This is big, maybe a little light is visible. But the statistics are still grim.
Practically anything is immediately available from stock, and factories are still running on a single shift.
Of course, no one goes there to say that nothing is happening and the phone isn’t ringing..
Hey @All_in_aina !
You’ve been predicting weak development for KH-Koneet here for the past few quarters, referencing your industry knowledge and public registration statistics. For at least the past few quarters, KH-Koneet has largely managed to prove these assumptions wrong. Have you delved deeper into what went wrong in your analysis and/or perhaps found other more relevant things to follow regarding KH?
One must always remember in these cases that a large part of the numbers are a numbers game played by the big boys.
I couldn’t find out how much used machine stock there was, how many buyback commitments had been made, and how many machines had been financed, e.g., for C-Rent, with huge leverage… or with a large residual value. Several business IDs enable all sorts of things…
These statistics are paid and Traficom provides them daily.
And this doesn’t just apply to KH-Koneet, but to the entire industry.
But something in the equation doesn’t add up. When I get those statistics model by model… TWO excavators have been registered this year, of course not all of them go on plates, Kramer is however the company’s main product and their numbers have melted significantly…
But time will tell.
Of those, 26 units have been registered as sales stock and the rest for rental without a driver, which is practically a demo machine.
Well, now it’s already over.. the machine is good, no problem with that. But the outcome was known.
KH Koneet Group’s financial statements include all business IDs (Y-tunnus) of the parent company and subsidiaries (7 pcs, on page 26). KH Koneet Group has no minority holdings; all Group subsidiaries are 100% owned. Thus, for example, no suspicious obsolete inventory can be “dumped” hidden within the group through “number games.” The amount of rental equipment financing you referred to (Crent and S-Rental) is shown in the financial statements’ finance lease liabilities.
The Group’s cash flow statement shows healthy good business. Conditions have been difficult, and the Group still generates positive operating cash flow (on page 9 of the financial statements). Inventories have been reduced in a controlled manner (if it had been done at a bargain price, it would show negatively in the operating cash flow). Debt has been repaid even in a challenging year, and even after that, free cash flow was positive.
I don’t know how competitors have fared, but by reading the public financial statements linked here, one gets a stable picture of the quality of KH Koneet Group’s operations.
2024
CASH FLOW BEFORE CHANGE IN WORKING CAPITAL = 7,624,927.68
OPERATING CASH FLOW (A) = 6,459,196.04
INVESTING CASH FLOW (B) = -375,189.52
FINANCING CASH FLOW (C) = -5,495,664.80
CHANGE IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS (A + B + C) = 588,341.72
You should upload the group’s financial statement PDF from above to ChatGPT and ask the American wonder machine? It seems the answers to the above can be found there.
The page “Collaterals and contingent liabilities” can also be found.
Behind a paywall
But it’s reportedly going well
Short quote from the article:
“Lännen LMCE Group’s turnover for the fiscal year ending in June 2023 was 50 million euros. The fiscal year was 17 months long at that time.”
There’s the magic word
Used machines.. I follow them quite a bit online, and yes, there’s a lot of stuff priced completely off.. though I don’t know what price they’re actually in at.
But, that’s the line that makes a catastrophe look like gold. I’m not saying it’s been done here, but it wouldn’t be the first Finnish company to play around with trade-in machines. Do you know why in Finland you can’t get inventory financing from practically any bank? We had one company in Tampere that had 20m€ worth of trade-in machines there.. when the bubble burst, the truth was probably 3m€ and they were all “financing company machines” since they don’t understand anything about machines..
But you can take a 10k€ lump sum in a 50k€ trade-in and write it down over time.
For example, Hankkija once had a compensation model where commission came from the RRP (Recommended Retail Price) of a new machine. Even if you had traded a tractor for a manure spreader and no money had changed hands. That trade-in was written down after 12 months, after which the seller received commission again when selling the product from which the company had incurred significant losses.
Yeah. Best ever… at least when looking at the financial statements and payment methods. It’s probably normal to accumulate payment default records, pay late and…
Yep 
the machine market is challenging 
and that’s really good to be aware of. You’ve done some good ‘digging’ above. Risk factors are high and we haven’t seen those rising quarters yet.
Was the answer to the question, reading a bit between the lines, accounting fraud or some milder misconduct regarding the reported figures?
However, if we were to hypothetically assume that the figures reported by KH were audited and also described the company’s business quite accurately, then in this scenario, could you come up with possible explanations for the strong success in recent years? Otherwise, it might be fair to say that following registration data or machine factory opening hours is not necessarily very fruitful from the perspective of a KH shareholder.
Well. An auditor generally has no understanding of the products. If they are shown that there are 10m€ worth of trade-in machines, they will believe it. It could be 1m€ or 40m€.
KH machines have good products. And a good brand in the field.
But look at the financial statements of any company in the same industry from last year, and maybe you’ll understand the point.
Everything collapsed, absolutely everything (including our company), everything is monitored very closely. So my opinion is that in light of the statistics, “Keijo thinks there’s foul play here.”
