Except for the guidance. Inderes expects 15% growth and the company itself guides for 5-10% growth.
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Cautious guidance. The reasons are royalties and uncertainty over the duration of validations.
GastroPanel has very good chances to succeed and multiply its sales manifold. New countries are running pilots and global interest is increasing.. Potential FDA approval as a bonus
Personally, I remain very positive about Biohit’s potential to succeed and be included in treatment guidelines..
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Siltanen interviewed Biohit’s CEO Jussi Hahtela. 
Topics:
00:00 Introduction
00:08 Biohit’s year 2025
00:40 Agreement made with Hefei
01:14 Royalty income
02:19 Geographical distribution / Europe
04:14 Closure of the Italian subsidiary
05:03 Screening in Chile
06:01 Quick tests grew
06:46 Strong result
07:16 Negative cash flow
10:23 GastroPanel sales
12:23 FDA application
14:46 Guidance
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Here is a new company report on Biohit from Siltanen regarding Q4.
Biohit’s revenue was in line with our forecast and the result exceeded it. However, the growth was mainly driven by license income from China, which according to the company will cease in the future. The company was also more cautious regarding the guidance for the current year. We are updating our forecasts moderately downwards and revising our target price to 3.5 euros (prev. 3.7). The risk-reward ratio is still on the positive side, so we reiterate our accumulate recommendation.
Quoted from the report:
Cash flow statement suggests reasonable upside
The DCF model gives the current value of future cash flows per share as 3.5 euros and thus suggests an upside exceeding the required rate of return. We assume a terminal growth rate of 2.5%, based on the growth prospects for the healthcare needs of the aging population. In the terminal period, we assume an EBIT margin of 17%, guided by companies in the mature phase of the industry and Biohit’s high gross margin. We have used 10% as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The WACC is increased by the risk of forecasts being realized, the company’s small size, and concentrated ownership. On the other hand, the strong balance sheet, good performance, and the defensive nature of the industry have a downward effect..
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Has Biohit estimated what kind of sums are involved now that GastroPanel is in full use in Chile?
I apologize for the really long message. This is somehow very hard for me to summarize briefly, because otherwise the justifications always remain completely insufficient. I tried hard, but this turned into a long explanation.
Or is this starting to resemble the TEM1V pattern (VMBO) after all?
I’ve been quietly mulling over this case in the back of my mind since @Antti_Siltanen’s Thursday (Feb 12, 2026) analysis:
In this company (too) (for the first time for me), questions are now starting to arise.
Especially a few small dark clouds in an otherwise clear sky are worrying.
Antti and Inderes have indeed been warning about the dangers of concentrated ownership for years in this otherwise promising case. But now…
In this latest (once again good) analysis by Antti Siltanen, I paid attention to a couple of things.
- The ending of Chinese license income (which played a big role in the good revenue in line with Inderes’ expectations and the earnings exceeding expectations) at some point. This upcoming cessation of license income was mentioned quite a few times in the report.
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”Biohit’s revenue grew by 20% in H2 thanks to Chinese license income, but this income will end in the future, which affects growth.”
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”The company’s guidance for the current year is more cautious, with a revenue growth target of 5–10%, due to … and the ending of Chinese license income.”
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”Operating profit in H2 was EUR 1.7 million, exceeding forecasts, but profitability is expected to weaken as license income ends.”
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”Growth was, however, mainly driven by Chinese license income, which according to the company will end in the future.”
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”According to the company, license income will end in the future, so the tailwind will likely remain one-off.”
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”The moderate guidance was due to … and on the other hand, the Chinese license income ending in the future.”
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”The company did not specify more precisely whether any license income will be received in 2026 at all.”
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”In the future, profitability is unlikely to remain at the same level due to ending license income and changes in the sales mix.”
Ok. Apparently, license income in China is ending at some point =).
Is this as bad a thing as the report (might) lead the reader to believe?
If the license income came through Hefei, Osmo (and/or the insiders) has strongly appeared to be buying out its stake for himself. If Hefei is this income-generating party, all China sales income would then at some point click directly into the company’s account without intermediaries. That would be quite a great thing… right?
It would therefore be really interesting to know:
Who was paying this license income now and why is it expected to end ”at some point”? The company or Antti did not comment on this information, given as a statement of fact, in any way.
