The starting point for dividend models is the idea that a paid dividend is an approximation of distributable free cash flow, cf. e.g. Rauli’s comment: “If Anora distributed its entire 2025 net profit/free cash flow as dividends (approx. EUR 20 million), the dividend yield would be approx. 10%, which exceeds our approx. 8% required rate of return” and his assumption of an approx. 60% payout ratio. Purely based on the -25 dividend, a growth assumption of approx. 1.5%, using Rauli’s equity return requirement of 8.3%, would seem to justify a price of 0.22/(0.083-0.015)=3.24 eur. If Anora were to distribute its entire profit as dividends, as the model assumes, the price could be, for example, between 0.3/0.083=3.6 eur (no investment in growth, so dividend does not grow) and 0.3/(0.083-0.015)=4.4 eur (replacement investments corresponding to depreciation, however, ensure keeping pace with GDP). The examples I presented earlier are roughly in line: “Rauli’s -26 ROE forecast of 6.4% divided by his cost of equity of 8.3% multiplied by the equity per share (OPO) of 6.14 eur yields approx. 4.7 eur. For the year -25, however, this estimate remains at approx. 3.7 eur.” All these calculations are, however, simplifications and based on many assumptions, e.g., that the book value correctly reflects the company’s assets.
Nice to see some good buzz in a quiet thread
. I agree with many things, but I’ll write down my own thoughts.
One big factor at Anora right now is the change in management. In October, it was announced that a new CEO (TJ) was being sought. I don’t believe Anora’s strategy will be greatly changed. Anora has a couple of large owners, and I assume the CEO (TJ) will be chosen to implement the strategy, not the other way around. A new CEO (TJ) is always a threat and an opportunity. Anora has a lot of cost base, and it’s easy to see that after lean years, someone who “streamlines” will be chosen to steer the ship, but the business’s greatest value lies in its brands and high-margin products, so a brand-growth-hype person who wants acquisitions and marketing might become the CEO.
Anora’s business is established, and it’s easy to think that the return expectation in the long run will largely consist of dividends. However:
https://anora.com/fi/sijoittajat/anora-sijoituskohteena
"Significant change in scale promotes productivity
We have a strong production and logistics footprint across the Nordics. Our industrial operations and supply chain are based on an integrated business model, which brings us economies of scale and improves capacity utilization. This leads to higher productivity, a smaller carbon footprint, and more responsible operations.
Growth opportunities in the Nordics and beyond
We have a strong drive for growth. Our industry is very stable and profitable, and our investments are small. This results in strong cash flow and a low debt-to-equity ratio. Our strong financial position and increased borrowing capacity give us good opportunities for growth both in the Nordics and beyond. Acquisitions play an important role in Anora’s growth strategy."
Investors like to play with SOTP (Sum-of-the-parts) calculations, and especially industrial buyers/private equity investors can realistically calculate that by buying company X and breaking it into parts, they would get Y amount of return. I don’t believe anyone is considering buying Anora, but rather the opposite. I would assume that Anora’s board and top management are repeatedly considering whether there are parts whose sale would be sensible or whether there are targets whose acquisition would be sensible.
Investors often look at companies quite hectically, but from a few years’ perspective, there has been
A merger into a larger scale about four years ago
https://anora.com/fi/sijoittajat/yhdistyminen
Three years ago, wines were bought for a large sum
https://anora.com/fi/anora-ostaa-globus-winen-tanskan-johtavan-viiniyhtion-vahvistaen-asemaansa-johtavana-pohjoismaisena-viinien-ja-vakevien-alkoholijuomien-talona-220620221030
Two years ago, cognacs were sold
https://anora.com/fi/sisapiiritieto-anora-myy-larsenin-konjakkiliiketoimintansa-international-beveragelle-060920231520
It must be remembered that most acquisitions fail!! ![]()
But Anora’s market value is “only” 220 MEUR. It doesn’t seem realistic to expect anyone to buy Anora or for the company to be broken up, but I would assume the value obtained from breaking it up would be more than Anora’s current price. But certainly, money could also be made for owners through other acquisitions; by divesting “something”, through mergers, or suitable acquisitions.
The markets for Anora’s individual operations are stable, but the market situation is constantly evolving.
When looking at Anora’s share pricing, it’s perfectly appropriate to reflect on analyst assumptions. Inderes is a good place to find data, and the latest forecasts are the best and most up-to-date, so for example, @YoungKaptah’s calculations are a good starting point in themselves.