It must be said that AI has again taken a nice leap since the last quarter. Quite decent development this winter in the RAG/agent department, as in my opinion, the LLM was able to retrieve and process quite relevant and essential information with a very simple prompt. Of course, there are still easy mistakes included. I eagerly await what kind of analyses we will get from AI in a year’s time for Q1/26. Here you go, an analysis & forecast for Indoor’s Q1/25, made in 2 minutes, by LLM.
| Variable | Pessimistic | Base Scenario | Optimistic | Explanation / Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market volume change | -5 % | -3 % | 0 % | ETU: 2024 -6.6% → bottom softens 2025 Finnish Association of Speciality Retailers ETU ry |
| Indoor’s market share | -1 pp | 0 pp | +1 pp | Asko online store ↑ / Sotka ↓ → net stable |
| Impact of store reduction | -3 % | -3 % | -3 % | Merger of 33 Asko-Sotka pairs Yle.fi |
| ERP stabilization & other efficiency (Δ-margin) | 0 pp | +1.4 pp | +2.6 pp | Decrease in ERP costs after H2/24 KH Group |
| Personnel savings Q1/25 | 0 M€ | 0 M€ | 0 M€ | Savings from 162 redundancies begin 4/25 mtvuutiset.fi |
| Base EBITDA marg. (excluding one-offs) | 8.0 % | 10.7 % | 11.9 % | Derived from Δ-margin |
| Depreciations (M€) | 5.2 | 4.3 | 4.0 | Estonian property and write-downs of entries |
| Calculated revenue (M€) | 34.4 | 35.5 | 37.0 | formula 1 |
| Calculated EBITDA (M€) | 2.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | formula 2 |
| Calculated EBIT (M€) | -2.4 | -0.5 | 0.4 | formula 3 |
And when I asked for clarification regarding the Estonian property transaction:
| Step | What I did | Why it was necessary |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Removed a one-off sales gain of €3.7M from the Q1/24 baseline | – It will not recur in Q1/25 → baseline EBITDA decreased from €5.0M to €1.3M. | So that the comparison basis represents the business’s “true” performance without one-off items. Nasdaq News |
| 2. Reduced depreciation expenses in the Q1/25 forecast (€5.2M → €4.3M) | I assumed that depreciation of the sold Tallinn property (NBV estimate ≈ €7M) would cease from 4/24 onwards → -€0.23M/quarter. | The property has been removed from the balance sheet, so ongoing depreciations are permanently reduced. |
| 3. Did not include income or expenses related to the property transaction in the Q1/25 forecast | The Q1/24 entry was a one-off; cash flow already received → €0 impact on profit or revenue in Q1/25. | The sales gain was recorded and realized in 2024 – IFRS rules prevent it from being “rolled over” to the next year. |
| 4. Accounted for the cessation of Estonian operations in revenue only indirectly | Q1/24 still included two months of Estonian sales (~€1M). In my forecast, revenue drops from €37.8M to €35.5M (-6%) due to market, store, and share drivers. | The shutdown of Estonia is already reflected in the sharp revenue drop in Q1/24; further itemization would have led to overlap with other negative drivers. |
And for KH Koneet, the same prompt quickly. It seems we are not far from a point where our own Excel tracking and analyses will permanently become history…
1. The model independently started with segmentation
| Segment | Share 2024 | Product Type | Currency Exposure | Profitability Profile |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FI new machines | 40 % | Kobelco, Kramer, Wacker Neuson | EUR | ~6 % EBITDA |
| SE new machines | 35 % | Kobelco, Doosan, Ljungby | SEK | ~7 % EBITDA |
| Aftermarket (spare parts + service) | 15 % | Machine base >10,000 units | EUR/SEK | 25–30 % EBITDA |
| Rental & others | 10 % | KH-Rent equipment base 310 machines | EUR | 15 % EBITDA |
2. Key Assumptions
| Driver | Pessimistic | Base Scenario | Optimistic | Justification / Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 FI machine volume |
–6 % | –3 % | 0 % | Building permits still –42% y/y 2024, tender activity low. Statistics Finland |
 SE machine volume |
–4 % | –1 % | +3 % | Movement in Swedish infrastructure projects, KH-Maskin opened Luleå office 11/24. KH Group |
| Aftermarket volume | +1 % | +4 % | +7 % | Spare parts business grew in 2024 despite a difficult market. KH Group |
| Rental equipment base | ±0 % | +2 % | +5 % | Rental rate rises in spring (maintenance season). |
| Price inflation (new machines) | 0 % | +2 % | +2 % | Steel component price –4%, but manufacturers maintain lists; EUR-SEK exchange rate positive. Statistics FinlandEuropean Central Bank |
| Spare part price inflation | +3 % | +3 % | +4 % | Benefit to parts and service revenue. |
| FX effect SEK/EUR | +0.5 % | +0.6 % | +1.0 % | ECB’s Q1/25 SEK average 11.38 vs 11.45 Q1/24. European Central Bank |