- Despite the (in my opinion) really promising, in fact fantastic, steps forward made last year (UK, South Korea, India, Chile), the company is now significantly lowering its guidance.
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”Guidance for revenue growth for the current year was 5–10%, i.e., quite clearly below the company’s strategic target (15–20%) and more cautious than before.”
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”Despite the strong result, guidance fell clearly short of our expectations.”
This theme of lowering expectations is repeated several times also in the recaps of the license income ending above.
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There’s also starting to be some slight friction or rubbing with receivables.
(This was precisely one of the most significant things that, over time, made TEM1V look worse and less interesting as an investment and, along with vague financial structures and ambiguities in management’s actions, helped collapse the company’s share price to be vulnerable to a takeover attempt.)
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”The deviation relative to the result is still explained by rapidly grown receivables from China, in which EUR 4.3 million was tied up during the year…”
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”We estimate that there are real risks related to receivables…”
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”According to management, these items will likely continue to grow in 2026….”
Fortunately, to buy the company off the stock exchange, more than 90% of BOTH the voting power AND ALSO the shares are required.
However, that joint voting power of Osmo and Hefei (perhaps moving entirely towards Osmo or the inner circle) is so crushing that it can be used to change the articles of association however they want. And surely such weight enables many other kinds of creative arranging and dabbling.
This is a really interesting case. I’m in with a fairly large position, I’ll admit that. I reduced it for a while but bought back this week when the price dropped, in my opinion, unjustifiably low.
I still believe in the company’s products and the huge potential of its international openings - credible approvals with an insane geographical and cultural spread are really strong stuff.
The company itself is now starting to raise questions. I still emphasize that Inderes has warned us about this. Albeit without opening up what those bad scenarios of overly concentrated ownership ultimately are.
If there were a takeover bid for the company now with a good premium (and maybe even a raised offer on top of that), I would take the money and start to keep my distance from such Finnish small-caps. No matter how great the promises or outlooks.
If this one also goes the same way as a few others in our small fringe market, I will quietly wind down all my investments in similar ones. The shame here, of course, is that this is exactly what the party doing the LBO or MBO wants me to do. At a bargain price, of course.
We’re starting to have a bit too many of these now (TEM1V, BRETEC, FARON…).
(Though with the difference that I’ve considered Faron a suspicious investment for a long time - the gross misinterpretation of Traumakine results and the distortion of research results in another study revealed by their own employee in district court last summer. I still have a few hundred euros in it as insurance against disappointment. No further purchases, though.)
(Of course, for the sake of the narrative arc, it would be a poignant thing if Faron were actually on the verge of a major breakthrough now, and after management / insiders had trashed its price, it would now allow some player (alongside themselves) to sink their claws deep into the company via a directed issue.)
Yeah. I see BIOBV’s potential as huge. I really hope my speculation is in vain and that the company management is not intentionally trying to make the output of this (soon-to-be) golden-egg-laying goose look like droppings.
I will continue to follow this company’s communications quite closely in the future.
And I promise at the same time to try to avoid excessive tin-foil-hatting. I’ll let the company itself prove its case of great potential.
Or then my conspiracy theory - which I hope is badly flawed and woven too early =).
Edit(s): a couple of small typos
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And it’s no longer just minor friction in receivables. Since Biohit’s impressive turnaround, they have generated a cumulative net profit of just under €8 million on paper during the 2022-2025 financial years.
Cash flow tells a slightly different story. I quickly calculated that the cumulative free cash flow for the same period is only about €300k 
In this analysis, I calculated free cash flow by subtracting investments and payments of lease liabilities (from the financing cash flow section) from the operating cash flow.
Meanwhile, on the balance sheet side, accounts receivable are €3.6 million and contract assets are €7.5 million, totaling a staggering €11.1 million And the message was clear: at least contract-based receivables are still rising; for other trade receivables, there was apparently some timing issue.
In principle, there is a rational explanation for all of this—there are the pledged shares and so on—but this is starting to get a bit “acidic” (tough to swallow), especially as one also has to tolerate ownership risk, and there is no external visibility into the China situation or the interaction between the two main owners.
The impression from the Inderes report was that Antti has also started to worry a notch more about the receivables and cash flow.
