Huge congratulations to you and your wife on your child, Divinesia.
Portfolio fluctuations are quite minor compared to things like that ![]()
Intrumâs situation has changed my stance; Iâm keeping my distance for now and monitoring the situation without holding any shares. SEB (SP) warned about this in their summer reportâthat the debt trajectory wouldnât be smoothâand looking at it from the debt side, this was ultimately quite clear.
The companyâs chances of survival are improving and the debt path is changing, but the upside for current shareholders is melting away. I also agree with Divinesia that talk about a path to dividends should be considered nonsense; they should prioritize solving their debt interest rather than promising dividends.
The pricing of the rights issue is currently a total gamble (casino), essentially betting on red or black. But if we look at Intrumâs situation after the rights issue (after all, the banks promised to buy any excess shares
).
Letâs wait and see what the following will be:
- Terms of the rights issue
- Final dilution
- Debt trajectory
- Valuation of the ânewâ Intrum
We were certainly reflecting here together that quite a lot of debt remained after the restructuring, and that clearing it with cash flow will require quite a miracle. In the restructuring, it was the lawyers who made the money. The creditors and Intrum fared a bit worse. Thatâs probably why Rubio had to go.
With the share issue, itâs possible to properly get their heads above water, but at the same time, they need to deliver results. Otherwise, itâs just throwing good money after bad. Iâll be watching from the sidelines and will get back to this once itâs clear what happens to the company.
Edit: congrats on the kid!
I have to agree with @Arvuuttaja and @Odetus. (Thank you very much for the wishes @Bamford!).
Now that Iâve been wondering about this for a day and Q1 showed a setback in terms of earnings development after all the familiar explanations, admittedly that 2027-2028 timeline was coming up too fast.
And knowing how this business works, itâs unlikely that the announced 5 billion can even be fully applied to debt repayment after all expenses. With this move, 2027 is handled well, but 2028 would still be a major problem. I wonder if credit rating agencies would actually raise Intrumâs rating much higher than junk status anyway.
Admittedly, I was hoping for Perkier Q4 and now Q1 reports than what we saw, and the new leadership duo doesnât exactly exude inspiration. In this bad scenario, is there a risk of having to dig into oneâs pockets again in the same way next spring.
Iâve seen back-of-the-envelope estimates that to âdefendâ a position in the rights issue, one might well need 44 SEK / share, but these are just speculations for now. On the other hand, would one be able to sell their subscription rights? How much could one get for them?
Iâm strongly weighing up divesting 2/3 of my position and staying with cash and a 1/3 position to see what happens. A bit like a protective measure and preparation for the rights issue (without the loan option). Well, I still need to chew on this.
In any case, here is the schedule for the rights issue from the presentation:
Rubio did a good job in getting the debt restructuring completed.
Now this capitalization is much cheaper.
Isnât this quite clear when you calculate the total amount of the rights issue divided by the current number of shares? That is the amount of additional money each current holder of one share must put in to keep their ownership percentage the same.
Of course, we donât know yet what the subscription price and dilution will ultimately be, but that part is quite clear and nothing else matters if you participate in the offering. If you do not participate, the subscription price is of great significance (and naturally, so are the terms of any directed issue).
Masih Yazdi CFO
âWhat happens, right away when the capital is being raised and we get it in, is that we can park it in the RCF, where we have an RCF of SEK 11 billion, and we can reduce that by SEK 7 billion from day one. Which means that, the current interest rate on that is about 6%. Right away from day one, we start saving, SEK 7 billion times 6%. Depending when and how we address different bonds, that cost will be reduced further as we keep generating more cash flow. As the debt has been reduced, weâre paying less, as on interest, therefore the cash flow improves. With that, we can start to either buy back bonds, refinance at cheaper levels, or address the RCF.â
Iâm attaching this regarding the debt structure issue, as it mentions the use of this 2028 RCF. It is more like a facility from which Intrum can draw new loans up to a limit of 11 billion; so if they immediately use the full 7.5 billion SEK here on day one, the RCF (should also) roll forward (payment 2030?), interest expenses will decrease (400m SEK), and then they will pay off these âdangerousâ Eurobonds as the maturity dates approach.
One might really have to crunch the numbers if planning to participate in the rights issue and defend their position. Still, the cash injection is a significant boost for Intrum, and the engine isnât deadâjust strangled by interest costs.
