and things need to get moving. Soon these so-called âbrown fieldâ mines will have passed the critical stages, and order books also suggest that a new phase of price formation is beginning again.
This ~$80 level has remained for quite a long time, and the next movement will then be dictated by new green field projects. I think the next level where we will stay longer is around the $100 mark. The final and last level will be when toilet paper runs out of stores and prices are no longer regulated by calm contract negotiations but by surging emotions. Now Iâm talking about LT (long-term) prices, not spot prices, which could fluctuate even this year to $120-140 if the financial world decides so.
The sector has pushed up at a fairly robust pace since the early spring dip (Traders Club indeed served as a good contra-indicator, see above). There have been breathers and attempts at intermediate landings, but more fuel is constantly being added to the flames. Kazatomprom is reducing its 100% production capacity, and Cameco has challenges with the next phase of McArthur River in the form of declining production volumes. Small bombs are flying around like drones at oil refineries.
When even existing established producers have to slow down, one doesnât need to be a prophet to know what will happen with the next round of larger mines. Freely quoting Justin Huhn: thereâs a 0% chance that Nexgen, Denison, etc., will get the job done on budget and on schedule. Cameco also mentioned challenges in the availability of skilled labor, an area that has remained far too obscure under all the trendier news coverage. A massive bottleneck is coming for North American and especially Athabascan projects.
Although the outlook is once again âbetter than ever,â the sectorâs nature still includes large and strong accumulation phases. Mines have already surged ahead and anticipated the next price increase. Many already have air and expectations built in. For physical uranium, the situation is different; the only direction is up. A broader hype bubble is still far away. The sector is still largely followed by a rather specialized group; when the deep ranks awaken and fast profit-seeking money flows in, it might be a good time to lighten up again. Perhaps the next time Traders Club holds a special episode focused on uranium?
Interesting point. You seem to know about the topic. Is there any estimate when Nexgen and Denison will get the mines built, let alone into production?
According to official estimates, Nexgenâs production should start at the turn of 2030-2031, and Denisonâs in 2028. And these estimates are if everything goes smoothly: bureaucracy proceeds without hiccups, financing is in order, workforce is available, no surprises in mining technology (vs. paper plans), and last but not least: no corporate acquisitions.
It is likely that, for example, NexGenâs management does not genuinely and truly aim to bring the machinery into production themselves, but rather prepare things as far as possible and wait for a buyer. This buyer may then have completely different plans than to rush to dig metal out of the ground at full steam.
These schedules are also constantly shifting forward; just over five years ago, Denisonâs Phoenix was supposed to be in production already. The shift forward happens gradually: â2026H1, no, 2026Q4, actually 2028, etc.â So, itâs easy to add another +1 year to current estimates, and when production starts, it certainly wonât immediately be the full capacity that has been circulating on investor slides. Those estimates requiring perfect success are part of the companiesâ PR.
I have been following the uranium sector since 2021. At first, I thought these âmining is hardâ comments were just worn-out one-liners from senior folks. Power plants and the consultants serving them take these estimates seriously when assessing the supply<demand balance, and I have too. Only in the past year or so has it become concrete that absolutely EVERY new production startup is in trouble. Boss Energy seemed to be an exception, before their story also collapsed.
When companies fail one after another, the importance of diversification is emphasized. The risk-reward ratio of physical uranium is extremely strong, and a SPUT investment is almost becoming a safe haven when looking at indexes that are bubbling across the board.
Letâs also add here the estimates at different price levels:

The cheapest will soon be mined out, and we will move to the next cost level. Although it seems thereâs still plenty of the cheapest for several years, from the perspective of mining project durations, that is a short timeframe.
Edit: Countries for the next tier perhaps include Australia.

Apparently, Kazatomprom is reducing its production because it doesnât see demand at a level that justifies producing at 100% capacity. What do you think about this?

Kazatomprom has been quite late in realizing their negotiating power and market position in the market; for a long time, they only sought market share. Itâs been wondered a few times about their previous actions to quickly and cheaply get rid of the rock that cannot be replicated or produced from scratch. Of course, the equation must take into account the complex interests of centrally controlled state-owned companies, in addition to two big âfriendsâ in the neighborhood and their JV cooperation.
If Kazatomprom were to purely consider the value for its shareholders, they should tighten the reins even more; the share price would quickly explode upwards the longer they postponed their production.
We are eagerly awaiting what the final 2026 production target will be; it will certainly be smaller than the 100% maximum stated now.
Any thoughts on Global Atomic? It should be the only Greenfield project in the world, with production just around the corner, and according to the outlook, uranium would certainly be welcome on the market. The only obstacle is the repeatedly delayed financing, which, according to the company, still involves the American DFC bank and a potential JV partner. Will the project collapse, will the financing succeed, why such a long delay when the market is starting to wake up to the fact that uranium isnât endlessly available on the shelf?
Globalâs dark journey through the wilderness will eventually end. The JV has clearly been on a longer leash than Stephen Roman implied at the beginning of the year, but these CEOs looking for financing have to play that game of half-truths.
I personally think that DFC will eventually provide the financing, but there might be one or two more funding rounds before that. The share price could go surprisingly low, and whoever manages to buy from the last PP (private placement) round before financing will get a fairly quick multiplier. But of course, even a 5x increase in the share price wonât comfort long-term investors if the starting level is, for example, 0.20 CAD.
Given that Global has experienced every possible misfortune, the cherry on top would be if the Niger junta decided to nationalize the mine just as it was brought into production.
DFCâs management met again after a long break at the end of June and facilitated the progress of several projects, including a mining project in Africa. I would think that trade negotiations with Canada are a bigger reason for this yearâs delays than the junta in the target country. After all, Marco Rubio is the conductor there, and he now acts as a similar puppet for Trump as other influential figures. Trade agreement finalized and in a couple of weeks, a DFC loan to Global, I would guess, I would surmise, I would hopeâŠ
Yep, the variance is really stretched to its limits with bad luck. I understand that Global and CEO Stephen Roman are in a tight spot between the junta and DFC, but one variable in that scenario is what I donât fully understand regarding dilutions. The CEO is still the largest individual owner with 15m shares and, through dilutions, has seen the value of his holdings drop from peaks of approx. 70m CAD to 7.5m CAD. And further dilutions shrink his own stake. Whatâs the catch here? Or is his investment horizon long, in which case the share price could have recovered to previous peaks, for example (he is also quite old, so itâs hard to say about the length of his horizon). Or, for example, stock options or bonuses once things are running at full capacity? In that case, he wouldnât suffer in the same way as private investors. A difficult puzzle.
It wouldnât be the first time that the main owners also go down with the ship.
Now listening to Romania with earbuds on because the volumes are so low that my old ears canât make out anything from the gentlemenâs explanations.
The article below discusses how the new rise of nuclear power has boosted uranium demand, which is expected to grow by a third by 2030 and even double by 2040. Uranium has come into focus as AI and energy needs grow. Reportedly, there is âmomentum in the industry which we have not seen for decadesâ.
The challenge, however, at least currently, is the sufficiency of supply; production from existing mines threatens to halve between 2030 and 2040, so permitting, mining innovations, and new discoveries are essential. The article also mentions that geopolitics increases market sensitivity, as Kazakhstan and Russia control a large part of the production and enrichment capacity.
https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/10/uranium-market-heats-up-on-nuclear-revival-hopes.html