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This seems to be a case of the so-called Urpilainen 
“first of all, I would like to remind you of the royalty income from China”
Hefei has been paying them. The new contract structure clearly no longer includes licensing income from a certain point onwards. There will surely be an impact already this year based on the guidance. It would have been nice to hear something a bit more concrete about it, but I assume that we will reach a low level already this year. Perhaps limiting Chinese income to product sales in the future will also limit the growth of receivables… It would, of course, be better if receivables started to clearly decline.
Good that you broke down those figures for the coming years 
Regarding the concern: the issue itself has remained the same, i.e., trade receivables + contract-based items have grown since H1’24, and since then (hopefully) they have been flagged in every report and interview. As the scale grows, the importance of the matter has naturally increased further, and the growth of receivables has proven to be faster and longer-lasting than I previously thought.
I think it is important that potential risks are clearly flagged. On a general level, it would be a massive mistake for the analysis if a major risk were to materialize and it hadn’t been brought up in the reports/interviews. Of course, the intention isn’t to paint devils on the wall, but rather to bring key issues to light.
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It has not provided an estimate. Sales in North and South America have been 0.1–0.2 MEUR per half-year in recent years. Based on the interview, they have more or less reached full speed in Chile already, so some conclusions regarding the scale can probably be drawn from the H1’26 report based on how much it rises above that baseline.
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At least in my opinion, the analysis (including management interviews) has highlighted this very well, which is why these receivables/cash flow have been monitored closely from the start If a risk materializes in this regard, no one can at least blame Inderes for ignoring the risk 
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Phew, wow, and oh my goodness.
Huge and most humble thanks to both @JP199 and @Antti_Siltanen !!
I admit I was completely in the dark that the situation regarding those receivables is this bad.
This is starting to remind me of the TEM1V case one-to-one (1:1).
As I have written, I believe in the product and its value-add for customers like a rock. I no longer believe so much in the company itself, or especially its leading insiders.
I am still strongly of the opinion that Biohit’s (BIOBV) international openings and approvals last year (UK, South Korea, India, Chile) especially build huge potential that is materializing right now.
This is mentally tough. I felt forced to reduce my holding by 40%. Ha, just after I had loaded back up to the max last Friday =).
There are (for me personally) too high risks here that the share price level will be driven down even lower before what I believe is a completely possible VMBO (buyout) offer is made. If I were even half sure that the offer I predicted with my tinfoil hat on could come, for example, at the current level or even after the price rose a bit from here, I would probably stay sitting on my hands and my whole position.
Now, however, it’s slowly starting to seem like 80s-style Wall Street is being cautiously tested in our small-town stock exchange.
It feels like there are already a few of these cases ongoing or starting. I wonder if some pantyhose-selling consultancy firm has found a “completely new and original” angle to advise their clients (and themselves at the same time) on how to make some faster BIG money?
Yep, I’m clicking BIOBV off my active price monitoring and will stop grinding out conspiracy theories (in this thread) at the same time.
Godspeed to everyone with this, great success!
Kiitos.
Edit(s).
- The word BIG added.
- Apology removed. I do stand by these thoughts, however. The thanks at the end still stands.
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This really good clarification by @JP199 to my own previous ramblings kept playing on my mind disturbingly.
I have hyped up the company’s great openings (UK, India, South Korea, Chile) and their immense potential here. In my opinion, this “ketchup bottle effect” is still real. However, I now have one tiny reservation about it, at least at the current share price.
According to Inderes, the company is delivering strong results.
“Biohit’s operating profit (EBIT) in H2 was EUR 1.7 million, which grew strongly from the comparison period and exceeded our forecast (EUR 1.3 million). The operating margin was an excellent 21% in H2 and 19% for the full year.”
Except that the money isn’t landing in the company’s account.
“Operational cash flow for the full year remained EUR 0.7 million negative (H2: +0.2 MEUR).”
Quotes here: Biohit H2'25: Vahva tulos – kasvunäkymät aiempaa maltillisemmat - Inderes
According to the Stockanalysis.com website, FCF was 0.2M in H2/2025 and solidly in the red at -1.5M in the first half of the year. So, the free cash flow for 2025 was -1.3 million.