Hopefully, this fundraising will be the âlastâ one needed.
I already predicted back in 2025 that Intrum would need a rights issue in early 2026. For some reason, this idea did not garner any support or discussion here, even though it was quite clearly one of the new managementâs primary objectives.
Next, I want to point out that Intrum will still have approximately 40 billion in debt remaining after this rights issue (versus a market cap of 3.6 billion). Every crown you put into the issue is directed solely toward debt repayment. This money cannot be used to develop the business in any significant way; instead, business development will be negative or at best neutral as headcount is reduced and costs are cut.
This rights issue could be described purely as a transfer of shareholder wealth to creditors. The debt amount only decreases by about 12% in relative terms, so interest rates will continue to have a strong impact on the bottom line.
I emphasize that after the issue, every owner faces a significant risk of dilution just regarding the remaining debts. The next debts mature as early as 2028, so there is a risk that they will come back to shareholdersâ pockets to raise money again, as there is no access to the debt markets.
This is a case of legal robbery.
Iâve got a few monthsâ worth of net salary tied up in Intrum, and the position is deep in the red. This has required a lot of patience and will continue to do so; Iâm sticking with the rights issue like a hemorrhoid.
âThe debts for next year should be renegotiated during H1 and on even better terms, instead of the current 7.75% coupon.â Quoting myself after the previous audiocast.
Well, they werenât renegotiated, as the priority turned out to be planning the offering. I somehow imagined that the new CFO wouldnât make such a bold statement unless they were very sure about it.
Why has Intrum failed to reduce its net debt over the last four quarters?
2025 Q2: 46.450 billion
2025 Q3: 45.20 billion
2025 Q4: 45.459 billion
2026 Q1: 45.357 billion
Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting.
This gives an idea of the share volume Intrum is heading towards; this may not necessarily materialize exactly like this, but these are the upper limits.
Phase 1 Directed Issue:
The company proposes increasing the limit to a maximum of approximately 544 million shares.
Phase 2 Rights Issue:
After this, the limit could be raised up to approximately 2.176 billion shares.
Thanks for this, very useful!
With my weak high school Swedish, I understood it so that the max 544 million would include both the directed issue and the rights issue? And the subsequent increase of the upper limit to 2,176 million could be an adjustment of the Articles of Association to the post-issue reality⊠and possibly the next share issue ![]()
This would mean that one current share would grant 3 subscription rights (if they go to the maximum amount).
Is it possible to estimate the issue price from this then? 7.5 BSEK of new capital divided by ~408 million new shares = ~18.4 SEK per share.
Be that as it may, a massive dilution is ahead. It might be that my own finances canât handle subscribing to new shares, as I already have so much of my savings tied up in this⊠and significantly in the redâŠ
My understanding is failing me right now (please, hold the sarcasm), and Iâve never participated in a rights issue before. Would someone mind explaining this process in simple terms? Specifically, how much new money should/could one inject in the rights issue so that the relative value of the holdings is preserved? For example, if one owns 4,000 shares and the estimate mentioned above holds trueâthat the price would be 18.4 SEK per share. I would greatly appreciate it, and you can also reach me via private message.
You need to invest the same amount of money regardless of the share price to maintain the same ownership percentage.
If we calculate based on the current share count of 136 million and assume a subscription price of 18.4 kr:
New shares in the rights issue: 6,000,000,000 / 18.4 = 326,086,956.522
Proportional share with 4,000 shares and the current total share count: 4,000 / 136,000,000 = 0.0000294
The same share of the new rights issue: 326,086,956.522 * 0.0000294 = 9,586.957, meaning new capital to be invested is 18.4 * 9,586.957 = 176,400 kr.
However, due to the directed issue, ownership will still be diluted even if one subscribes in full.
I would like to ask the âhive mindâ about this part of Johanâs write-up regarding Servicing in the report:
"New sales increased by more than 30 percent year on year, however conversion of new business into income needs to improve. Addressing this is a key operational priority.
Actions underway include reducing client onboarding times, improving pipeline quality, unlocking growth with existing clients and selectively pursuing new business opportunities. Client satisfaction remains high, reflecting continued confidence in Intrumâs compliance, reliability and fair treatment of customers, which gives us confidence in returning to growth."
If sales rose by 30% in the quarter, how is it that they arenât already showing up on some linesâsome kind of advance sales? Is this bullshit? One would think this trend would be visible once this pipeline starts showing up somewhere, if one believes the text to be true.
