I read the thread from start to finish while getting to know the company more closely, and there are good observations here on both sides. eQ is at a clear turning point, and the range of possible outcomes for earnings in the coming years seems quite wide, so the risk profile has clearly increased. I have burned my fingers a few times in similar situations, but I am still intrigued by the company’s incredibly high profitability and historical track record of strategic choices and their execution. History is, of course, no guarantee of the future, so one shouldn’t rely too much on that. In any case, it was nice to hear the perspectives of long-term eQ followers on a few things I haven’t managed to clarify for myself.
To what extent are eQ’s open-ended real estate funds products for institutional versus private investors? Is it possible to estimate whether redemptions are purely related to private investors or are institutions also withdrawing their investments? If these funds are also favored by institutions, what distinguishes eQ’s social infrastructure real estate from Titanium’s Care fund in the eyes of institutions? As I understand it, Care (Hoiva) is a pure private investor fund (please correct me if I’m wrong).
With redemptions stuck and their total amount unclear, it is also relevant to ask: to whom would these assets primarily be sold? In a normal situation, probably to other funds (?), but currently, the majority of real estate funds are in “selling mode.” What about pension insurance companies? Global real estate investors?
All of this makes new sales for real estate funds difficult, even when the situation normalizes. Sauli has mentioned several times (and Larma mentioned it in the Q2/2025 interview) that eQ’s funds have sold their properties quite well, or at least tried to be active compared to other similar funds. I wonder if eQ’s funds can gain any kind of advantage from this when capital starts flowing back into domestic real estate funds, or will investors feel that all funds failed equally badly.
I also follow the realization of Private Equity (PE) fund performance fees with interest. Good points have been raised in this thread about the fact that “the air” may not have been let out of the valuations yet, and private equity funds are also in a waiting mode regarding realizations. Significant performance disappointments would naturally not be good, and in the worst-case scenario, both of these growth engines could sputter at the same time.
I have also been pondering the sensibility of the fund-of-funds concept from an institutional investor’s perspective. In a FoF concept, there is one additional layer of management fees to be paid, and visibility into the assets owned by the fund presumably weakens compared to a situation where a manager invests in assets directly. What is the benefit of that structure then? Diversification is likely a significant advantage, i.e., when eQ invests in several funds, the risk associated with an individual manager decreases. It is often said that the differences between a good and a bad manager are huge, so fund-of-funds likely have, on average, better opportunities to get into the best funds than an individual institution due to their ability to pool larger amounts of capital. What does the Finnish institutional field think about this? Many probably invest in both structures (e.g., eQ and CapMan), but it would be interesting if someone could shed light on the nuances related to this.
After all this, it seems essential to question whether eQ’s quality status has permanently weakened in the eyes of fund investors, or if last year’s SFR survey result was merely a temporary hiccup.
As a final point, I also wonder why eQ owns a Corporate Finance business. Does it support asset management in some way? If it doesn’t, why own a cyclical business whose impact on the Group’s figures is very minor?
There are many question marks in the air, and the range of possible scenarios is significant. However, I am considering investing because the company has historically been able to choose the right strategy and provide top-tier products. There are also growth opportunities in the logical expansion of both the customer base and the product offering. It is unlikely that the company will completely wither and die; rather, it’s a question of the baseline from which growth will eventually start and whether now is a good or bad buying opportunity relative to that. Next week’s strategy release is therefore extremely interesting, and its impact and credibility will significantly guide my own investment decision.