BUT…
Analysts’ forecasts change over time. Inderes’ latest comprehensive report is a year and a month old. 13 months ago, Inderes suggested BUYING Anora with a target price of 5.5 euros.
The cash flow model stated that Anora’s enterprise value was 847 MEUR.
Anora’s consensus forecast has been updated after the earnings report. The update is so close to the earnings report that I would guess not all forecasts have been updated in this table. I must say I am very surprised that the forecasts are very close to each other:

If the forecasts were to materialize, Anora would pay ~0.26 € in dividends annually (now less and slightly increasing) reflecting the current share price of 3.26 €. This would give owners an 8% dividend yield, which is the historical stock market return over time.
Anora also seems to be trying to grow. Anora Lithuania was established at the end of 2024:
New CEO from within the company, with 10 years of experience and prior familiarity with alcoholic beverages
Anora Group Plc Inside Information 4.3.2025 at 7:20 p.m.
Inside Information: Kirsi Puntila appointed as Anora’s new CEO
The Board of Directors of Anora Group Plc has this evening appointed M.Sc. (Econ.) Kirsi Puntila (b. 1970) as the CEO of Anora Group Plc, effective immediately.
Kirsi Puntila has served Anora and its predecessor company since 2014. Her most recent position has been Senior Vice President, Spirits. Earlier in her career, Kirsi served as Director of Altia’s Spirits Category department and Marketing Director for Altia Brands, during which time she worked in Stockholm. Prior to this, she held several international positions with Pernod Ricard companies, most recently as International Marketing Director (Absolut portfolio and Kahlua) in Stockholm and London.
Here are also Rauli Juva’s comments on the new CEO. ![]()
I have to put this story here, as the company will probably get free marketing through this - it’s about a tragicomedy, which could also partly describe the antics of Altia and the current Anora ![]()
The Swedish krona has surprisingly started to strengthen against the euro. How does the forum’s panel see this? Will it bring a tailwind to Anora, and how quickly?
It should not immediately be visible in the company’s results due to the currency hedges put in place. Probably in the latter half of the year, bigger changes might be seen when old currency hedges are renewed with changed exchange rates.
Monthly data providers Alko and Norway’s Vinmonopolet have released their February figures. For the first two months, the Norwegian market has decreased by about 5% in wines and spirits, and the Finnish market by over 10%. In Finland, the allowance of 8% beverages in grocery stores since last June continues to be visible for wines, which compensates for Alko’s decline (and the decline in spirits also steepened with that legislative change as Alko’s customer numbers decreased). February had one day less than last year (a leap year), which slightly weighs down the figures. March also faces “calendar headwinds” as Easter was at the end of March last year, meaning seasonal sales fell in March, whereas this year it will be in April.
Regarding Q1, it can already be said that for at least these two markets, the decline continues, which is weaker than Anora’s expected stable volume development for the full year 2025. Easter will, of course, then support Q2 accordingly, and last year’s comparative figures are weaker in late summer and autumn, so there is no need to adjust the full-year outlook yet due to the weakness at the beginning of the year.
Anora has released new types of Koskenkorva long drink beverages. These are probably worth focusing on if sales in Alko stores decline.
Koskenkorva Long Drink
The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (KKV) today published a press release and a substantial slide deck regarding the liberalization of wine sales. From Anora’s perspective, a slightly more optimistic interpretation has been reached there than what I’ve had, although their view doesn’t sound very strong (see below)

The KKV also shares Alko’s previously stated view that if wine sales are liberalized, the sale of strong alcoholic beverages should also be planned differently, as Alko’s current store network/operations would not be sustainable.
A government inquiry on the matter is therefore underway, from which results are expected to be heard at some point this year.
Anora’s Annual Report


So, the combined tax-free sales at all Nordic airports + tax-free sales in ship traffic + German sales operations + all other exports outside the Nordics/Baltics for all Anora brands from Koskenkorva to Blossa is less than 35 MEUR annually? ![]()
Of course, it’s easier to sell here where operations are located and brands are more well-known, but one would think there’s SOME room for growth there ![]()

Fortunately, volume development ≠ revenue development, but a somewhat weak future outlook
@Sijoittaja-alokas kindly retrieved this table of peer valuations from X, which can also be shared here.
Anora held a pre-silent call today, where they reiterated the continuous negative volume trend in Q1 that I mentioned earlier, and the negative Easter effect. At the same time, it was noted that Q1 is the smallest quarter (in recent years, less than 10 MEUR EBITDA, while the full year has been just under 70 MEUR).