It is likely that implementing the service simply takes time for one reason or another. For example, in debt collection, switching service providers isnât necessarily something that happens with a snap of the fingers; it involves various technical and customer service adjustments.
A few thoughts:
- The number of new shares is not yet known, although the convening of shareholders suggests the amount will rise significantly in the rights issue. In practice, existing shares will be heavily diluted â the share price will likely continue to drop from here.
- The most âamusingâ part is Nordic Capitalâs participation: first dumping shares (to retail investors), then dilution, and then putting the same money back inâŠ
- The CEOâs credibility is limited; if the companyâs previous plan had worked, recapitalization wouldnât have been necessary. A rights issue is, however, the worst option for current shareholders.
- Even after the recapitalization, the balance sheet remains quite weak; equity will still be smaller than the 32 BSEK goodwill (see graph).
- The recapitalization will get the company back on its feet, but the bigger question mark is the industry outlook: in the aftermath of the Euro crisis, especially in Mediterranean countries, banks had a lot of debt to be collected on their balance sheets⊠lending was tightened then, whereas today credit losses (and collectibles) are quite minimal. How much portfolio (debt) Intrum can acquire in the future and at what price is probably the bigger questionâŠ
- As for the share price, it will likely drift lower until the dilution is clarified. After the recapitalization, the stock might rally; a âkitchen sinkâ quarter will probably be done before the recapitalization, with the first quarter being cleaned up again⊠below is a graph of Orstedâs price development after its recapitalization (~ 9 BUSD recapitalization was announced in August 2025, the stock bottomed about a month later on the day the number of new shares was announced (Sept 15). Likely the same ahead for Intrum?)
This certainly leaves a bitter taste; my condolences to long retail investors. Perhaps a small long opportunity lies ahead on the day the number of new shares is announced (Orsted, albeit driven by the energy markets, is ~ 60% up from the bottom. Orstedâs market cap was about 2x the recapitalization when the price bottomed, making it a relatively good comparison for Intrum, despite being a different industry). Intrum probably wonât make for a good long-term hold due to the industry outlook.
I doubt that share issue is any kind of final corrective measure. There is still a massive amount of debt. Intrum will gain significant new owners through the directed issue. It will be interesting to see what the next act in this play will be.
There will be plenty of debt remaining even after this; itâs currently at 45 billion if cash reserves are taken into account. After the rights issue, weâll be at around 40 billion. If the portfolio sale to Brocc goes through, itâll be at 38 billion (I assume this rights issue was some kind of requirement from the banks for the sale to be approved).
And of course, the portfolio sale will drop revenues again, although the price premium was apparently around 30%, which is great for evaluating current goodwill. On the other hand, the 1.5 billion injection from the rights issue increases investment portfolio income, but even that might not be enough to turn investing income back to an upward trend by 2027.
Even after the rights issue, we are by no means out of the woods yet. And unless the direction changes, there might already be a new rights issue as early as next summer, even if it werenât âmandatory.â Rights for that are partially being granted at the AGM, as management will likely be given permission to dilute the new share count by another 4x.
Currently, the number of shares is 136 million. A good guess is that with the rights issue, the number will rise to 544 million. And the wording regarding the potential share count will likely rise to as much as 2,176 million. Since managementâs word on how âorganic growth is sufficientâ cannot be trusted, one should proceed with caution.
Crisis pricing will likely continue until results in Servicing actually improve. And Intrum itself guides that this year will be just âflatâ regarding 2025. In any case, the result on the Investing side will still decline slightly next year, even after the 1.5 billion injection.
With a good run, we might survive 2028, but it feels like they absolutely must get back into the financial markets before that. Whether the rights issue is enough for that yet, at least this year, I wouldnât bet on it.
This announcement was good for the bonds; at least the direction is upward. But can Intrumâs credit rating return to non-junk level even after this rights issue? I assume they still need more proof. The bottom lines presumably need to head in the other direction first (?).
Iâm sounding the alarm here, but Iâm still participating in the rights issue. The companyâs valuation is so low that IF the earnings power improves, the potential is substantial, even though risk still remains. And Intrum isnât making a loss, so itâs still hard to compare the case to a Viaplay-style wipeout.
Maybe I just need to completely destroy my own investment portfolio.