| Market share | –0.2 pp | ±0 pp | +0.5 pp | Launch of Bobcat electric excavators in Q1/25 may increase share in optimistic scenario. |
| Inventory reduction / discounts | –1.0 pp to margin | –0.5 pp | 0 pp | Dumping of older models starts in Q1. |
| Fixed costs | +2 % | ±0 % | –1 % | Personnel for Sweden expansion included; no new offices in Q1/25. |
| Depreciation | 3.1 M€ | 3.1 M€ | 3.1 M€ | Demo machine stock is not dismantled. |
| Financing costs | –1.2 M€ | –1.2 M€ | –1.1 M€ | Interest rate still 4 – 4.5%, leasing portfolio constant. KH Group |
| Scenario | Revenue | EBITDA | EBIT | Net Result (before taxes) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pessimistic | 27.7 | 2.3 | –0.8 | –2.0 |
| Base Scenario | 29.2 | 2.7 | –0.4 | –1.6 |
| Optimistic | 31.0 | 3.2 | 0.1 | –1.0 |
4. Why the base scenario is most likely
Overall, the base scenario keeps revenue at Q1/2024 levels and the EBITDA margin at 9%, but high depreciation and financing still push EBIT slightly into negative territory (-€0.4M). This reflects KH-Koneet’s strategy of “growth through a weak cycle, profitability improving from late 2025,” which the group communicated to investors in its annual report. KH Group
Thanks @peruspiensijoittaja for the informative AI-assisted analysis. I would like to ask, what are your estimated prices for the stock in different scenarios? In my opinion, the stock still seems REALLY cheap… Sweden’s growth is not priced in at all?
Here are Thomas’s pre-report comments for Tuesday, i.e., tomorrow’s Q1 report release. 
KH Group will publish its Q1 report on Tuesday at 8:00 AM. Seasonally, Q1 is a quiet quarter for both KH-Koneet and Indoor Group, which is classified as an asset held for sale. We expect this to be emphasized in the report’s figures due to the subdued economic environment. The company is unlikely to be able to provide new information on the Indoor Group sales process at this stage. Thus, the most interesting aspect of the report, in our view, relates to comments on subsidiary-specific demand drivers. We expect KH Group to reiterate its guidance for the current year.
KH Group konserni Tammi–maaliskuu 2025 IFRS
- Liikevaihto oli 41,8 (40,4) milj. euroa. HTJ ja Indoor on luokiteltu takautuvasti lopetetuiksi toiminnoiksi.
- Vertailukelpoinen liikevoitto oli 0,2 (-0,1) milj. euroa.
- Liikevoitto oli -0,1 (-0,5) milj. euroa.
- Tilikauden tulos jatkuvista toiminnoista oli -0,4 (-1,7) milj. euroa.
- Tulos / osake (laimentamaton ja laimennettu) jatkuvista toiminnoista oli -0,01 (-0,03) euroa.
- Oma pääoma / osake katsauskauden lopussa oli 0,85 (1,30) euroa.
- Oman pääoman tuotto liukuvalta 12 kuukaudelta oli -43,4 % (-19,2 %).
- Konsernin rahavarat katsauskauden lopussa olivat 4,5 milj. euroa.
- Nettovelkaantumisaste katsauskauden lopussa oli 291,3 % (225,3 %).
- Nettovelkaantumisaste ilman vuokrasopimusvelkoja oli 187,9 % (141,6 %)
Looks decent to me, and there’s light at the end of the tunnel. Kh-machines perform admirably even in a weaker economic climate.
Nrg gets a boost from clarified funding for welfare regions and a strengthened order book, and Indoor’s 6-7M salary cost savings (2025) will start to show clearly from Q2 onwards.
Analyst estimates were met quite well
A seasonally weak quarter. Once Indoor’s savings kick in, it will already strongly reflect in the results. In addition, Kh seems to consistently outperform the market.. If construction were to gradually recover, we could achieve even more encouraging results.
Indoor’s result is indeed quite terrible. It might be time to take the whole thing behind the sauna after the summer, if lenders become greedy and a buyer cannot be found at a reasonable price. At this rate, savings may not be enough and sufficient to turn the ship around without new capital, and KH Group should no longer throw good money after it when other owners do not seem to be participating in the company’s financing.
Otherwise, it looks quite good; NRG maintained quite reasonable profitability, and the filling of order books is positive news. Also, KH Koneet’s growth is quite good, although one would have hoped to see it more positively on the bottom line.
Indoor is struggling, but I believe that in the coming quarters, Indoor will break even, and KH and NRG will bring optimism to investors👍
KH’s employee count has grown, which certainly has some impact on the result, and they have sold heavy equipment with weaker margins.
It’s hard to say how much fixed costs increased with the opening of the Luleå office and the launch of Pronar Fixed recycling equipment. But something is being done right when market share is gained.
Clearly, KH is now investing in future growth, even if profitability suffers a bit. In my opinion, it’s sensible. Leverage can be gained if construction starts to recover.