In my opinion, more people are rather wondering why it wasn’t allowed to collapse but was funded one more time.
The point has been more that in recent years it has been said that the furniture business is worthless, and you have strongly disagreed with that. Because even KH’s management was a bit slow in understanding the facts, a lot of shareholder value was destroyed while waiting for better times.
Jysk has now set a new sales record in Finland for two consecutive fiscal years. But then again, it is a much better managed company.
The buyer certainly had their reasons to buy. The seller also had their reasons to sell. Kesko understood more about the business than the buyer.
The normal trend in housing sales will be something completely different from what we were used to just a few years ago. And the competitive landscape and consumption habits have permanently changed for the worse for Indoor a long time ago.
This morning, I went through Sievi Capital’s financial statements from previous years, starting from 2017, and I’m now writing down my main observations from memory. There are certainly rounding errors in the figures, and the information is incomplete in many parts, but this is what stuck in my mind from the financial statements:
-the original investment in Indoor was approximately €21m, of which an estimated 3/4 was a capital loan and the rest was share capital
-in 2018, part of the capital loan was converted into shares when a new CEO and board members became shareholders. At the same time, the ownership stake rose to around 58%
-in 2019, Indoor repaid the rest of the capital loan with interest, and it was probably the following year when Sievi Capital withdrew €11.5m in dividends from Indoor. At the same time, Indoor’s financing was rearranged again (the company’s debt increased significantly)
-by 2021, the value of Indoor’s ownership had risen to almost €50m on Sievi Capital’s balance sheet, even though Sievi Capital had by then withdrawn almost the entire sum it had invested from the company.
-in 2022, a €10m write-down was made on the Indoor ownership, bringing its value on the balance sheet to €40m
-in May 2023, the company changed from an investment company to a multi-business company, and in connection with this change, the then-current balance sheet value was used as the value of the group’s companies.
In conclusion, I would state that KH Group’s Indoor adventure cost ±€10m in total, taking into account the dividends received and the repayments of the original capital loans. My most significant observation was the substantial revaluations made to the value of Indoor’s ownership, which inflated the value of the ownership on Sievi Capital’s income statement and balance sheet.
For example, in 2021, €11.5m in dividends were withdrawn from Indoor, and at the same time, the balance sheet value of the ownership was written up by €8m:
In my opinion, the biggest bubble has been in Indoor’s balance sheet values, and it has now burst. However, these balance sheet values were mainly created in Excel; in my opinion, the company’s business has never been profitable enough to support these revaluations. Money has been withdrawn from Indoor mainly by indebting the company, which is not a very healthy development.
Aki has written about KooHoo again. ![]()
I woke up on Thursday afternoon to the news “KH Group led by Carl Haglund sells Indoor Group” and for a moment I was happy. But before I even noticed, the stock price had fallen. It took my heart with it. And left a piercing pain in my chest.
I delved into the news, and damn it, this time too, the devil was in the details. I was mentally prepared for a divestment from the plywood furniture companies for zero euros. I had arrived at this view after KH Group’s previous CEO assured that Indoor’s bank loans were separate from the parent company.
A new extensive article about Haglund and KH Group in Arvopaperi.
I can provide one direct quote from behind the paywall:
“Indoor has affected the group’s credit rating and thus reflected in the cost and availability of money for the other two companies. The sale was important so that the other two have their financing in order and we can start operating as profitably as possible.”
A few things from the article:
According to Haglund, letting Indoor go bankrupt would have prolonged the umbilical cord between Indoor and KH Group by up to three years and ruined the development opportunities and financing arrangements of KH Koneet and NRG. It was also not realistic to expect that KH Group would have gotten its loan back in Indoor’s current situation anyway.
The interests of the Finnish bank had to be considered in their entirety, and also towards KH Koneet’s principals, this was the right solution so that from their perspective, KH Group maintains its “position” as a reliable partner.
NRG’s value can still be increased, and the management is now given the peace to work to further develop the company.
This article gave a quite positive impression, suggesting that perhaps someone has a plan behind the development of things.
But the previous and earlier CEOs failed in investor communication regarding the financing risk concerning KH Koneet and NRG due to Indoor’s difficulties. At least I remember that it was assured these were under separate financing. But as was speculated earlier, the financiers were indeed in the driver’s seat here.
Based on the article’s interview, it also became clear that Teppo Sakari’s departure had indeed been in the parties’ plans all along. From previous communications, I had gotten the impression that originally it was indeed thought that Sakari would lead the company through its growth to the next phase, and I would have expected it to continue until the company’s full exit.
It seems clear that the financing terms will improve then. This should then be reflected in future
https://www.inderes.fi/files/d6a377ca-e3b6-4cdf-b0cd-ba4d1d232600
New analysis coming. Reduce recommendation continues, and risk factors include Indoor’s cyclicality and Indoor’s balance sheet risks.