The thing that hit me hardest today is the following:
The company had cash (Cash & Equivalents) of 3.5M on Dec 31, 2025. The amount of cash has remained pretty much the same compared to H2/2024 (3.8M) and H1/2025 (3.9M). A slight decrease, which I’m not worried about.
But.
Short Term Investments have collapsed to zero during that time.
- H2/2024 3M H1/2025 1.3M and H2/2025 0
So the entire cash-equivalent position (Cash & Short Term Investments) has nearly halved (-47.8%) since H2/2024
- H2/2024 6.7M H1/2025 5.2M H2/2025 3.5M
The company only has actual cash left. Antti also noted that:
So we have a company that makes a strong, growing profit on paper.
At the same time, it has burned through its cash-equivalent assets without (at least yet) having to touch the hard cash itself.
Now only that 3.5M in cash remains. How far will it last when even the analyst warns that no money is currently coming into the company, and that those large (and exceptional) licensing revenues from China were practically it?
How big of an operation do you believe can be launched in the UK, India, South Korea, and Chile with 3.5 million?
My guess (which I hope with all my heart proves to be wrong) is that more money will still be needed. Possibly quite soon.
How large a (directed) share issue or, at worst, even a convertible bond (VVK) arrangement would you expect?
At what stage?
And at what price?
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Warning: this post is pure speculation and irresponsible doom-mongering. I don’t actually have any idea what the most likely outcome will be. It could go well or very badly
I can’t say anything more specific regarding the need for cash or possible share issues, but I personally consider the Hefei and China business operations to be the greatest risk. There are €7.5 million in receivables from Hefei, against which there is a pledge of 1.5 million B-shares (value approx. €4.5 million).
The matter is further complicated by the fact that Hefei is Biohit’s second-largest owner (over 20% of shares and votes) and, additionally, China is Biohit’s most important market (Asia accounted for nearly half of the revenue in 2025), the distribution of which is handled by Hefei.
One can then wonder what happens if Hefei, for one reason or another, gets into financial difficulties and is at risk of total collapse. Or what if Hefei is nationalized in the name of China’s public health The receivables would go unpaid, the pledge could be liquidated, but at what price if the distributor for the most important market collapses? In that case, would Hefei also sell the rest of its holdings at a fire-sale price to the other major owner?
Quite many other things could also go wrong related to this. The problem and risk simply culminate in the fact that, from the outside, a private investor has no way of assessing the probabilities of these options.
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Peer-reviewed study confirms the value of the GastroPanel® test in reducing endoscopy queues
A new peer-reviewed publication in the prestigious Helicobacter journal (2026) confirms the clinical utility of the GastroPanel® test as a non-invasive triage tool for gastric cancer risk stratification.
GastroPanel® combines a biomarker-based test with risk algorithms, enabling safe prioritization of patients for endoscopy and reducing unnecessary procedures. In a practical implementation in Chile (Molina), the method led to an 87% reduction in endoscopy queues and ensured rapid access to endoscopy for high- and medium-risk patients.
“This is a very significant milestone for Biohit and healthcare systems worldwide,” says Jussi Hahtela, CEO of Biohit Oyj. “We now have peer-reviewed evidence that endoscopy queues can be reduced by up to 87% without compromising patient safety. The scarcity of healthcare resources is a global challenge, and GastroPanel® offers a practical, evidence-based solution for more efficient resource allocation and improving early detection of gastric cancer.”
The results strengthen the position of the GastroPanel® test as a scalable and evidence-based solution for promoting early detection of gastric cancer and for more efficient allocation of healthcare resources worldwide.
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Here are Antti’s comments on Biohit’s latest good news
Biohit announced on Tuesday a new peer-reviewed study, the results of which supported the company’s value proposition regarding the benefit of the GastroPanel test in gastric cancer risk stratification and shortening treatment queues. The research results provide the company with important scientific evidence to support sales and marketing, which is crucial particularly in new market areas and public healthcare projects. The study is based on a project conducted in Chile, which has already led to the implementation of GastroPanel as part of a national cancer prevention strategy.
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The notice of the Annual General Meeting seeks authorization for the Board to issue a fairly large number of shares. I wonder if there is already something in the works, or what this might be about? There haven’t been authorizations like that in previous years.
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And then the final, most important question:
At what price?
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