Regarding the USA, the company stated, perhaps more as a curiosity, that it has approximately 1 MEUR in annual exports to the US. A bigger risk lies in the fact that one of its largest own wine brands, Falling Feather, is US wine, meaning that if potential counter-tariffs hit, this presents a risk for Anora, which one might not immediately associate with US tariffs. And of course, it also has principal brands produced in the USA, but any potential (counter)tariffs on them would probably just be passed on to sales prices in monopoly chains.
A new report from @Rauli_Juva: the target price was slightly raised and the “add” side was maintained, I was going to say something about timing, but I’ll leave it unsaid
: Anora laaja raportti: Kassavirta tukena, kasvun luominen haasteena - Inderes
And it is indeed a comprehensive report, meaning it’s readable by everyone.
This has been on the calendar for at least a week for today, so any connections to market movements are coincidental.
The course fluctuation naturally influences the recommendation, as I’ve been quite on the fence between add/reduce lately.
Regarding the company itself, perhaps in this broader context, it’s worth noting that, as I understand it, under the leadership of the CEO who started a month ago, the strategy and goals are being re-evaluated to some extent. Anora published them at the end of 2022, and practically since then, things have gone poorly. So, some kind of new beginning is needed, and perhaps more realistic (lower) goals than those painted for 2030. I have also tried to comment on these in the report. Forecasts and outlook are indeed unchanged at this stage, even though Q1 has been weak, as I have written above.
Well-done report, thanks Rauli, and a special mention for the discussion related to working capital. Let’s state once again, however, that operating with negative working capital is a good thing, so of course accounts receivable must be sold if the price is good. In your DCF calculation, the share value of 3.6 EUR is now burdened by the value of sold receivables of 2.4 EUR. I still cautiously ask what you are preparing for here? A decline in the creditworthiness of monopolies? Regarding inventory, I again smell something fishy in Anora, meaning the company (perhaps also?) at the demand of monopolies is now hoarding far too many marginal products. So, surely something can be done regarding the inventory; the scale is another question. This is also indicated by the company’s own mention of focusing on key products. Regarding valuation, a bit of primitive reasoning: if Anora were just a perpetual bond without growth, Rauli’s 2026 eps divided by the required rate of return on equity gives a share value of 0.39 EUR/8.4% = 4.6 EUR. On the other hand, Rauli’s 2026 ROE divided by the required rate of return on equity multiplied by shareholders’ equity gives a share value of 6.4%/8.4%*6.14 EUR = 4.7 EUR. At the average price of these, 4.65 EUR, the 2026 dividend yield, if Rauli’s forecast is correct, would still be 5.4% even at this price. So the share does not seem expensive to me, but others besides Rauli should also note the Disclaimer regarding the above, namely that I own shares in the company.
This has indeed been discussed before, and I don’t have much new to add. But the company also sees some connection between the amount of debt on the balance sheet and the amount of sold receivables. I am actually preparing for the possibility that the amount of sold receivables could also change in the other direction (i.e., decrease and the debt on the balance sheet would increase), and it seems logical to me that the company’s (share capital) value would not decrease in that case. One can reasonably disagree with this, and by using market-value-based valuation methods, this problem can, of course, be avoided.
The company’s pricing is indeed attractive, but if the company can’t even succeed in a closed monopoly market, then what happens when monopolies are dismantled and competition increases?
A closed monopoly market is not necessarily optimal for profitability, as the producer’s pricing power is quite limited. Of course, in the short term, liberalizing the Finnish market would pose challenges for Anora here, but in the long term, it could revitalize the company’s operations, which could be described as typical for monopoly sectors. I haven’t seen Anora strive to streamline its operations at any point after listing.
The Arcus merger and especially the acquisition of Globus Wine have been quite a failure for Anora. I believe the company needs significant efficiency improvements, and future acquisitions should be made with extreme caution.
Of course, over the past three years, exchange rates and the rise in raw material prices caused by the war in Ukraine have partly contributed to the weak profitability, but Anora’s management has not been active enough in improving profitability. Rauli, how do you see the room for efficiency improvements and the resulting profitability enhancement in the company after the Altia+Arcus merger and the acquisition of Globus Wine?
It should be noted that Anora is the second largest holding in my portfolio because I believe the company has the potential to return to being a highly profitable and good dividend-paying company once things are sorted out. Currently, from the outside, it appears that the company has not succeeded in integrating the operations of the former Altia, Arcus, and Globus Wine as desired.