Question about the new report @Thomas_Westerholm
You write on page 4:
“So far, we have kept Indoor Group as an asset held for sale in our balance sheet forecasts, where it does not, however, affect cash flow or capital returns. We will update our balance sheet forecasts to reflect the current group structure in connection with the Q4 report.”
On page 2, you consider KH Group’s valuation:
“With our current year forecasts, KH Group’s EV/EBIT multiple is at a very high 20x level, and with our forecasts taking into account a significant improvement in results next year, it is still at a high 15x level.
My question: Are the EV-based figures therefore calculated such that Indoor is still included in them, thereby weakening the EV-based figures?
I think it’s good that Haglund gave this interview and thereby opened up KH Group’s thinking to the media regarding both Indoor’s divestment and the continuation of the “change project”. I also got to meet him this week, and similar themes were discussed there. Next, the focus will be on renewing the financing base of the subsidiaries and their structures (e.g., legal company forms).
I’ve also generally formed a better impression the more I’ve digested Indoor’s divestment and heard the explanations behind it. Someone previously commented that Calle is a stronger communicator than his predecessors, which I think is even more emphasized in person and especially in the other domestic language. Of course, the explanation came a bit surprisingly, as based on previous communication, Indoor’s impact on the availability of financing for other subsidiaries was certainly not emphasized or brought up. Have they perhaps thought that openly sharing this would further weaken their negotiating position in the divestment of Indoor Group?
I also considered KH-Koneet to be Teppo’s company and didn’t imagine his departure so soon. I wasn’t entirely convinced if leading a listed company is what he would return to in the long run. In any case, successfully choosing a successor is now critically important for the investment story. As I understand it, the successor could well take on just the role of Country Manager for Finland, due to the local nature of the business.
Damn, at this point, reminding about Indoor’s balance sheet really borders on fear-mongering.
I corrected it in the report.
Indoor does not affect valuation multiples at all and has not affected them since the company recorded it as an asset held for sale. From KH Group’s balance sheet, it has since been easy to separate the company’s assets and liabilities, and for us, Indoor’s liabilities circulate in the model as if they were a free loan. Thanks to this, the return on invested capital reflects ongoing operations, and Indoor is not complicating the overall picture.
This is just a simplification, because due to Indoor’s significant balance sheet, cash flow and balance sheet forecasts in our model would spin into an absurd position and consequently become highly prone to errors if one tries to separate the company from there. With the financial statement release, we will get the correct figures and the balance sheet will also be in order ![]()
KH-Koneet has won tenders for the delivery of a total of three sweeping vehicles to the City of Helsinki. The total value of the announcements is EUR 1.6 million.
Published 3.12.
Published 21.11.
Does KH-koneet supply sweepers, or is this a Kramer + a sweeping attachment connected to it?
These are probably all Brock-branded sweeping vehicles, which KH Koneet imports. For example, that 18-ton vehicle costing 555,000 EUR is a Scania P 320 B4x2NB CP17L Brock VS7.
Source:
Probably junk (brokkia)…
Generally, the margins are good at the time of sale. But generally, those margins melt away very quickly in the aftermarket. It’s strange that we’ve even been to the moon, but a functional dirty sweeper vehicle doesn’t exist.
So then, shouldn’t the aftermarket be a profitable business?
Unless of course one has to do warranty work
What kind of profit margin is there on an order like this? Only 10% more? The company’s market value is very low…
No idea about the car’s own margin, but those dirty sweeping devices account for the lion’s share of the cost. And they should have a 40% margin. The downside is that the manufacturer pays about 29€/h for warranties, no travel costs or anything, so every job results in a loss when you go there. And there are enough faults in them. And everything is behind the bus systems, so even the least skilled person can’t fix it.
Wacker Neuson, imported by KH-Koneet (Edeco), is likely to change ownership. South Korean Doosan Bobcat is making a takeover bid for Wacker. Here’s one more thing to follow: Will anything change in the principal-agent relationship between KH-Koneet and Wacker after the potential change of ownership? Is this a risk or a potential expansion opportunity for the representation of other Doosan Bobcat brands?
(December 5, 2025, no paywall)
As a lighter note, some good news (and I sincerely hope this is a broader indication for the better
). Namely, in Kramer sales, a one-man sales record was set in November.
“In November 2025, a small piece of history was made in machine sales: a one-person, one-month all-time sales record, by supplier Pekka Gylden.
Also present to present a small memento was the representation from the Kramer-Werke GmbH factory: Stefanie Moog and Christian Stryffeler. From this, it’s a good starting point to break the next records!”



