I have to admit that based on our coverage, the expectations for Framery are certainly on the higher end, but then again, few companies can match their historical track record of value creation.
Of course, the “aggressiveness” of assumptions always depends on the benchmark. Relative to the company’s own track record? In our 2025–2035 forecasts, revenue grows by a total of 70%, whereas by comparison, it grew by 37% last year and averaged 21% between 2018–2025. In euro terms, the €154M growth in our forecasts is less than the €217M the company achieved during the previous decade. Granted, the category was in a hyper-growth phase then, and no one knows how many statistical outlier events helped the company’s success along the way.
Compared to the category’s projected growth figures of 12–15% reaching until 2030, my forecasts actually predict a loss of market share, although in the report, I expressed my own skepticism towards such strong market growth. Forecasting, especially further into the future, is very challenging, so time will tell.
They do say something about the forecasts, but also about the business model.
I agree with you regarding Harvia’s quality, and while quality correlates with return on capital, you cannot put an equals sign between them. In some businesses, a high return on capital is a characteristic of the business model. Rush Factory, which I previously followed, is probably a great example of this from its golden years.
Framery’s and Harvia’s business models differ in that Harvia carries out heavy production itself, whereas Framery only assembles its products and outsources the production of modules. Consequently, the company’s business model ties up less capital, which supports the return on capital. For context, Harvia’s Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) adjusted for goodwill was 41-43% in 2024–2025, while Framery’s corresponding figure was 93-131%. Does this indicate higher quality than Harvia? No, but it does signal that Framery’s business model is more capital-light.